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ABSTRACT 
 
Through socio-historical and market analysis and through the lens of ethical theory, this 
research argues that past thinking about vulnerable audiences is insufficiently grounded in 
evidence, unsubtle in its understanding of markets, and unselfconscious about its own 
paternalism. As a result, such thinking can actually disempower the very audiences it sets out to 
protect. This project is not simply a commentary on branding or on an historical incident; it is an 
important reflection of race relations in the United States and a theoretically important 
exploration of the power dynamics of defining vulnerability and of the roles and responsibilities 
of marketers, advertisers, endorsers, the media and consumers. This research proposes dialogic 
ethics as the framework through which to understand and define vulnerability in the consumer 
realm. 
Advertising frequently is criticized for creating and perpetuating negative stereotypes of 
vulnerable populations. Scholars have criticized the media and, in particular, advertising for 
reflecting and perpetuating racism in portrayals of minorities, with much popular and scholarly 
criticism of advertising and race into the 1980s based on the fact that there were few to no 
positive representations of African Americans in mainstream advertising. In 1984, Nike signed 
rookie Michael Jordan and, in 1986, Nike’s advertising agency hired Spike Lee to direct 
commercials starring the athlete-turned-hero. The Spike/Mike campaign became emblematic of a 
breakthrough in race relations. However, the cultural “success” of the Michael Jordan, Spike Lee 
and Nike relationship and its influence on the brand was played out on the streets across 
America. The late-1980s and early-1990s mass media was full of reports about youth—
specifically black, urban youth—killing each other for Nike’s Air Jordans. Social discourse on 
the increasingly mainstream images of African-Americans, initially pleased with the depictions 
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of a positive, successful and empowered black man in advertising, exploded with charges of 
exploitation and manipulation. The debate was framed by the premise of urban African-
Americans as vulnerable to advertising in a unique way. The circumstances of the “sneaker 
killings”, which coincided with a time of change and re-formation in the advertising industry and 
its relation to the African American community, offer not only a rich context in and of itself but 
unsettles current perceptions of consumer vulnerability and are a hub from which to explore 
broader concerns about this concept—including issues of social, corporate and consumer 
responsibility, meaning exchange and control, power and discourse and empowerment. This 
long-running campaign and the discourse surrounding it are powerful expressions of American 
race relations and an opportunity to address how definitions of vulnerability can affect the 
marketplace and the populations deemed vulnerable.  
This research explores the development of the Nike brand through its association with 
Michael Jordan and addresses to what extent this association came at a time when the black 
community was looking for and developing new expressions of their social experiences and 
position within American society, particularly as it was lived on the streets of urban America, 
and the ways in which that experience was represented to Main Street America. I argue that the 
Nike example provides a different perspective on the history of race dynamics and advertising 
than previously has been presented in scholarly inquiry. This case is a rich illustration of the 
complexities of and consumer engagement with the Nike brand; and because of the various, but 
similarly partial, interpretations in media and academic journals of the use of the Nike brand by 
black, urban communities, it provides a strong foundation upon which to question scholarly 
approaches to vulnerability and responsibility in consumption environments. Thus, the intention 
of this work is to interrogate the construction of vulnerability and issues of power and 
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responsibility in the consumer realm, and to affect change in discourses of and approaches to 
consumer vulnerability by re-conceptualizing an approach that both recognizes the structures of 
power through which consumers must navigate and acknowledges the interpretive domain of 
human nature.  
I propose a dialogic ethics as a framework for understanding vulnerability and responsibility 
in consumer environments. Paulo Freire, in particular, helps us to understand that our humanity 
is bound in dialogue. Dialogue requires co-participation. The naming of groups as vulnerable 
through sweeping generalizations neglects to empower the oppressed by giving them voice in the 
encounter. When definitions of vulnerability are instituted in cultural and social structures of 
meaning without appropriate respect for and discourse with those so-named, then we risk 
instituting a culture of silence from the oppressed or “vulnerable.” This dehumanizes the 
oppressed and diffuses the structures of accountability that come with liberation. Instead, we 
must engage in true dialogue that accepts multiple voices, presents message that enable critical 
consciousness and empowers the participants, acknowledges the historical circumstances of our 
language in discourse, and promotes our humanness, which we find in relation to others.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
One complaint about much social criticism directed at advertising is that it is not grounded in 
“real-world” questions and does not offer promising solutions. To address this concern, I am 
interrogating circumstances in which discourses of vulnerability have had an effect on actual 
practices directed at “vulnerable consumers.” Through socio-historical and market analysis and 
through the lens of ethical theory, I am arguing that past thinking about vulnerable audiences is 
insufficiently grounded in evidence, unsubtle in its understanding of markets, and 
unselfconscious about its own paternalism. As a result, such thinking can actually disempower 
the very audiences it sets out to protect. This project is not simply a commentary on branding or 
on an historical incident; it is an important reflection of race relations in the United States and a 
theoretically important exploration of the power dynamics of defining vulnerability and of the 
roles and responsibilities of marketers, advertisers, endorsers, the media and consumers. 
In 1984, Nike signed rookie Michael Jordan and, in 1986, Nike’s advertising agency hired 
Spike Lee to direct commercials starring the athlete-turned-hero. Wildly popular and pronounced 
a success in the annals of corporate histories, the Spike/Mike campaign became emblematic of a 
breakthrough in race relations, changing the course of Nike’s advertising and symbolism and, 
indeed, altering the landscape of advertising itself. This long-running campaign and the discourse 
surrounding it are powerful expressions of American race relations and an opportunity to address 
how definitions of vulnerability can affect the marketplace and the populations deemed 
vulnerable. Until 1984,1 the company had been primarily a running company founded and 
managed by white male running enthusiasts, and the company’s advertising focused 
predominantly on a target market that reflected the company’s management. The Spike/Mike 
campaign offered a complex contrast not only to the previous advertising, but also to the white 
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Nike executives behind the brand. According to Phil Knight, Nike’s collaboration with Michael 
Jordan re-invented Nike and “conspired so profoundly to mark the general culture that… Nike 
had altered the look and sound and feel and even the abiding fantasies of everyday life.”2 Not 
only did this collaboration influence fantasies, but also the cultural symbols of myth and 
meaning that are exhibits of lived experience, having a profound effect on American and global 
culture. 
But there is a significant difference between the popular perceptions of Nike’s power and 
strength and their actual health as a company. Contrary to what much of the public discourse 
suggested, signing a rookie Michael Jordan was an incredible gamble for this struggling 
company, whose marketing plan thrived on instinct and risk. And while Nike’s collaboration 
with Jordan breathed new life into the company, it did not solve all of Nike’s health problems. 
Nonetheless, the cultural “success” of the Michael Jordan, Spike Lee and Nike relationship and 
its influence on the brand was played out on the streets across America. The late-1980s and 
early-1990s mass media was full of reports about youth—specifically black, urban youth—
killing each other for Nike’s Air Jordans. Social discourse on the increasingly mainstream 
images of African-Americans, initially pleased with the depictions of a positive, successful and 
empowered black man in advertising, exploded with charges of exploitation and manipulation3 
and then with similarly myopic criticisms of the critics.4 The debate was framed by the premise 
of urban African-Americans as vulnerable to advertising in a unique way. 
This research explores the development of the Nike brand through its association with 
Michael Jordan and addresses to what extent this association came at a time when the black 
community was looking for and developing new expressions of their social experiences and 
position within American society, particularly as it was lived on the streets of urban America, 
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and the ways in which that experience was represented to Main Street America. I argue that the 
Nike example provides a different perspective on the history of race dynamics and advertising 
than previously has been presented in scholarly inquiry. This case is a rich illustration of the 
complexities of and consumer engagement with the Nike brand; and because of the various, but 
similarly partial, interpretations in media and academic journals of the use of the Nike brand by 
black, urban communities, it provides a strong foundation upon which to question scholarly 
approaches to vulnerability and responsibility in consumption environments. Thus, the intention 
of this work is to interrogate the construction of vulnerability and issues of power and 
responsibility in the consumer realm, and to affect change in discourses of and approaches to 
consumer vulnerability by re-conceptualizing an approach that both recognizes the structures of 
power through which consumers must navigate and acknowledges the interpretive domain of 
human nature.  
 
Methodological Approach 
This research is interdisciplinary, integrating theory from a range of traditions but focusing 
on a historical analysis of Nike and Michael Jordan and, subsequently, with African-American 
communities. The use of historical methodology in consumer research offers “important 
opportunities for investigating many dynamic and volatile consumer phenomenon.”5 Historical 
research is not simply descriptive, but rather is an important interpretive and explanatory 
approach grounded in “real-world” questions that generate critical theory in a domain where 
complex forces drive human events. This means acknowledging consumption as a historically-
shaped, sociocultural practice within a dynamic marketplace and acknowledging sophisticated 
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and often rebellious ways in which consumers engage with systems of meaning within the 
marketplace. 
Under this framework, the ways in which black inner-city “marginalized” consumers used 
the Nike brand and the equity built into it by the Spike/Mike advertising offers an interesting 
venue for exploring symbolic performances of class and racial subjectivity and group/other 
interactions. This analysis is grounded in the historical context of the Spike/Mike campaign, 
which includes the antagonistic relationship between African-Americans and advertising through 
the 20th century, and approaches it as a “vehicle for understanding the structures of reality within 
a culture.”6 Thus, this research considers advertising as a creative and commercial expression 
and as a cultural text.  
I spent six weeks in Washington, D.C. at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of 
American History, which houses the Nike Advertising Oral History and Documentation 
Collection, 1976-1992. This collection contains over thirty boxes of materials broken down into 
seven series that include thirty-one oral history interviews, Nike, Inc. documents, clip reports, 
advertising and marketing materials, and commercial reels. I went through every page of every 
available file and listened to all oral histories, transcribing research-relevant content, and viewed 
all video material. Additionally, I have gathered materials from a variety of outside sources, 
including print and online publications or advertising material, media reports not included in the 
Nike Archives, and interviews and histories presented by authors not introduced in the Archives. 
I also had the opportunity to meet with and interview Erin Patton, who as Director of Product & 
Marketing was the architect behind Nike’s JORDAN brand division launched in 1997, and who 
is author of Under the Influence: Tracing the Hip-Hop Generation’s Impact on Brands, Sports & 
Pop Culture (2009). While Mr. Patton’s arrival at Nike postdates much of the timeframe 
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developed in this research, he was confronted with many of the same issues presented in this 
research in his role as the Jordan brand manager and he was interviewed on Nightline in 1997 
alongside Michael Jordan regarding issues relating to the “sneaker killings” and the marketing of 
Nike shoes. 
There are four main components to this research. First, I examine the literature on 
vulnerability in consumer environments and, in particular, to persuasion attempts such as 
advertising. To fully understand this literature, I review the dominant critiques of advertising and 
their implicit views of consumers as either passive recipients of manipulative messages or active 
participants in systems of meaning. Due to the heavy weight that definitions of vulnerability 
place on demographic characteristics such as race, this necessarily brings me to the second 
component—a discussion of the history of African-Americans as consumers and as expressed 
through advertising. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the history of the African American experience in 
consumer environments and as expressed in advertising. Chapter 2 begins with early slave 
advertisements, the conventions of which are reflected in advertising depictions of African 
Americans well into the 20th century, and proceeds through the Civil Rights Movement of the 
1950s and 1960s. Chapter 3 explores the post-Civil Rights era of African American consumers 
leading into the 1980s—an era in which a convergence of factors provided a ripe environment 
for a young African American basketball player to transition from a sports and advertising figure 
into a hero. Chapters 2 and 3 include the social and economic role of African-Americans and the 
results of multiple challenges by black communities and activists to the dominant systems of 
consumption and representation. Additionally, issues of social responsibility are incorporated 
into this history and are an important aspect of the theoretical framework of my research.  
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Third, I turn to the history of Nike and the development of their relationship with Michael 
Jordan and Spike Lee, with particular attention to the so-called “sneaker killings” of the late 
1980s and early 1990s and the media focus on this phenomenon. Chapter 4 chronicles the history 
of Nike from its inception as a running company with an executive structure and a symbol 
system dominated by white male runners through the seminal years of the mid-1980s when their 
collaboration with Michael Jordan profoundly changed Nike’s symbolic value. This 
collaboration was implicated in the violence in America’s urban core. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
discourses of vulnerability evident in media reports and debates around the violence associated 
with athletic wear and the factors that placed Nike, Michael Jordan and Spike Lee within this 
system of consumption and violence. I consider what it was about that moment in history, that 
brand, and the black community in particular that made such an impact on popular conscience, 
and to what extent it came at a time when the black community was looking for ways of re-
conceptualizing their social and economic roles, as well as their ability to develop meaning 
within these systems. In addition, I look critically at the roles and responsibilities of Nike, their 
advertising agency Wieden & Kennedy, as well as the celebrity spokesmen and directors who 
participated in Nike’s brand communications.  
This leads into the fourth component of this work. Chapter 6 examines the structures of 
meaning within consumption environments and provides an ethical framework through which to 
understand and approach the complex relationships of consumers and brands that takes into 
account personal, ethical, social and corporate responsibilities. This requires a re-interrogation of 
the role of the audience and of the advertiser in creating meaning and of responsibility for 
symbolic and lived experiences through the brand. Finally, I introduce an ethical framework 
  
7 
through which to understand and approach the complex relationships of consumers and brands 
that takes into account personal, ethical, social and corporate responsibilities. 
 
Advertising and Meaning 
Marketing and advertising practices have been censured for an array of social, economic, 
ecological, political, and ethical reasons. Advertising theory in particular was long embroiled in 
debates over advertising’s role in society, with a great deal of scholarly attention devoted to the 
question.7 Critics of advertising claim that it is manipulative, intrusive, and superficial while 
others argue that it is informational, that it supports economic and information systems, and that 
it delivers meaning to consumers. A series of core claims are particularly pertinent for the current 
research. These criticisms include the notion that advertising promotes materialism and creates 
desires that are not in the public’s best interest;8 that it creates and perpetuates stereotypes, 
particularly of minorities; and that it inappropriately targets “vulnerable” consumers. A variety 
of influential authors have argued, to varying degrees, that the media in general and marketing 
and advertising in particular frame modern life by controlling social discourse and exerting 
power over the consuming public.9 But others instead have suggested that consumption practices 
carry cultural meaning that includes consumers as an inseparable component in the process of 
meaning making.10 Firat and Venkatesh (1995) suggest, “we do not study the consumer as 
someone seeking to satisfy an end (needs), but as someone seeking to produce (construct) 
symbols.”11 In this view, production occurs not only in public or work spaces but in consumption 
as well, and consumers produce meaning not in a moment but as an ongoing process imbedded 
in systems of objects and existing in “a world of contradictions of his/her own making.”12 
Further, consumption has been tied to the self and identity,13 to social meaning and the value 
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derived from it14 and to forms of social cohesion15 and meaning exchange.16 Advertising has been 
reconceptualized as “a vehicle of social communication” and as an institution working within an 
“ideological web” in which “advertising is at once defined by and defining culture.”17 It is “more 
than merely a system of creating meaning, it is a system of discerning or discovering meaning.”18 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in these arguments are varying views of the consumer’s role in 
the communication process—that is, the ways in which consumers are defined, as active 
participants or passive recipients, are an indivisible part of the debate. These frameworks have 
vital implications for the way in which “vulnerable” consumers are defined and treated. 
Therefore, the current research examines this process of defining consumer vulnerability.  
 
Constructing Vulnerability 
The power to define what groups are vulnerable is the power to define meaning and position 
within a society19 and is the capacity either to uplift or denigrate these groups.20 Because of legal 
and conceptual precedents of vulnerability in the marketplace, advertising images of and targeted 
toward “vulnerable” groups have been feared in contemporary critiques as major moral threats.21 
While sometimes acknowledging the complex interactions of consumers and advertising, such 
critiques tend to emphasize and extend assumptions of group weaknesses.22  
Yet, a satisfactory understanding of vulnerability in consumer realms has remained elusive 
and, in large part, has been based on demographic and socioeconomic variables. Vulnerable 
consumers have been defined as elderly,23 children,24 women,25 minorities,26 poor27 and urban, a 
term generally used to mean poor, urban minorities.28 This practice has continued, despite the 
fact that there is no empirical evidence to support sweeping characterizations of vulnerability by 
gender, age, and minority status.29 Additionally, the vulnerability of these groups is frequently 
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merged with promotion and targeting of “sin” products and services30 or deceitful promotional 
practices.31 With few exceptions,32 elderly, young, female, poor and minority are the defining 
characteristics of vulnerability and are the focus of concerns over persuasive attempts by and 
targeting practices of marketers and advertisers. 
Drawing from David Caplovitz’s The Poor Pay More (1963), Alan Andreasen (1975, 1976) 
was instrumental in bringing issues of the urban (minority) poor to the attention of consumer 
researchers and arguing that marketing and advertising have an important role in improving their 
situation.33 In doing so, Andreasen explores the argument frequently lodged against the 
disadvantaged and particularly the poor that they act irrationally and, in doing so, are implicit in 
their own disadvantage. He notes,  
“Americans tend to view the disadvantaged as disreputable, as behaving 
irresponsibly, as having too many babies, not looking for work aggressively 
enough, ‘living in sin,’ drinking excessively, and thus contributing to (if not 
causing) their own socioeconomic downfall… It points to the fact that many of 
the poor are heavily in debt, that many claim to be undernourished yet own color 
television sets or fancy cars, or that people who can’t get jobs wear $40 shoes.”34  
In his seminal work, The Disadvantaged Consumer (1975), Andreasen lays out a framework 
for addressing disadvantage along a variety of dimensions, including demographic 
characteristics, marketplace characteristics such as access and price, and the exploitative 
behavior of marketers. Further, he suggests a connection between disadvantage and vulnerability 
such that the powerlessness of disadvantage makes consumers more susceptible to vulnerability 
in the marketplace. Vulnerability is relational in nature35 and some of the most common debates 
about consumer vulnerability stem from the relationship of vulnerability and disadvantage.36 
Subsequent research has focused on the demographic makeup of the disadvantaged37 and the 
implications for consumer vulnerability. The cumulative result of this attention to the 
demographic and socioeconomic variables that potentially interact with vulnerability has been 
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twofold: it has resulted in conflation of disadvantage and vulnerability and in definitions of 
vulnerability that rely on demographics. As one article points out, “heretofore consumer 
vulnerability has been equated to who experiences vulnerability, with the implication that some 
categories of people, because of their membership in a defined class, are always vulnerable.”38 
Further, the emphasis on demographics has led to a critique of scholarship on disadvantaged and 
vulnerable consumers as deterministic and reductionist, neglecting a wide range of complex 
social and cultural forces39 that influence not only the production and reinforcement of 
disadvantage, but also influence how these groups are defined in popular and scholarly 
discourse.   
Additionally, research on gender, class, and consumption has responded to these critiques by 
addressing the experiences of inequality and the constraints that create conflict.40 This theme is 
evident in the literature that addresses price discrimination in urban communities.41 Evocative of 
Andreasen’s argument of the 1970s that poor consumers do in fact make rational decisions as 
best they can “given their disadvantage”42 more recent research has demonstrated that our 
understanding of the consumption practices of urban poor has been too presumptuous about what 
such consumers cannot understand,43 has not adequately accounted for the structures of 
disadvantage under which consumption decisions are made, and has not been sophisticated 
enough to accommodate the savvy ways in which they negotiate their limitations within a 
broader consumer realm.44 
Furthermore, there is evidence that popular and scholarly understanding of who constitutes 
this group of poor disadvantaged consumers and how they behave has been misguided. Research 
has demonstrated that the American public dramatically overestimates the proportion of black 
Americans among the ranks of the poor and this miscalculation may be due to the dominant 
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public images of poverty as black and urban.45 The fact that these characteristics are frequently 
linked with crime and depravity46 both further encourages discriminatory practices in the 
marketplace and enhances fears about the consumption practices of these communities. As 
Austin (1994) argues, “Blacks are condemned and negatively stereotyped for engaging in 
activities that white people undertake without a second thought. Among the most significant of 
these activities is buying and selling of goods and services.”47 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
targeting practices aimed at blacks have become a central debate in public discourse and 
scholarly works alike—a debate that is heightened further by concerns over targeting of 
potentially harmful products and ostensible “sin” products to minority consumers. 
The targeting of inner-city black communities with messages that encourage drinking, 
smoking, and gambling, for example, has fueled negative practices towards these consumers and 
debates about how and with what messages economically deprived communities should be 
included in the consumer world.48 These arguments pivot on controversies over targeting 
minorities due to their perceived vulnerability, but also recognize that historically minorities 
have been under-targeted.49 On one side of the debate minorities are perceived as uniquely 
vulnerable to targeting practices; on the other side targeting of these groups represents some 
movement toward inclusion.50 As one author points out, “There is nothing inherently wrong with 
target marketing,” but when vulnerability and potentially harmful products are factored together, 
“the concept of target marketing takes on an almost sinister connotation.”51  
Sautter and Oretskin (1997) address Senate hearings in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the 
practices of alcohol and tobacco companies in targeting minorities. They propose that the 
hearings were swayed by the argument that minorities “are more vulnerable and/or manipulable 
than other groups in society”52 and that advertisers of these products can exert control over their 
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consumption by creating needs through advertising that would not otherwise exist. The case of 
Heileman’s Powermaster malt liquor beverage is one particularly prominent source of these 
debates and is the subject of various advertising industry reports53 and scholarly articles.54 
Powermaster, an “up-strength malt liquor,” was introduced in 1991 and was mainly targeted to 
the inner-city, whose population had demonstrated a preference for malt liquor drinks.55 
Criticism of this drink and the company’s marketing tactics came from a variety of government, 
media, religious and community sources, including minority groups. The Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) reacted to these concerns by requiring Heileman to remove the 
word “power” from the name based on the premise that Powermaster was a direct reference to 
the product’s alcohol content. But the moral concerns raised in this case demonstrate the kind of 
attention given to target marketing of alcohol, tobacco and other potentially harmful or “sin” 
products. For example, Brenkert (1998) writes, 
“Heileman was said to lack concern for the harm likely to be caused by its 
product. Blacks suffer disproportionately from cirrhosis of the liver and other 
liver diseases brought on by alcohol. In addition, alcohol-related social problems 
such as violence and crime are also prominent in the inner-city… Heileman was 
accused of taking unfair advantage of those in the inner-city whom they had 
targeted. Inner-city blacks were said to be especially vulnerable, due to their life 
circumstances, to advertisements and promotions formulated in terms of power, 
self-assertion and sexual success.”56 
Brenkert points out that while outcry came both from within and outside of the inner-city, 
there were no reports of objections raised by those actually targeted. He concluded that the 
criticisms of Heileman lacked merit insofar as the product was being marketed with the same 
strategies as similar products that experienced no public condemnation. Rather, Brenkert calls for 
an assessment of social or “collective responsibility” of associated groups.  
In response to the kinds of criticisms outlined in the Heileman case, some have argued that 
the suggestion to curtail advertising of potentially harmful but legal products to minorities not 
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only constitutes censorship but racism.57 Others argue that it is patronizing and paternalistic for 
regulators to assume that they are more capable of discerning for minorities what they should 
drink than are minority individuals and populations themselves.58 These debates are framed by 
discourses on vulnerability and stand on varying definitions of vulnerable consumers; they are 
further complicated by the often-serious consequences that can be the direct result of consuming 
potentially harmful products such as alcohol and tobacco.  
The basis for defining vulnerability by disadvantage along various demographic 
characteristics, insofar as it addresses who is vulnerable, is also consistent with developments in 
legal definitions of vulnerability.59 Morgan, Schuler and Stoltman (1995) chronicle the 
development of vulnerability as a legal concept of consumers “whose idiosyncratic sensitivities 
have contributed to their product-related injuries, differently from typical consumers.”60 Under 
this classification, vulnerable consumers historically have been small groups of consumers 
whose own characteristics predispose them to harm, as opposed to injurious features of the 
product or actions of the marketer. Over the past three decades courts have expanded this 
understanding of vulnerability to encompass larger groups, as well. Based on developments in 
case law and legislation, the authors suggest a formalized concept of vulnerability that is 
expanded beyond physical hypersensitivity to include physical competency, mental competency, 
and level of sophistication.61  
Various legislative acts have been designed to protect consumers under these three classes of 
vulnerability. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA, 1990) applies to both physical and 
mental competency and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, 1968) ensures that those 
with diminished mental capacity are not at a disadvantage in certain circumstances. Morgan, 
Schuler and Stoltman (1995) suggest that these classes of vulnerable consumers could be 
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expanded to include populations with reduced physical competency that results from aging and 
those whose ability to process information (as those with dyslexia or attention deficit disorder) or 
comprehend information (illiterate populations or those with poor English skills) is 
compromised. The third class of vulnerability the authors discuss suggests that the level of 
consumer sophistication—that is, their naiveté or gullibility due to certain demographic 
characteristics, such as low socioeconomic background and level of education, that put them at a 
disadvantage—should be taken into account. While the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) extends protection to even the least sophisticated consumer, Morgan, Schuler and 
Stoltman (1995) propose that definitions of vulnerability should be expanded across classes to 
incorporate a situational perspective since certain sets of factors “tend to be more stable across 
situations than across populations.62 This argument suggests that vulnerability is the result of 
interactions between individual consumer characteristics and consumption situations63 and 
incorporates the relational nature of vulnerability.  
Recent scholarship in marketing and advertising has rejuvenated attention to issues of 
consumer vulnerability and has begun to reexamine definitions of this concept. The Journal of 
Macromarketing dedicated a 2005 special issue to vulnerable consumers calling for a broadened 
understanding of the intersection of individual and structural factors in marketplace 
vulnerability.64 Indeed, the first article of the issue by Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg (2005), 
entitled “Building Understanding of the Domain of Consumer Vulnerability,”65 proposes a 
“consumer-driven definition of consumer vulnerability” that does not fall prey to the 
misconception that vulnerability arises from demographic variables and avoids the paternalism 
often inherent in discourse on vulnerability. Theirs is an informative review of previous 
scholarship on vulnerability, but more importantly they place prevalent constructions of 
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vulnerability under a critical scope and provide a sound basis from which to move forward. 
Therefore, it is worth discussing this article in greater detail.  
Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg (2005) make the distinction, drawn from Smith and Cooper-
Martin (1997) between actual and perceived vulnerability. Perceived vulnerability is derived 
from expectations of what the experiences of others must be like, rather than what they truly are. 
The authors argue that actual vulnerability is “understood only by listening to and observing the 
experiences of the consumer”66 and only through that understanding can marketers and public 
policy makers base their decisions. They reiterate the argument that vulnerability and 
disadvantage are not to be equated, as disadvantage is attributed to personal characteristics and 
does not acknowledge the power of individual agency. Instead, they offer the following 
definition of consumer vulnerability: 
“Consumer vulnerability is a state of powerlessness that arises from an imbalance 
in marketplace interactions or from the consumption of marketing messages and 
products. It occurs when control is not in an individual’s hands, creating a 
dependence on external factors (e.g., marketers) to create fairness in the 
marketplace. The actual vulnerability arises from the interaction of individual 
states, individual characteristics, and external conditions within a context where 
consumption goals may be hindered and the experience affects personal and 
social perceptions of self.”67 
The authors are working to account for the complexity of consumer vulnerability that stems 
from various interactions of states, characteristics, and situations. Further, they assert that 
conceptions of vulnerability must be drawn from consumers themselves, allow for consumer 
agency and acknowledge that regulatory responses to protect consumers can also inhibit agency. 
Drawing from Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg (2005), others have suggested the opportunity to 
develop new and expanded perspectives that account for the complexity of interactions or 
relationships that drive vulnerability in the marketplace.68  
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Shultz and Holbrook (2009) question whether the sustenance of modern socioeconomic 
systems is contingent on the factors that lead to vulnerability in others. Power and the perception 
of it are important determinants of consumer behavior. Those in positions to regulate messages 
in the marketplace, whether formally or informally, have a real effect on consumer vulnerability. 
Henry (2005) found that the experience of power influences consumption practices through its 
effect on the experience of social class and on self-concept. Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg (2005) 
argue that policy response can affect consumer experience of vulnerability by either facilitating 
or impeding consumer agency. The situation becomes complex indeed if the very same systems 
that define vulnerability are in fact its main contributors. 
Because much research on vulnerability has focused on minority consumption, and 
specifically that of African Americans, the history of African Americans’ interaction with 
advertising and their involvement in the consumer world is a fertile area in which to consider 
vulnerability, but it is vast. The circumstances of the “sneaker killings,” which coincided with a 
time of change and re-formation in the advertising industry and its relation to the African 
American community, offer not only a rich context in and of itself but unsettles current 
perceptions of consumer vulnerability and are a hub from which to explore broader concerns 
about this concept—including issues of social, corporate and consumer responsibility, meaning 
exchange and control, power and discourse and empowerment.  
  
African Americans and Advertising 
Advertising frequently is criticized for creating and perpetuating negative stereotypes of 
vulnerable populations.69 Much popular and scholarly criticism of advertising and race into the 
1980s was based on the fact that there were few to no positive or empowered representations of 
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African Americans in mainstream advertising. Scholars criticized the media and, in particular, 
advertising for reflecting and perpetuating racism in portrayals of minorities.70 While interest in 
African Americans as a consumer market is evidenced in the earlier part of the 20th century,71 
marketers began to take more steady notice of black consumers in the 1960s. They proceeded 
with trepidation and feared alienating the larger white market.72 In reaction to these concerns, a 
body of research developed on consumer responses to racial cues and, in particular, on the 
effects of black models in advertising.73 Though the cumulative results were inconclusive, the 
research demonstrated neither dramatic racial differences nor negative effects in consumer 
responses to black models. 
 While negative portrayals of African Americans did not go unchallenged by black 
individuals, publications and organizations,74 the majority of mainstream images in advertising 
had long capitalized on the historical associations of African Americans as good domestic 
servants, a trend that continued well after the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights era. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the literature on race and advertising turned a critical eye towards issues of 
inclusion and stereotyping of African Americans in advertising.75 Still other scholars have 
expressed concern that even when African Americans have been integrated into mainstream 
advertising, it is nothing more than tokenism;76 that while “classic” racist appeals in 
contemporary contexts are subjected to severe retribution, contemporary appeals still carry on a 
legacy of racism;77 and that potentially racist elements present in advertising may have blunted 
any positive impact of increased representation.78 
African Americans fought representations of inferiority both in advertising and in the larger 
social and economic realm through their roles as consumers and their status in the business and 
economic world. This was enacted, for example, through consumer boycotts, legal pressure, and 
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the spirit of the Civil Rights Movement.79 The Civil Rights era brought slow but steady success 
as the African American consumer market began to fuse with the mainstream consumer market. 
Images of African Americans in mainstream media became more successful and more 
empowered, even within a circumscribed set of roles. Black celebrities, such as Bill Cosby, were 
hired as endorsers with mass-market appeal and were important reflections of greater social 
shifts in American race relations. These increasingly popular representations of black figures in 
advertising developed into the 1980s were lauded as breakthroughs in race relations. Of these, 
one of the most celebrated of icons, and one who was honored in popular and scholarly works as 
having a prominent role in changing the media landscape for African Americans is Michael 
Jordan. 
 
Michael Jordan and Nike 
For a variety of reasons, notwithstanding his incredible physical and athletic prowess and the 
passion this sparked in the public conscience, Michael Jordan has been a figure of intense 
fascination, scrutiny and debate. Scholars have investigated his physical body as a site through 
which to explore larger cultural meanings, particularly of blackness and masculinity,80 of 
commodity,81 and of sociopolitical meanings of race, the construction of race82 and how it is 
normalized.83 In addition, Michael Jordan has been investigated and interpreted for his role as a 
spokesperson and as a brand himself for Nike, Inc. (i.e., the Nike Air Jordan line and the Jordan 
brand). Jordan has been called “a twentieth century sports hero,” “the greatest pitchman of all 
time,”84 “…God disguised as Michael Jordan,”85 “the perfect embodiment of the sports 
spectacle,”86 the embodiment of “herculean cultural heroism,”87 and a plethora of other 
superlative-bearing descriptions. As a figure embedded in America’s popular conscience—
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indeed, of the global conscience—he is an important site of study in theorizing “broader social, 
economic, political, and technological concerns that frame contemporary culture.”88 He has been 
called “one of the highest paid and fecund generators of social meaning in the history of media 
culture.”89 But as well, and as David Andrews90 argues has been lost in the swell of popular 
culture, Michael Jordan is a part of a longer history of oppression and degradation to which 
African Americans were subjected well into the 20th century. Further, according to scholar 
Cheryl Cole, he represented a stark contrast to the representations of criminalized African 
Americans and his celebrity potentially signified “the end of the historical pathologization and 
stigmatization of African American men, at least in the realm of the popular.”91 Thus, authors 
have explored Michael Jordan from a variety of vantage points that expand our understanding of 
the culture or spectacle of athletics, of the history and contemporary circumstances of African 
American culture, and of the marketplace and processes of commodification in contemporary 
socioeconomic systems.92 
Just as Michael Jordan has sparked intense interest and scrutiny, so has the story of Nike. The 
company and its founder have been the source of numerous case studies,93 histories,94 exposés,95 
and scholarly works.96 The Nike story has been both a source of inspiration and of repudiation, 
but on both accounts there is a shared belief in the tremendous impact that Nike has had on the 
global landscape and popular conscience. 
 
Basketball and African American Culture 
Athletics have long been an important element of the American experience. Athletic pursuits 
have been circumscribed with aspects of community and communal good, with myths of 
exploration and conquest, as a source of heroism and valor and, as some would argue, for much 
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of its history it has served as a reflection of white patriarchal privilege.97 But in spite of—or more 
likely because of—the fact that dominant social norms prevented any significant number of 
African Americans from participating in mainstream sports until the late 20th century, sport 
became a space for demonstrating and ritualizing achievement against the socially imposed 
restrictions of cultural expression. As one author argues, black sports heroes “captured and 
catalyzed the black cultural fetishization of sport as a means of expressing black cultural style, as 
a means of valorizing craft as a marker of racial and self-expression, and as a means of pursuing 
social and economic mobility.”98 This has been done perhaps no more successfully than through 
basketball, which in turn owes its rise on a popular national level in large part to the influence of 
Nike and Michael Jordan and advertising agency Wieden & Kennedy in shaping popular 
culture.99  
The sport of basketball was born in the United States in 1891 of Canadian Dr. James 
Naismith.100 It was made popular through YMCAs, churches and other clubs in the northeastern 
United States101 that included African American and white players, males and females102 and it 
quickly infiltrated collegiate sports. The game began to flourish, particularly with young 
Americans whose means to participate in other sports was limited by equipment needs and social 
standards. A basketball game only required a ball and a goal and reputations were born through 
the oral traditions that passed on news of pickup and schoolyard games.103 Various attempts in 
the early 1900s were made to “professionalize” the sport; in 1949 the Basketball Association of 
America (BAA), formed three years earlier, and the National Basketball League, formed in 1937, 
merged to create the National Basketball Association (NBA) that characterizes the professional 
sport today.104 Since its early beginnings, basketball has held a significant place among things 
considered quintessentially American; but it was not until the 1970s that the game and its players 
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began to move towards a position of dominance in American popular culture105 and to experience 
unprecedented economic growth.106 Yet this growth at the same time was threatened and marred 
by public revelations of drug use by players, on-court violence and the retirement of Boston’s 
Bill Russell and Philadelphia’s Wilt Chamberlain, who had captured the attention and 
imagination of American fans.107 
While basketball today is virtually inseparable from the aesthetic and symbolism of Michael 
Jordan, it is important to remember that basketball is the “metaphoric center of black juvenile 
culture”108 and the sport draws much of its energy from urban, usually inner-city, courts. When 
Black players hailing from the inner-cities walked onto professional courts, many of these 
players had to alter their style of play because the moves, the jargon, and the interactions that 
characterized “schoolyard” play did not translate well in organized sport. The creative 
improvisations and on-court tricks of schoolyard basketball, drawn from the Harlem 
Globetrotters playbook, was considered “showboating,” “razzle-dazzle,” “fancy-pants stuff”109 by 
coaches and officiants of organized ball. According to Bijan Bayne (2005), “by the 1960s, some 
conservative coaches referred to this free style as ‘nigger ball,’ and not all of these coaches were 
white.”110 Even as far along as the late 1980s, according to historian Steven Riess, professional 
basketball was dominated by almost 90 percent with players from urban areas, nearly one-third 
of whom were from New York City.111 There were, nonetheless, wide discrepancies in the 
treatment of African Americans in professional basketball and its increasing commercialization. 
Despite the dominance of African Americans in college and professional team play, there were 
very few head coaches or general managers and a comparison of salaries and commercial 
endorsements demonstrates that the income for black players in comparison to white players was 
not commensurate with performance.112 Additionally, through media depictions of black culture 
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and of basketball, sports and gangs “are represented as the two practices vying for the agency 
and souls of African American male youths in urban America.”113 
In the end, though, it was the freewheeling, improvised style of black-dominated urban 
“schoolyard” ball that helped bring fans back to the sport in the early 1980s. The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and high school bans on dunking were lifted in 1976 
and fans were drawn to the street-like, though more disciplined, styles in the rivalry between 
Larry Bird and Earvin “Magic” Johnson114 that went from college to professional ball. These 
events helped paved the way for an improved NBA, but even in 1980 the professional sport was 
facing bankruptcy. 
In 1984, David Stern became Commissioner of the NBA. He had already helped broker the 
1983 salary cap agreement that gave poorer teams an opportunity to compete and implemented a 
drug testing policy that helped clean up the league’s tarnished image. Stern’s appointment 
coincided with Jordan’s entrance on the professional and commercial scenes. In fact, many credit 
the appearance of Michael Jordan and Nike on NBA courts for reinvigorating basketball, 
ensuring its rise and commercial success.115 In the 1980s, Nike helped promote the NBA and 
individual basketball stars into global icons, “enabling black athletes such as Michael Jordan to 
attain world-class superstar status and to promote the dream that success and renown are open to 
all in contemporary America.”116 One author called this relationship, together with the kind of 
celebrity culture that developed around the same time, the “perfect storm.”117 Indeed, despite a 
tumultuous and often adversarial relationship between Stern and Nike, Stern recognized that 
Jordan’s popularity, fueled both by his grace and dominance on the courts and by the spectacle 
of his presence in commercial media, was a boon for the NBA. 
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Conclusion: Meaning, Consumption and Power 
Neither Nike nor those who endorse it have been without their share of criticisms, most of 
which revolve around production and consumption practices. Nike has been heavily criticized as 
exploiting foreign workers in developing countries to produce overpriced sneakers and athletic-
wear that are then marketed to underprivileged youth.118 Douglas Kellner (2001) argues that Nike 
and Michael Jordan are each such an integral part of the meaning of the other that a tarnish on 
the reputation of one is a tarnish on both. And while many have considered Jordan a positive role 
model, still others have pointed to Jordan as a symbol of the decline of social values (Kellner 
2001). One author writes, 
“[W]hile sneaker companies have exploited black cultural expressions of cool, 
hip, chic, and style, they rarely benefit the people who both consume the largest 
quantity of products and whose culture redefined the sneaker companies’ raison 
d’être. This situation is more severely compounded by the presence of 
spokespeople like Jordan, Spike Lee, and Bo Jackson, who are either ineffectual 
or defensive about or indifferent to the lethal consequences (especially in urban 
black-on-black violence over sneaker company products) of black juvenile 
acquisition of products that these figures have helped make culturally desirable 
and economically marketable.”119 
Given the considerable cultural clout of Nike and Michael Jordan, it is important to explore 
these figures as sites of cultural production and knowledge, but also as sites that have been acted 
on by consumers, and to question from where or from whom they obtain such clout—or power. 
This project expands on the inquiries of Michael Jordan and considers his role in a system of 
cultural consumption and meaning. I examine Nike and their association with Michael Jordan, 
particularly as it was expressed in the campaigns directed by Spike Lee and, through the use of 
ethical theory, I begin to map a system of advertisers and consumers as actors in a process of 
meaning. Rather than a system in which responsibilities have been diffused, I recognize these 
actors as working within broader social, economic, and political systems and consider ways in 
which these actors can act more responsibly and ethically. With the groundwork having been laid 
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by previous authors to question approaches to consumer vulnerability in various realms, 
including popular, legal, and scholarly, the time is ripe to reconceptualize how consumer 
vulnerability is understood and countered. To advance this goal, I propose a framework of 
dialogic ethics for critiquing and understanding consumer vulnerability that is grounded in 
historical understanding and is founded through ethical theory, and that accounts for the 
structures of power and acknowledges the critical element of exchange in communication 
processes.  
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CHAPTER 2:  AFRICAN AMERICANS AND MARKETS, 1700s-1940s 
 
Introduction 
African Americans have sought inclusion and positive representation in advertising not only 
as an indication of economic power but as a symbolic expression of social value and respect.1 
Despite long-standing evidence that the African American market would be a profitable one, it 
was not until the late 1980s, when the advertising industry could no longer turn away from the 
$203-billion buying power of Black consumers,2 that positive representations of African 
Americans began showing up in mainstream and targeted media in force. This was, as the 
histories of slavery, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights Movement have taught, and as was reflected 
and perpetuated through the texts of advertising, a long and arduous process. It was in the 
context of this history that, in 1984, a young rookie Michael Jordan, fresh from his college days 
at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, signed with the Chicago Bulls and Nike, both of 
which he is credited with having redefined. But this story goes beyond his successes on the court 
and in Nike shoes to explore the impact that he had on the advertising industry and the symbolic 
life of America. Michael Jordan’s ascent as an icon of sports and of the American dream of 
success and consumption coincides with a changing advertising landscape that began earnestly to 
reflect the struggles of Black Americans for inclusion and positive representation. The history of 
African Americans’ relationship with advertising and consumption and the story of Nike, 
Michael Jordan and the “sneaker killings” are mutually informative because they contextualize 
the complexities of inclusion and representation, of the economic, social, and political situation 
of the Black community, and of the physical, social and symbolic importance of consumer goods 
in the struggles of Black Americans. The next two chapters are dedicated to exploring this 
history in order to set the stage for a stronger understanding of the role that Nike, Michael 
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Jordan, and other Black athletes and famous figures such as Spike Lee, played in ushering in a 
new era of representation for African Americans in advertising. The current chapter will address 
the history of African Americans, advertising and consumption in the United States dating back 
to the early slave advertisements and progressing up to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s. By the 1950s, African Americans had made important inroads into political, 
economic and cultural inclusion in mainstream America and in developing businesses and 
communities that were uniquely Black, both of which set the stage for the Civil Rights-era 
developments that are more frequently cited as the source of improved status of Blacks in 
America and in advertising. Chapter 3 resumes, then, with this history from the Civil Rights Era 
to the 1980s and 1990s. While numerous versions of American progress present the ever-
increasing possibilities of African Americans emanating from the gains of the 1950s and 1960s, 
a closer examination of economic, social and cultural conditions reveals that many Blacks were 
struggling to understand and develop their cultural identity within the post-Civil Rights America. 
This was a particularly difficult task for the first generation of post-Civil Rights urban youth, 
many of whom were born into impoverished conditions with little access to the gains celebrated 
in the Civil Rights Movement. In trying to reconcile the advancements for which their 
predecessors so ardently fought and the conditions of their own existence, they developed new 
forms of representation, expression, and participation. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that leading into the 1980s, the African American community was looking for new ways of 
conceptualizing and expressing itself in the symbolic landscape of consumption, a search in 
which Nike and Jordan were implicated.  
Several authors have presented compelling histories of African Americans and economic life, 
consumption and advertising, and their works help to inform this chapter. Marilyn Kern-
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Foxworth’s Aunt Jemima, Uncle Ben, and Rastus (1994) traces the stereotypes of race, with their 
roots in slavery, that made their mark on advertising and for which advertising frequently served 
as a conduit. Her work provides an in-depth look at the development and symbolism of several 
long-standing and popular Black icons in advertising and the response of Black Americans to 
these (mis)representations. Kern-Foxworth also presents a discussion of the issues of frequency 
and status of African American representation in advertising, both of which have been developed 
in other popular and scholarly work and have played an important role in advertising criticism. 
In Split Image: African Americans in the Mass Media (1993, 2nd edition), Janette L. Dates 
considers how advertisers have treated African American consumers, how they have portrayed 
them, and the role of African American practitioners and activists in fighting for more positive 
representations and in contributing to the strength and advancements of a growing African 
American consumer market. The African American consumer market is, in fact, the central issue 
in Robert E. Weems’s Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the 
Twentieth Century (1998). Weems demonstrates that characteristics and developments in the 
consumer realm are intricately intertwined with civil rights, broadly defined, of African 
Americans in the twentieth century and, contrary to many of the histories of “development,” that 
inclusion in mainstream consumer realms has had both positive and negative consequences for 
the Black community. But nonetheless, these advances were not made without the perseverance 
and savvy of African American individuals and organizations that fought for more appropriate 
inclusion in consumer and economic realms.  
In no small part, as is demonstrated by Jason Chambers’ Madison Avenue and the Color Line 
(2008), this work was conducted by African Americans in journalism, sales, and advertising. 
According to Chambers, these professionals saw advertising as both a means of employment and 
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financial opportunity and as a vehicle for change in the way that African Americans were 
perceived. While they were “actively engaged in defining the Black consumer both for the 
potential client and for Blacks themselves”3 and promoting positive representations of Black life, 
they were working contrary to the years of racism and degradation that were manifest in 
advertising. These and other authors contribute to our understanding of the forces that affected 
change in advertisers’ approach to consumers and to the imagery of African Americans in mass 
media and advertising, and of how these developments reflect cultural and structural changes in 
race relations in the United States.4 
 
Early Advertising and Enslavement of African Americans 
The history of African Americans and advertising dates as far back as slave advertisements—
announcing the barter of slaves and rewards for those fugitive and found—which serve as some 
of the most permanent historical records of the time.5 These ads were constituted with physical 
characteristics of the slave “commodities.” For example, John Custis of Williamsburg, Virginia 
sought the return of a runaway slave in the following advertisement placed in the Virginia 
Gazette in 1745: 
RAN away, about the 10th of April last, from the Hon. John Custis, Esq; of 
Williamsburg, a Negro Man named Peter, of a middle Stature, about 30 Years of Age; 
has a Scar in his Forehead, or somewhere about the upper Part of his Face, occasion'd 
by falling into the Fire when a Child, is Virginia-born; he went away with Irons on 
his Legs, a Kersey Waistcoat, and a Cotton Pair of Breeches, laced on the Sides for 
Conveniency of putting them on over his Irons; he has robb'd me, in Cash, Houshold 
Linen, and other Goods to a considerable Value; and notwithstanding he is Out-law'd 
will not be taken or return home; he can read, and I believe write. Whoever 
apprehends and conveys him safe to me, shall have Two Pistoles Reward, besides 
what the Law allows.  
John Custis6 
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These ads serve as stark reminders of the brutalities suffered by slaves. For example, the physical 
descriptions of slaves, as in the example above, are frequently accompanied by the markings of 
scars, serving as likely records of the brutal treatment they endured. Additionally, these ads serve 
as records of the cultural mentality and presumptions about the nature of African Americans that 
were necessary to maintain the status quo, as in the following example: 
March 18, 1752. RAN away, last Night, from the Subscriber, a Negroe Man, named 
Anthony; he is a tall, slim young Fellow, hollow-eye'd, and has a large Scar of a Burn 
on one of his Wrists; he is very subtil, and frequently changes his Name when run 
away, and is suppos'd to be concern'd in a Robbery, committed in the Neighbourhood 
a few Nights ago, which is thought to be the Cause of his running away, as no other 
appears yet; Together with him went, I suppose for the same Reason, another Fellow, 
named Matt Cooper, who is a squat, well-set young Fellow, and has a Scar of a Boil 
on one of his Cheeks, just below the under Jaw-bone. Whoever takes up the said 
Runaways, or either, and conveys them to me, according to Law, shall be generously 
rewarded, by  
Philip Ludwell.7 
 
A contemporary reader might readily see a simple desire for freedom as a clearer rationale 
for an enslaved man to run away. Mr. Ludwell’s presumptions demonstrate the 
embeddedness and depth of racial misrepresentations necessary for the maintenance of 
slavery. Here, as is later reflected in the development and representation of such iconic 
figures as Aunt Jemima, Mr. Ludwell not only exhibits the typical commodification of 
slaves, but additionally portrays them as complicit in their own servitude—as at least 
resigned if not contented servants. Further commodifying them, descriptions in ads often 
would include postulates about the slave’s personality that would be characterized in terms of 
their value. A 1752 ad placed by Thomas Pleasants in Williamsburg, Virginia described a 
runaway slave thus: 
February 10, 1752. RAN away from the Subscriber, living in Goochland County, a 
likely Virginia-born Negroe Man, named Jack, about 6 Feet high, has a down cast sly 
Look when spoken to, talks very sensible, and is much addicted to Lying; had on 
when he went away a very long dy'd Cotton Waistcoat and Breeches, an Oznabrig 
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Shirt, Plaid Stockings, and Virginia-made Shoes. Whoever will apprehend and 
convey him to me, or to Mr. John Pleasants, in Henrico County, shall have a Pistole 
Reward, paid by  
Thomas Pleasants.8 
 
Such colored descriptions of the slaves’ dress, physical traits (particularly oddities) and 
mannerisms was common and served not only to identify them but to value them. 
The impact of the early slave ads was complex and enduring. Slave advertising was a vehicle 
of market information that united masters, bounty hunters and other parties who profited from 
the perpetuation of slavery, without which it would not have been as effective as an institution;9 
in addition to this functional degradation, slave advertising was an instrument of explicit racism 
and the dehumanization of Blacks. At the same time, as Kern-Foxworth (1994) argues, 
advertising provided information for abolitionists and slaves, uniting them in their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and providing them with documentation of “the brutality of slavery.”10 
Additionally, the involvement of African Americans in advertising was not completely 
disempowered. For example, thirty-six years before President Lincoln signed the Emancipation 
Proclamation, the establishment of Freedom’s Journal in 1827 as the first African American 
newspaper in the United States marked early commercial involvement of Blacks.11 This and other 
such journals would become, by the 1920s, “the first to vocally and publicly press American 
corporations to recognize and patronize the Black consumer market”12 and they provided positive 
depictions of African Americans otherwise lacking in mainstream media. For while from 1827 to 
the 1890s, images of African Americans began showing up on consumer product labels and in 
advertising,13 these images were frequently derived from many of the same conventions—
commodification, dehumanization, stereotyping of physical and mental characteristics—as slave 
ads. However, notwithstanding this dual role played by slave ads, as well as the introduction of 
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Black owned and oriented newspapers, the implicit message about African Americans through 
advertising did not change significantly after the abolition of slavery in 1865.  
The end of slavery and the swift changes that followed were disruptive, sparking fears among 
White Americans in both the North and South over the consequences of these changes and 
renewing debates over the role of Blacks in American society.14 The new industrial order 
threatened the romantic notions of the simplicity and honesty of agrarian society—a society that, 
in the reality of the American system, was largely dependent on the subservience and labor of 
African Americans. During and after Reconstruction in the United States, derogatory images of 
African Americans continued to surface in a variety of popular media, including advertising, and 
served to quell White anxieties and reinforce White dominance in American social, economic 
and political life. Despite the fact that Blacks had gained some status in legal terms—the 
freedom to own homes and businesses, to have their own communities and to participate in 
consumption—neither their social status nor their status in advertising had changed.15 In fact, 
advertisers continued to draw on images derived from slavery and perpetuated in dramatic 
fashion through minstrel shows as comical, crude, intellectually inferior and dependent on White 
masters.  
 
Advertising and Blackface: Roots in Minstrelsy 
Originally popularized in the mid-1800s by White actors in Blackface creating caricatures of 
African American life, the Black characters they depicted seem gross misrepresentations of the 
actual, lived experience of African Americans. These Blackface performances reached their 
pinnacle in the 1840s and 1850s, but they remained common into the second half of the century16 
and were frequented by both Black and White audiences. In addition to the White performers in 
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Blackface, Black performers also created troupes and participated in this entertainment form, 
some of whom became quite popular. For these Black performers, participation in minstrelsy 
undoubtedly was a conflicted act. While they performed the stereotypes that at once served to 
oppress their own people, their performances also brought them notoriety and fame and ushered 
in new forms of Black expression that would garner greater respect and interest from Whites and 
Blacks alike. “Father of the Blues” W. C. Handy began his career as a minstrel performer in 
1890 and minstrel stars George Walker and Egbert Walker became in 1901 the first black 
musicians to be recorded. Just as minstrel sounds drew their inspiration from black folk music, 
so too did the first widely known Black classical composer Harry T. Burleigh, who is credited 
with having shaped the development of a characteristically American music style.17 The minstrel 
shows derived their tone from the unique sounds of African American culture which would have 
a tremendous impact on the American experience and history. 
Just as the White and Black performers encountered minstrel shows from different 
perspectives, so too did the audiences. The White audiences were dominated by the working 
class, though some in the middle and upper classes frequented these shows. As historian David 
Roediger recounts, “Minstrelsy was featured at President John Tyler’s inauguration, and in 
performances before Queen Victoria. Abraham Lincoln stole away from the pressures of duty 
during the Civil War to see Blackface shows. But the energy and complexity of the minstrel 
stage came largely from below, and specifically from the uses of racial disguise not only to mask 
tensions between classes but also to mask tensions within the working class.”18 For the 
predominantly working-class White audience, these shows were a complex reaffirmation of their 
superiority in a romanticized pre-industrial agrarian society amidst the tensions of their 
urbanized present; for the Black audiences, the performances were complex expressions of the 
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African-American cultural mark. For some, the performances were reminiscent of Black folk 
tradition and the songs, frequently derived from slave songs that served to break the tedium or 
voice their hardships, were authentic expressions of the experiences of African Americans.19  But 
others resented the exaggerated and unrealistic caricatures and did not frequent the shows.20 
Minstrel shows were not only popular diversions but reflected tensions within broader social, 
cultural and political life in nineteenth century America.21 
 One particularly dramatic example of the impact of minstrel shows on African American 
experience well into the 20th century is the popularization of the term “Jim Crow” to denote state 
sponsored segregation. Jim Crow began as a singing and dancing African American stable hand 
played in Blackface by White actor Thomas Rice22 in a production in Louisville, Kentucky in the 
1830s. Thus, minstrel show characters found both political and commercial “success” in the 
popular conscience.  
Depictions of African Americans drawn from minstrel shows were appearing regularly in 
advertising by the 1890s,23 in the wake of popularity for this entertainment form.24 Some of the 
most famous and enduring advertising icons, such as Aunt Jemima, have their roots in 
minstrelsy. The inspiration for Aunt Jemima came when Chris L. Rutt, a reporter for the St. 
Joseph Gazette and co-inventor of the first pancake mix, visited a vaudeville house in St. Joseph, 
Missouri where a Blackface minstrel act played a popular tune called “Aunt Jemima.” Rutt 
appropriated the name Aunt Jemima and the image of the Black mammy, a remnant of American 
slave culture and as depicted on the posters for the minstrel act, to become what he believed to 
be the perfect embodiment of the image he wanted to portray.25  
Aunt Jemima debuted in 1889 and was trademarked in 1893. The original marketing 
materials for the brand described the story of Aunt Jemima as a former slave, willing and loyal to 
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her master until his death. This legend apparently was derived from the childhood experiences of 
Nancy Green, the first Black woman to bring Aunt Jemima to life, who spun the tale for 
audiences of Aunt Jemima’s former days “on a plantation ‘somewhere in the Deep South.’”26 As 
legend had it, at one point in Aunt Jemima’s contrived history, she saved her “employer” 
Colonel Higbee from imposing Union troops and revived wearied southern soldiers by serving 
them her pancakes.27 This disconnect from the realities of slavery is strangely reminiscent of 
Phillip Ludwell’s ad for his runaway slave, who he presumed must have been the culprit of a 
theft down the road—for lack of any better reason he could imagine for a slave to run away. The 
image of Aunt Jemima, the tale of her history, and her minstrel roots are clearly derived from a 
romantic notion of the African American slave that served to maintain the status quo of 
delegating Blacks to domestic realms.28 As a historian of The Quaker Oats Company described,  
“The American Negro has always represented in American life the acme of the 
culinary art, respected as in France the chefs who belong to the Société 
Gastronomique. Traditional southern hospitality in slave times was made possible 
by the legendary genius of the Negroes as cooks and chefs. Long before the Civil 
War the Negro had become entrenched in folklore as the ultimate expert in 
cookery. From its first days, Aunt Jemima pancake flour capitalized on this 
identity so rooted in the American culture. And in each generation, Aunt Jemima 
had reflected the advancing status of the Negro. The first Aunt Jemima, as 
portrayed by Nancy Green, took pride in being the White man’s valued servant. In 
the next generation, the overweight, good-humored but unsophisticated Anna 
Robinson established the Negro cook as a personage in her own right… In the 
mid-twentieth century, Edith Wilson and other show personalities completed the 
transition… far removed from the days of servitude and lending fresh dignity to 
the image of the Negro as America’s unrivaled culinary expert.”29 
 
This author rather misses the point of prejudice in even a “dignified” Aunt Jemima, but certainly 
demonstrates the embeddedness of racism in these problematic depictions. 
Aunt Jemima is but one example of the variety of stereotypes that frequently drew from the 
exaggerated misrepresentations of minstrel shows and were conspicuous in advertising icons, 
including Sambo, the Gold Dust Twins, Uncle Ben and Rastus. Imagery of Blacks in early 
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advertising was offensive and exaggerated physical characteristics and dialect. Mouths of Black 
figures would be gaping, their eyes and lips protruding, and their emotions uncontrolled. Their 
dialect would be misrepresented and derogatory terminology would be used to describe them.30 
They would be depicted as thieves and cannibals, or otherwise as lazy, childlike or subservient.31 
These distorted images and manipulated dialect and mannerisms characterized the minstrel 
shows and were reflected in advertising most prominently through some of its most famous 
icons. These icons serve as graphic reminders of the historically-rooted racism against African 
Americans, borne out in its most brutal form through slavery, and perpetuated in the belief that 
the cultural value of African Americans was situated in their roles as good domestic servants.  
 
Advertising at the Turn of the Century 
In many ways, the mass production of images such as Aunt Jemima was a consequence of 
the capabilities and needs driven by the Industrial Revolution in the United States. The Industrial 
Revolution brought with it incredible technological, social and cultural changes, most 
conspicuously in the form of mass-produced consumer goods. The burgeoning production 
processes necessitated increases in consumption. Mass production could not be sustained without 
expanding markets and changing social values that allowed for the new ideology of consumption 
to emerge in the late 19th and early 20th century in America.32 With the new networks of 
transportation that had opened by the mid-1800s, these mass produced goods could be 
transported around the country and into growing urban centers for consumption.  
In the modern era of mass communication, made possible by advances in print and 
production, photography, and distribution, advertising was the fuel for the consumer economy.33 
Advertising helped manufacturers profit by selling more mass-produced goods at a lower cost to 
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the public.34 By the late 1800s, advertising was moving beyond the small, print-only, classified 
style ads typified by early slave announcements and was becoming an industry. With advances in 
print technology and the development of a mass market for magazines, advertisers had a broader 
range of capabilities in presenting their arguments. By this point, advertisers had determined that 
by creating a brand name and image, they could make their product irreplaceable and charge 
higher prices. In exchange, consumers would have not only an assurance of quality and 
consistency, but a mark of display. The mass availability of goods and information was seen by 
many as a democratizing force, bringing previously unobtainable lifestyles to the general 
public.35  
The Industrial Revolution also brought with it a class of nouveau riche, whose “conspicuous 
consumption” habits, as termed by Thorstein Veblen, were for the purpose of display and social 
power.36 Since Veblen’s presentation of the term, it has been used beyond the realm of the 
nouveau riche and to discuss consumption for the purposes of social display in a variety of 
forms.37 This becomes an important issue in considering the history of African Americans and 
the consumer market because discriminatory practices in the marketplace put African Americans 
at a disadvantage in finding quality and the purchase of certain brands ensured product quality. 
Additionally, for many, including some important African American leaders, the consumption of 
luxury was considered a mark of success both within the Black community and to the broader 
public and was part of the larger struggle against discrimination.38 
But for all of the proclamations that the new, turn-of-the-century consumer society brought 
with it the democratization of goods, with few exceptions African Americans were markedly 
absent in depictions of this consumer life (unless, perhaps, they were serving the goods). The 
negative depictions and otherwise absence of African Americans in advertising represented 
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economic censure that was enacted in social and political ways through Jim Crow laws. All of 
these forms of segregation and dismissal subjugated African Americans. Thus, just as civil rights 
were at issue, so was inclusion in the commercial realm. As one noted scholar wrote,  
“…over the course of the twentieth century, consumption became a key aspect of 
citizenship… Therefore, advertising’s positive and representative depiction of 
Blacks fulfilling their role in the consumer society would be symbolic evidence of 
Blacks’ accepted status in society: stereotypes and subservient roles pointed to 
and justified discrimination, while positive or even simply accurate 
representations would point to their role as equal consumers and equal citizens.”39 
 
Working within the confines of a hostile racial environment in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
African American leaders such as Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois began to urge their 
communities to build and strengthen by establishing their own businesses and serving Black 
communities under the belief that economic progress was the key to race progress.40 In 1907, 
Booker T. Washington published The Negro in Business, in which he addressed African 
American economic development and sang the praises of Black entrepreneurs.41 Several years 
later in 1912, Monroe Work of the Tuskegee Institute published The Negro Yearbook and Annual 
Encyclopedia of the Negro, which ran until 1950, and provided an important resource on the 
wealth and economic progress of African Americans.42 Such efforts would gather momentum in 
the 1930s Depression-era environment.43  
But the circumstances at the turn of the century were still dire. The 1896 decision of Plessy v. 
Ferguson legally sanctioned segregation and the already existent Jim Crow social standards. 
Many Blacks were still subjugated as part of the agricultural economy of the south44 and those 
who sought a better life in urban environments encountered economic depravity and prejudice. In 
spite of all of this hardship and denigration, however, African Americans began to accumulate 
wealth45 and to open business ventures that catered to Black communities. As early as 1888, two 
of the first African American banks had opened in Richmond, Virginia and Washington, DC. 
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These were followed by insurance companies, retail stores, other ventures and crafts, and 
organizations such as the National Business League to support them. These businesses worked to 
instill trust in consumers through advertising that presented a more realistic and positive 
depiction of African American life and to engage them in the process of strengthening their own 
communities, and they did so through the newspapers that had been the mediums of the few 
positive representations presented of and to them. These processes were instrumental in the 
development of an African American consumer market. 
Companies approaching the Black consumer market through Black publications at the turn of 
the century, notably, were speaking to them predominantly through a limited set of stereotypical 
roles.46 Advertisers did not see the need for, and in fact actively did not create, messages for 
Black consumers that differed from what they would present to mainstream White America. 
Even while these stereotypical images did appear in Black publications, though, publishers were 
pressing advertisers to recognize the Black consumer market. In working for these new 
advertising dollars, publishers also were coaching advertisers to provide more positive and 
representative depictions of African American life in order to truly reach this growing market.47 
These African American publications were instrumental in providing the Black community 
with alternative and more representative images of their experiences by presenting Blacks in 
their pages.48 Further, through the pressures they exerted on advertisers, they were instrumental 
in the developing presence of Blacks working in the ad industry, which in turn helped to promote 
more positive representations in both Black and mainstream venues.49 In the first decades of the 
20th century, their success, however, in terms of reach and depth of representation would still be 
a long time coming. 
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The first two decades of the 20th century witnessed vast changes in the American landscape. 
Histories of the era depict an America of increasing wealth, populated by consumers with greater 
access to a wider variety of consumer goods. The “American Dream” as told through advertising 
was a testament to White ideologies that both reminisced about the purity of a romantic past and 
at the same time promoted a present and future of consumption to all with disposable income. 
The Progressive Era was marked by technological and scientific advances, political, economic 
and business reforms, a growing middle class and a developing consumer culture. Yet frequently 
left out of these histories is the growing Black consumer market, developing in spite of the harsh 
racial climate of the times. Black Americans worked largely through their own community 
channels and publications to build businesses and promote them. They developed organizations, 
such as the National Negro Business League (NNBL), formed in 1900 by Booker T. Washington 
(renamed the National Business League in 1966) to help promote and support Black businesses, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909 to champion 
legal rights of African Americans, and the National Urban League in 1911 to work to secure 
equal employment in the United States. African American leaders and communities clearly 
realized that working to become a strong economic force would give them weight and contribute 
to their acceptance and participation in American social, political, and economic realms.50 
Importantly, they also were looking for ways to express this in the symbolic landscape of 
America, one of the most influential spaces of which was becoming advertising. 
 
African Americans and Advertising: 1920s-1940s 
With the U.S.’s participation in World War I from 1917-1918, advertising experienced a 
boost, as advertisers aimed to keep their work relevant through messaging that let Americans 
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know of their support of the troops and their patriotism, and as the government created national 
advertising programs to gain and maintain public support.51 Advertising encouraged men to join 
the armed forces and rallied for domestic efforts and conservation of war materials on the home 
front.52 Three hundred and seventy thousand African Americans were in military service during 
the war, and between 1915 and 1918 countless others began migrating North in what has been 
called the “Great Migration”  to find employment in wartime industries, improving incomes and 
creating large African American consumer markets.53 As the first generation of Blacks born free, 
though hindered by the enduring Jim Crow laws, they had a sense of entitlement to the rights of 
citizenship and to equality in the economic realm. At the same time many Blacks from other 
countries—particularly from other parts of the Americas, including the West Indies and Cuba—
migrated to the United States. These Black immigrants of the “Great Migration” and from other 
countries during this era were symbolized by the “New Negro”, who was better educated, 
politically sophisticated, more powerful and more militant.54 As one author described, 
“Considered as a whole, the New Negroes were not only a national people, they were also 
international, multi-lingual, and ethnically heterogeneous.”55 The war also brought other changes 
for African Americans as they reconceptualized new identities and expressions and contributed 
in unique ways to the American landscape.  
While Black soldiers were left out of wartime commemoration despite their participation in 
World War II, their impact notably was felt through the sounds that they took with them as they 
traveled overseas. While African American units in the U.S. Army had their own bands that 
dated back to 1909, they gained notoriety for their Jazz sounds during World War I. Jazz had 
emerged in the early 20th century in and around New Orleans from a combination of African and 
European influences such as minstrel shows, plantation bands, and Irish and Scottish folk tunes 
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and it was played in a variety venues from concerts and clubs to parades and funerals.56 In 1918, 
military band of the 369th Infantry from New York City, under the direction of James Reece 
Europe, participated in a joint concert of allied bands on the Champs Élysées, which they 
followed by a worldwide tour that set off a “permanent enthusiasm” around the Western world 
for the highly syncopated sounds of African American jazz.57 
The spread of jazz sounds and the end of the war ushered in the “Jazz Age.” In the early 
1920s, Black music experienced various milestones on the American stage. While both Black 
and White audiences enjoyed the music of Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, and Ethel Waters, 
artist Mamie Smith recorded the first record for Black music consumers.58 The successes of 
Black music in this era were part of a larger movement that grew out of the New Negro’s sense 
of racial pride that was encapsulated in the Harlem Renaissance as the Black community found 
creative ways of expressing identity through the arts.59  
The “Jazz Age”, also known with slightly varied context as the “Roaring Twenties”, was a 
decade of prosperity and sweeping social change; the new consumer society, which had begun 
developing at the turn of the century, became entrenched in the 1920s.60 Advertising 
expenditures went from $2.2 billion in 1919 to $3.4 billion in 1929.61 Developing technologies 
opened up new mediums for advertisers and new ways of imparting their messages. The 
introduction of radio in the 1920s and its widespread dissemination in the 1930s presented new 
possibilities through sound. But just as they were in print, African Americans were subjected to 
further defamatory representations. As the imagery and written dialect of print advertising had 
drawn from the tradition of minstrel shows, so too did radio make use of these conventions in the 
spoken word and through music.  
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 Amos ‘n Andy, for example, was a hugely popular radio comedy that ran from the 1920s to 
the 1950s and was later adapted for television. Two White actors, Freeman Gosden and Charles 
Correll, depicted two Black characters and their antics. Typifying its minstrel roots, the show 
portrayed Andy in the “coon” role and Amos as the “Tom,” with plotlines that frequently 
positioned them alongside other common stereotypes such as the mammy.62 As one author points 
out, “What made them different from their predecessors [in minstrelsy and vaudeville] was the 
large number of people they reached with their comedy, including some African Americans.”63 
While perhaps not as offensive as some other shows of the day, Amos and Andy were far from 
representative of the Black public, but nonetheless were picked up as sponsors in advertising 
several products, most notably Listerine and Campbell’s, demonstrating the enduring complexity 
and rootedness of minstrel show conventions into the 20th century. Pressure from the NAACP is 
often credited for the demise of Amos ‘n Andy, but only after a long run that crossed mediums 
and formats.64 
Thus, despite a few locally broadcast Black radio stations, the majority of radio was 
dedicated to the entertainment of the White public and commonly at the expense of the Black 
community.65 To combat the barrage of negative stereotypes in mainstream advertising, many 
African Americans turned to Black-oriented media options as they increasingly came available. 
As early as 1929, with “The All Negro Hour,” radio began to speak directly to Black audiences.66 
Black companies used these “cultural oases” to reach out to Black consumers,67 but advances in 
the availability of Black-oriented options was sluggish. Even by 1949, only four radio stations in 
the country appealed directly to Black consumers.68 By the 1950s, “Negro appeal” programming 
would proliferate,69 with estimates ranging from between 40070 to as many as 60071 such stations 
by that time. The majority of these stations were White-owned, but their counterparts in 
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mainstream advertising continued to waver in their commitment to Black audiences. And while 
the 1950 census, demonstrating ever-increasing size and urbanization, did compel advertisers to 
take a more earnest look at Black radio audiences,72 these changes should not be overstated—
even into the 1970s, when Black entrepreneurs began buying stake in radio broadcast properties, 
“many advertisers claimed that they could as readily reach Black consumers through general 
market broadcast advertising, and they claimed that the African American consumer was not 
upscale enough to have much discretionary income.”73 This was an argument that had long-
dominated advertisers’ thought across media options and placement decisions. Had advertisers 
heeded the early pressures of Black leaders to conduct research on African American markets, 
advertisers would have recognized that this was, in fact, a market with incredible potential that 
could be reached through black-oriented media outlets that were more likely to provide them 
with representative content and deferential treatment that they desired. 
 The advertising industry had entered a period of interest and experimentation with more 
adept consumer research practices in the 1920s. Advertising agency J. Walter Thompson hired 
behavioral psychologist John B. Watson in 1920, marking a move in advertising to ground itself 
in science and find more professional standing. Agencies increasingly sponsored market research 
to understand not only the economic potential, but the psychological characteristics and 
tendencies of consumers. Recognizing that very little of this work was conducted to understand 
African American consumers, Black leaders continued to push for representation not just in the 
advertising but in the research that generated the strategies and messages of advertising.74 
Drawing from Booker T. Washington’s approach to the economic advancement of African 
Americans, Claude Barnett used his positions in a variety of ventures, including an advertising 
agency, a cosmetics business and ultimately publishing, to pressure American corporations to 
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attend to Black consumers; he was, as one author noted, “one of the earliest advocates pressing 
American corporations to devote specific advertising and marketing attention to Black 
consumers.”75 Barnett pursued multiple angles in pressuring companies and advertising agencies 
not only to attend to African American markets but to Black publications, as well, and he 
recognized the importance of research on this market to support his argument.76 
 Some works had been published on the Black consumer market by the 1920s. Booker T. 
Washington published The Negro Business in 1907 in which he discussed African American 
economic development.77 And in 1912, The Negro Yearbook and Encyclopedia began annual 
publications that lasted until 1950s, providing an overview of African American experience and 
informing readers of their wealth, progress, and collective consumer power.78 But the 1920s and 
1930s were a time of increased interest in Black business development. In 1928, the National 
Negro Business League (NNBL) began taking surveys of Black businesses and, while they never 
materialized, also planned surveys of Black consumers.79 The authors of the study recommended 
that advertisers give more attention to the Black consumer market and “implicitly suggested that 
Blacks had an untapped economic strength that could be used in various ways to improve their 
economic standing.”80 In 1928 and 1930, H.A. Haring published articles in the trade journal 
Advertising & Selling, entitled respectively “Selling to Harlem” and “The Negro as Consumer,” 
both encouraging corporations to market to Blacks. This work was anecdotal and tinged with 
condescension,81 but nonetheless suggested the viability of the African American consumer 
market.82 Haring’s work also was interesting for the assertions it made about the buying styles of 
Blacks, suggesting that they were a good market for high quality goods.83 This message about 
consumption patterns was further reinforced in academic literature by Paul K. Edwards’ 1932 
book, The Southern Urban Negro as a Consumer, and his 1936 doctoral thesis on the topic of 
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Black consumers and their spending power and tendencies. More considerate of African 
Americans, Edwards found that despite their status at the lower echelon of the occupation and 
wage scales, African Americans tended to purchase quality food and clothing and would 
purchase major brand-name products even when those brands were not specifically creating 
marketing campaigns to speak to them. At the same time, though, he noted that African 
Americans had negative opinions about advertising that featured Blacks in subservient situations 
or depicted them in derogatory ways. Citing Aunt Jemima as an example, some Black consumers 
passed over these products because of these portrayals; in light of this, Edwards concluded that 
advertisers would at least have to respect the feelings of Black consumers in order to gain their 
business.84 He believed strongly enough in this message that he would send a summary of his 
work to company executives around the country to encourage them to work for the business of 
Black consumers.85 
 Based on the work of Edwards, in 1933 Claude Barnett attempted but failed to garner support 
from corporations who stood to gain from his efforts to conduct a study on the consumption 
habits of African Americans in Chicago.86 Barnett and other Black leaders believed such work 
could have been the foundation for change by demonstrating to companies the value of African 
Americans as a market, by encouraging companies to invest advertising dollars in Black 
publications, and by encouraging more representative depictions of African Americans. Even 
though African Americans could be found depicted in professional roles in some Black 
publications, images of Blacks in the more expansive image industry remained problematic and 
few, and Black publications were often passed over in favor of more mainstream advertising 
options. Even companies such as Camel cigarettes, Chevrolet and Pepsi-Cola who began 
advertising in Black publications by the mid-1930s continued to use ads developed for 
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mainstream media without any efforts to reflect African American consumer experience.87 
Despite the movement of such companies into African American markets, many others 
continued to dismiss and avoid them, in part drawn from long-standing prejudices and in part due 
to the economic conditions and fears surrounding the Great Depression.88 
 The argument presented by Edwards and more forcefully promoted by Black leaders was that 
African Americans were aware of their power and influence as consumers, and were willing to 
use it to gain greater acknowledgement, representation and status not only as consumers but as 
citizens.89 This approach was more clearly articulated through the “Don’t buy where you can’t 
work” campaigns of the 1930s. Initiated in Chicago by editors of the Whip, a militant African 
American publication, these campaigns spread to cities across the country.90 While they were 
intended to pressure businesses servicing Black communities to employ Blacks and thereby 
provide them with greater access to jobs, these campaigns demonstrated the power of African 
American economic retribution.91 Both Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, while 
proposing different approaches to ensure the security and success of African Americans, 
advocated the position of strength through Black economic development.92 In the 1930s, DuBois 
would translate economic strength into support of the growing consumer boycott movement.93 
But the Depression offered a unique opportunity for Black consumers because the impact of their 
efforts was particularly acute for businesses. Robert Weems has explained, “Besides merely 
seeking to increase African American employment opportunities at White-owned businesses, 
some Black consumers, during the Great Depression, used their dollars to enhance African 
American business development.”94 Thus, encouraged by leaders such as Washington and 
DuBois, African American consumers leveraged their buying power not only to pressure White 
companies and advertisers but also to boost Black-owned businesses. 
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 On a broader scale, one thing the Depression era did for the advantage of consumers was to 
instigate increased consumer scrutiny and distrust of advertising and a greater desire among 
businesses to obtain what patronage they could get. In the context of these hard times, seemingly 
businesses would be more affected by consumer boycotts and the “Don’t buy where you can’t 
work” movements experienced significant successes both in getting Black patrons to be 
recognized as viable consumers and in gaining access to employment in these same places where 
they would spend their money.95 Additionally, the increased scrutiny of advertising spawned 
from the Depression would translate in subsequent decades, in conjunction with other social and 
economic changes, into concerns and criticisms over the unequal representation of Black 
Americans.  
 It was also during the 1930s that the first study of ethnic stereotypes was conducted by 
Princeton University researchers.96 F.H. Allport had suggested in 1924 that stereotypes were 
synonymous with prejudice, and Walter Lippmann introduced the concept to the general public 
in 1926. Later, in 1960, Gordon Allport published The Nature of Prejudice, in which he 
suggested that stereotypes are perpetuated through media, and in 1977, J. Bowes suggested that 
they are defined by being fixed and extreme despite changing events.97 This persistence of 
stereotypes is clearly represented in many of the public discourses and actions toward African 
Americans through much of the 20th century. Research has demonstrated that negative 
stereotypes perpetuate poor conditions and serve to maintain status quo.98 A barrage of media 
material, including advertising, socially sanctioned racial prejudice well into the late 20th 
century. And despite the telling research of a largely untapped, growing and viable Black 
consumer market, no significant quantity of research takes place until well after World War II in 
the 1950s and 1960s. But the efforts of the various consumer empowerment activists in the 1930s 
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had an enduring effect on African Americans’ awareness and use of their role as consumers and, 
along with increasing visibility in other cultural realms, only served to increase their 
determination during World War II.99  
For example, throughout the 1930s, several momentous events in athletics prefaced some of 
the later arguments that African American leaders would use to connect fascism abroad with the 
oppression they experienced at home. Runner Jesse Owens broke records in winning four gold 
medals at the 1936 Olympic Games held in Berlin, the stronghold of Nazi Germany. Boxer Joe 
Louis defeated Italian-American Primo Carnera in 1935 and German Max Schmeling in 1938. 
For African Americans who saw these opponents as symbols of oppressive forces, these victories 
destabilized racist claims of superiority over the Black race.100 As America entered World War II 
to fight fascism and racism, Black America faced conflicting demands on their loyalties to each 
other and to an America that had for years degraded and demoralized them. Blacks seized the 
opportunity to leverage the official American war rhetoric of democracy and freedom to speak 
out against racial discrimination.101 
 
World War II and Beyond: 1940s-1950s 
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and drew the United States into World 
War II. With wartime technology and production demands, industrialization gained further 
momentum and brought with it profound changes that ushered in a new era of prosperity for 
millions of Americans.102 As it had in the First World War, the advertising industry offered its 
services as consumption was reprioritized to support the war effort. In 1942, the War Advertising 
Council, renamed the Advertising Council in 1945, was formed to coordinate advertising’s 
efforts and reinitiate the poster and advertising programs that had proven successful in World 
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War I.103 The advertising industry provided almost a billion dollars of time and space;104 and 
advertising agencies and businesses rallied around patriotic themes, with a multitude of brands 
communicating a variety of wartime themes that helped develop consumer loyalty.105 After 
World War II, the United States had solidified its status as a global power106 and emerged 
prepared for another period of prosperity. 
But the 1940s is a somewhat underappreciated time in the in the history of African 
Americans and advertising. It is a period rich with developments that serve as the foundation for 
advances most commonly associated with the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.  According 
to author Thomas Cripps, “on the eve of an impending foreign war against nations that included 
racism in their policies, Blacks seized the opportunity to demonstrate that their social goals and 
the nation’s had very nearly become one.”107 Though they had to balance the issue delicately, 
Black newspapers played an important role in addressing the issue of discrimination both abroad 
and at home through the “Double V” concept.108 They voiced strong support for the war, but took 
the opportunity of the international effort to protest discrimination at home and segregation and 
exclusion of Blacks, particularly in the Armed Forces.109 Over 2.5 million African Americans had 
signed up for the draft.110 They served separately from White soldiers, but nonetheless played an 
important role in the war effort and returned home demanding equal rights for jobs, better 
housing and fair wages. African Americans gained increasing recognition for their efforts in the 
war, on the home front, and as consumers. African Americans had been armed with a growing 
assertiveness in consumer realms in the wake of consumer empowerment efforts of the 1930s 
and they returned with an “enhanced sense of self-determination” from World War II.111 
Advertising did not escape the censure of this increased consumer activism.112 
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Months prior to Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 
on June 25, 1941 to prohibit discrimination in government and government-related defense 
industries and established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (F.E.P.C) to oversee the 
implementation of the executive order.113 Though timed to deter a planned protest march in the 
nation’s capital, this edict paved the way for Black workers to gain entry into skilled industrial 
positions,114 of which there was an increasing number developing to meet wartime demands. 
Consequently, along with millions of other Americans seeking employment and a way out of 
Depression-era hardships,115 many Blacks migrated to areas where these jobs could be found116 
and were hired in skilled industrial positions with higher wages than previously imaginable.117 
These changes were not met without resistance and tension, as demonstrated through the 1943 
Detroit race riots.118 But additionally, these migrations opened up market possibilities that did not 
previously exist.  
For example, with black urban populations growing, the market for Black music expanded 
significantly119 and provided audiences for pioneers in Black music forms. This would have 
important effects in the postwar era, as the rhythm and blues sounds of Black-oriented radio 
crossed over into the White teenage market.120 William Barlow writes of this phenomenon, 
“Postwar radio was characterized by both White and Black deejays capturing the attention and 
imagination of a youthful urban audience with the introduction of rhythm and blues formats. As 
had been the case in similar cross-cultural exchanges in the past, the Black innovators set the 
new styles… while their White imitators and benefactors reaped the financial benefits.”121 Here, 
Barlow is articulating a recurrent theme in which the “cross-cultural exchange” is inequitable; 
more so, black businesses and organizations frequently would suffer from these exchanges. 
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In what Robert Weems has termed the “most dramatic business overture to African American 
consumers” of the 1940s, the Brooklyn Dodgers signed Jackie Robinson as the first African 
American to the White-dominated major league establishment.122 But this move meant mixed 
results for the African American community that sought mainstream recognition but had also 
worked hard to develop organizations of their own. While professional baseball had included 
black players from its inception in the 1870s and 1880s, Jim Crow conventions quickly 
prevailed. In a move that was representative of the situation with other American sports, 
professional baseball banned black players in 1877—a ban that was not lifted until Robinson’s 
1947 debut on Ebbets Field.123 Robinson’s move to the mainstream professional league united 
African Americans around a sense of growing pride and triumph. But this move was not without 
its trials. Robinson was subjected to a variety indignations and threats, the most egregious of 
which were against his life. In spite of this, he made a tremendous impact on the sports world—
earning the Rookie of the Year Award in his debut year and the league-wide MVP in 1949—and 
on American society, as having crossed the color line in sports. Robinson is credited with having 
paved the way for further integration in other arenas as well as breaking down the stalwart 
barriers of prejudice.124  
Robinson recognized on various levels the import of his entry into national major league 
baseball. Upon the announcement of his signing, he is quoted as having said, “I can’t begin to 
tell you how happy I am that I am the first member of my race in organized ball. I realize how 
much it means to me, to my race, and to baseball. I can only say that I’ll do my very best to come 
through in every manner.”125 According to Walter Leavy in a 1997 anniversary article on 
Robinson in Ebony, “Largely because of Robinson, the color line in sports came tumbling down, 
creating a path for the likes of Michael Jordan, Reggie Jackson, and Walter Payton.”126 Many 
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Blacks at the time also believed that this move was a symbol of ensuing change in other spaces 
previously closed to them. Thus, the benefits of this historic move were numerous, for it 
represented an important triumph, served as a source of pride and an entre into other arenas for 
African Americans, and it proved to be a quite profitable for the Dodgers.  
The rising levels of income and increased urbanization of the Black community were 
important factors in the desegregation of baseball.127 With urbanization, large communities of 
potential fans had developed whose pride in the accomplishments of their race undoubtedly 
made them quite loyal and whose increasing income allowed them the opportunity to support 
their teams. However, this move also signaled the beginning of the end for the Negro Baseball 
Leagues, originally founded to provide an outlet for Black players banned from mainstream 
sports, as both fans and players migrated to the major leagues.128 The Negro League baseball 
followed much the same path as other African American businesses that lost consumers and 
revenue to the process of integration, as mainstream outlets began catering to them.  
This issue was similarly reflected in the profits acquired from advertising to Blacks. 
American businesses were poised to reap considerable profits from Black consumers, while 
Black businesses faced the threat of losing consumers and revenue. African Americans’ 
increasing wages, greater disposable income, and developing awareness of their economic power 
garnered the attention of the advertising trade press and of advertisers129—attention that was 
followed, with some reluctance, by interest in and need for Black professionals within the mass 
media and image industries.  
Coupled with continued pressure from African American consumers and leaders, Americans 
were starting to feel the imminent changes in race relations. By the early 1940s, several 
corporations had been penalized by African Americans for their representation of and to Black 
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consumers. As Weems recounts, “These companies’ subsequent public apologies to Black 
consumers and their removal of offensive ads and products graphically demonstrated the 
potential power of Black consumer activism.”130 This kind of pressure continued throughout the 
1940s in the face of wavering business reactions to the growing African American consumer 
market.131 For example, David J. Sullivan, who had emerged as a leading expert on the Black 
consumer market during WWII, published several important and widely read essays on the 
demographic and statistical profiles of Black consumers,132 in which he advised advertisers about 
what not to do when advertising to Blacks. This advice attended to some of the long-standing 
prejudices and misrepresentations of African Americans, drawing from slave and minstrel 
imagery—he advised advertisers not to exaggerate physical characteristics, to avoid Blackface 
and other minstrel conventions and characters such as “Aunt Jemimas,” and to use proper 
English grammar and dialect.133 Sullivan was reflecting in the popular press what previous 
research had already indicated—African Americans have long been sensitive to negative 
depictions and used their role as consumers to act out against them.134 With a greater number of 
major corporations advertising in African American media by the mid-1940s135 and with the new 
challenges of representation posed by the introduction of television, this issue was becoming 
increasingly prominent. 
As interest in the African American market grew, White companies and advertising agencies 
began turning to “Negro market” specialists like Sullivan to help them communicate with Black 
audiences.136 Some companies, such as Pepsi-Cola, hired these specialists to work internally. 
Pepsi established a Negro Sales Department in the 1940s and put African American Edward J. 
Boyd in charge. He was later replaced by Harvey C. Russell, whose previous experience at a 
Black owned advertising agency prepared him for the role,137 and who would go on to become 
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the first African American to earn the title of vice president for a major corporation when he was 
promoted by Pepsi.138 Noticing the success of companies like Pepsi in African American markets, 
other companies began to follow suit in the 1950s.139 In 1953, several such special-market 
experts established the National Association of Market Developers (NAMD) through which to 
further promote the African American consumer market.140 As it developed, this organization 
became instrumental in encouraging advertisers and marketers to tailor their messages to Black 
consumers and speak to them with greater deference and creativity.141 
But while White-owned companies were consulting “Negro market” specialists, the 
entrepreneurial spirit of African Americans like David Sullivan was playing its own hand in 
creating Black-owned agencies and advertising mediums. Sullivan, whose market research 
proved influential, opened what is likely the first African American full-service advertising 
agency in 1943.142 The fact that his work became so influential was a testament to the importance 
of the growing African American market; but the fact that his agency only stayed open until 
1949 points to the difficulties faced by Blacks in convincing White-owned advertisers to attend 
to Black consumers and of Black-owned media to thrive. However, despite the difficulties 
experienced by Sullivan’s and other Black-owned advertising agencies, these businessmen had 
gained important experience in the field of advertising that helped them dispel some of the long-
standing prejudices about Blacks’ ability to work in such an environment and proved the inroad 
to American corporations that began hiring African Americans for their special expertise with 
Black consumers.143  
In 1945, as World War II concluded, John H. Johnson launched Ebony magazine to appeal to 
members of the accomplished African American middle class. Following on the heels of Negro 
Digest, which he formed in 1942, Ebony was a contrast to previous periodicals that highlighted 
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the difficulties of African American life. Instead, Johnson created Ebony to focus on stories of 
African American lifestyle and achievements.144 Ebony was quickly a success among African 
Americans and, despite initial hesitation on the part of advertising agencies to direct their clients 
to a new, Black-oriented magazine, Johnson began to urge such national advertisers as 
Chesterfield cigarettes, Kotex and Zenith to put their advertising dollars into Ebony.145 As one 
scholar has concluded, “Johnson’s importance in generating corporate interest in Black 
consumers can scarcely be overestimated.”146 Not only did he fill a void for a large population of 
African Americans at a time when they were increasing in size and earned income, but along the 
way he convinced many national companies that they would be a lucrative market and one to be 
taken seriously. Fitting of this argument, Ebony publicized their scoop on the 1950 Census report 
that revealed some important data about Black consumers.147 While editors and Black leaders had 
been relying on outdated and questionable data to demonstrate the strength of the African 
American market, the census revealed that the Black population had increased over 17 percent in 
the last 10 years to over 15 million and that their income had increased almost 300 percent since 
the last census. These data further demonstrated the consumption needs of Blacks, as they 
ventured into home ownership, entered better occupations and were increasingly urban.148 
Johnson also believed, as had Claude Barnett before him, that Black consumers were uniquely 
brand conscious in a way that White consumers were not because they had learned to use brands 
as assurances of quality and consistency as they coped with the abuses endured in the market 
system from years of prejudice and ill treatment. Additionally, Johnson argued that while 
conspicuous consumption was at play, choice brand names served as markers of class status 
within the black community that symbolized their ability to consume as first class Americans, if 
only in their own neighborhoods.149 On these various grounds, Johnson continued to encourage 
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advertisers to attend to the African American market into the 1950s. He bypassed advertising 
agencies, whose reluctance to recommend Black-oriented media to clients had stunted Johnson’s 
efforts, and he went directly to corporate executives; his articles for the trade press, speeches at 
trade organizations, and marketing films focused on reaching Black consumers; he initiated a 
program of product endorsements from Ebony; and he advertised regularly in the trade press.150  
Through the 1950s, an increasing number of research studies were published demonstrating 
the capacity of African American consumers and the possibilities of reaching them through 
Black-oriented media and messages.151 Black publishers had served as the early impetus and the 
continued driving force behind this increased recognition of and interest in Black consumers.152 
The financial success of their publications was certainly at issue, but for many, there was a clear 
and self-conscious drive to remodel the representation and symbolism of African American 
life.153 
 By the 1950s, television had become the dominant advertising medium, trumping radio, 
newspapers and magazines,154 and its rapid expansion provided advertisers with unprecedented 
access to consumers.155 But television posed a new set of challenges and opportunities relating to 
representation. Just as in previous mediums, racism and discrimination were prevalent on 
television156 as its images entered homes across America. The Amos ‘n’ Andy show’s move onto 
television is one prominent example. Though on television the Amos and Andy characters were 
played by Black actors, they lacked none of the stereotypical representations evident in the radio 
show, and with television’s visual impact, critics like the NAACP objected even more 
fervently.157 Nonetheless, mainstream America’s acceptance of racial discrimination in the media 
was embedded enough that the show would last through syndication until 1966. 
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As physical spaces across the country were being desegregated in the wake of a variety of 
highly-publicized events such as the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of 
Education and the 1955 Rosa Parks incident and subsequent 381-day Montgomery Bus Boycotts, 
the contentions on the television medium were indicative of continuing fears of advertisers over 
the potential effects of pursuing Black consumers. Even as they expressed increase interest in the 
African American consumer market, advertisers were trepidatious of the effects that they 
imagined would come from mainstream consumers if they were clearly and openly to target 
Black consumers. Despite strong evidence to the contrary, advertisers feared White backlash if 
they blatantly targeted Blacks, integrated them into their advertising or used them in anything 
more than nominal roles158 in mainstream venues. Nat King Cole blamed such reasoning for the 
demise of his NBC show in 1957.159 Cole was the first African American to have his own 
television show,160 but it appeared to him and to others that despite the fact that the show was 
created to deliver Black consumers to advertisers,161 industry executives never gave his show a 
chance. As Nat King Cole was quoted in Ebony, “Madison Avenue, the center of the advertising 
industry, and their big clients didn’t want their products associated with Negroes.”162 These 
events are relevant because if media serves as any indication of social and political realities, then 
through the 1950s Blacks were allowed very little contribution and recognition and were 
designated to specific, limited sets of stereotypical roles. 
By the 1950s, it was clear to most observers that advertising held considerable influence over 
the symbolic life of America. In 1952, historian David Potter declared, “Advertising now 
compares with such long-standing institutions as the school and the church in the magnitude of 
its social influence. It dominates the media, it has vast power in the shaping of popular standards, 
and it is really one of the very limited group of institutions which exercise social control.”163 
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Further, in 1954, Potter argued that advertising lacked any sense of social responsibility.164 Or, as 
another scholar articulated, until the 1960s advertising maintained “an amoral attitude to social 
concerns” that went unquestioned.165 Thus, it is no surprise that the Black community, standing 
on a foundation laid by African Americans throughout the 20th century,166 increasingly turned its 
attention to the advertising industry as they entered into the Civil Rights era of the late 1950s and 
1960s.  
 
Conclusion 
 By the 1950s, African Americans had made significant inroads into gaining stronger and 
more accurate representation in American cultural, political and economic arenas and had set the 
stage for the tremendous impact of the Civil Rights Movement. While there were many positive 
changes yet to be made, Black images in the culture industries that had long been based on gross 
misrepresentations and stereotypes drawn from early slave ads and minstrel show acts were, by 
the 1940s, beginning to make a shift towards more representative images that spoke directly to 
Black consumers. Mid-century advertisers were taking a keener interest in the growing African 
American market and, rather than relying on old stereotypes, some advertisers were beginning to 
turn to “Negro market specialists” to help them develop more appropriate appeals.  The early-
American slave ads and the images of African Americans in mainstream advertising throughout 
the 19th century serve as records of the mindset of Americans towards Blacks and demonstrate 
the presumptions and misrepresentations that served to reinforce white dominance in American 
social, economic and political life. Drawing inspiration from these same stereotypes and in turn 
feeding back into the advertising landscape, the caricatures in minstrel shows misrepresented the 
actual lives and contributions of blacks and likewise served to reaffirm white superiority in a 
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romanticized pre-industrial agrarian society. Some of the most famous and enduring advertising 
icons such as Aunt Jemima have their roots in minstrelsy. But at the same time, minstrel shows 
were a complex arena for acting out the tensions in a post-Emancipation society. The unique 
sound of the minstrel shows was drawn from African American culture and had a strong impact 
on American musical language. Despite the derogatory tone of minstrel shows, various African 
Americans, including actors and musicians, made names for themselves in this arena.  
 But black communities were content with neither the derogatory imagery depicting them or 
the marginal status afforded them. The turn of the century and a new industrialized era had 
brought with it a new consumption ethic that was supported by modern methods of transportation 
and of mass communication. African American leaders detected opportunity within this 
developing system and urged their communities to build and strengthen themselves economically 
in an effort to assert themselves in other areas in which they sought inclusion and equal 
representation. These leaders began urging their communities to establish their own businesses 
and to serve the growing black consumer population. Black publications, which had begun to 
build even in pre-Civil War America, began to press advertisers to recognize the growing power 
of the Black consumer market and to attend to them with more realistic representations that did 
not fall guilty of the stereotypical standbys. 
 Wartime migration reformulated the black consumer market further. As blacks moved to the 
north and to urban centers searching for better wages and better acceptance, they also 
reconceptualized black identity and contributed to the American landscape with various 
expressions of this new identity. They did so through unique sounds of African American jazz 
and the artistic expressions of the Harlem Renaissance articulated a new sense of racial pride for 
the aging first generations of Black Americans born free. However, these sounds and images in 
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their authentic forms were not to become a part of mainstream America for decades. As radio 
was introduced in the 1920s and disseminated in homes across America in the 1930s, many of 
the same stereotypes that had been found in print transitioned onto radio. And despite America’s 
fascination with the sounds of jazz, white America co-opted and profited from these sounds, 
while the African Americans who created them were relegated for the most part to black-oriented 
media options and were marginalized.  
 While the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s were times of intensified interest in African American 
markets, as was reflected in increased research into these markets, there was still a great amount 
of resistance to black consumers. Many advertisers maintained the belief that they could reach 
blacks through mainstream media and, despite a great deal of evidence showing otherwise, that 
most blacks did not have enough discretionary income to be viable consumers anyway. Despite 
this resistance, African American leaders and publishers like Claude Barnett and John H. 
Johnson continued to push for more research and to urge companies to attend more closely to 
black markets. As a result, some national advertisers did begin placing advertisements into Black 
publications, but these ads were the same ones developed for white consumers and did not speak 
directly to the publications’ black audiences. Overall, depictions of African Americans remained 
problematic and few through the 1930s. But, by that time, African American leaders were 
becoming increasingly sophisticated in their approaches to obtain greater recognition and 
equality. 
 While America was in the depths of the Great Depression, advertisers began to realize that 
they could not afford to turn away patronage based on long-standing prejudices. Black leaders 
seized this opportunity and implemented a series of efforts that culminated in the “Don’t Buy 
Where You Can’t Work” campaigns of the 1930s. African Americans were aware of their 
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economic power, of what it could do to advance them in American society, and they were not 
afraid to use it. Despite a change in Americans’ focus as a result of World War II, African 
Americans continued their consumer activism in the 1940s and created organizations such as the 
NAMD through which they rallied their efforts. 
 Thus, in post-Civil War America, African Americans endured long-running battles for 
inclusion and representation. They leveraged the cultural impact of the uniquely Black sounds 
and images of music and art, and they realized the tremendous potential of their economic force. 
In building African American businesses and pressing mainstream advertisers with the 
developing growth of Black, urban markets and increased research into these markets, they 
began to build, though sometimes slowly and rarely without resistance, the momentum that 
would propel the Civil Rights Movement of the late-1950s and 1960s. 
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CHAPTER 3:  AFRICAN AMERICANS AND MARKETS, 1950s-1980s 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Two chronicled the hardships and successes of African Americans—planted in 
the 1700s with early American slave advertising and proceeding through the early 1950s with the 
seeds of the Civil Rights Movement—in garnering greater inclusion in consumer realms and in 
struggling to transform the symbolism and imagery by which they were characterized. It 
concluded with the 1940s and early 1950s, during which time the foundation was laid across a 
variety of mediums for greater and more representative African American presence that would, 
as many believed, be the path to the achievement of civil liberties. Indeed, the social and political 
achievements of the coming Civil Rights Movement were indebted in no small part to the 
economic advancement for which many in the African American community had fought.  
 This chapter continues that history by examining the major initiatives towards 
representation during the Civil Rights movement, the environment in which they developed, and 
what kind of change they affected in subsequent years. As struggles for civil rights met greater 
attention in mainstream America, activists also called for greater attention to representations of 
African Americans in media as important vessels for and reflections of positive change. 
Additionally, this chapter explores various communication media and forms that were important 
in providing voice for African Americans, as well as the political and social environments in 
which they existed.  
 
Civil Rights and Consumer Rights: Late 1950s-1970 
 The 1960s in advertising histories is known for the Creative Revolution of the industry. 
But on a broader scale, the 1960s were met with sweeping social, political and cultural change. 
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The seemingly unfettered prosperity of the 1950s had only served to quell the growing 
disillusionment with the American government’s failure to alleviate racial and social injustice.1 
The 1960 Presidential election was in many ways a demonstration of the newfound African 
American influence, as the political movement toward Democratic nominee John F. Kennedy 
provided the margin of votes that helped elect him.2 Kennedy’s attention to civil rights issues had 
attracted many voters who might otherwise have gone with Republican nominee Richard Nixon.3 
Despite fervent opposition from Southern powers within his party, Kennedy proceeded to push 
various civil rights enactments, including the strongest civil rights legislation to date that, when 
stymied in Congress, inspired Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous 1963 “I have a dream” speech 
before the Lincoln Memorial.4  
After Kennedy’s assassination in November of that year, Lyndon B. Johnson pushed the bill 
through Congress in a tribute to Kennedy, creating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was 
considered “the culmination of the civil rights movement at that time.”5  Included in the 1964 
Civil Rights Act were Title VI and Title VII, which required that federal agencies allocating 
financial assistance must do so free of discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. 
Federal organizations such as the Small Business Administration, established in 1953, began to 
target blacks as part of their obligation to abide by the new legislation.6 In tandem with the Civil 
Rights Act, President Johnson’s Economic Opportunity Act established the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to support an increase in black employment and the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, which helped to guide black businesspeople through loan programs 
designed to provide business assistance to poor, inner-city blacks.7 Despite the fact that these 
measures to aid small businesses still provided significantly disproportionate support in favor of 
white businesspeople, they met resistance from opponents who argued that they preferentially 
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treated African Americans.8 Regardless, many considered these efforts largely in and of 
themselves ineffective; however, they did offer an opportunity for national civil rights and local 
community-based organizations who were able to leverage Johnson’s political moves “to 
promote the economic empowerment of black communities in creating their own programs.”9 
For example, in 1962 Martin Luther King Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) founded Operation Breadbasket in Atlanta and in 1966 expanded to Chicago under the 
direction of the Reverend Jesse Jackson. Operation Breadbasket was created to put “bread, 
money and income in the baskets of black and poor people.”10 As the program developed, it 
established a mission of promoting both black employment and black business, targeting both 
black and white establishments through their efforts.11 
Thus, among the issues of the 1960s that came to the forefront were the civil rights and 
economic opportunities of African Americans, and these issues would have a tremendous impact 
in the following decades. Robert Weems recounts an August 5, 1961 Business Week story 
entitled “New Business Ways in the South,” in which a department store manager was quoted as 
saying, “After this eating thing has settled down, we’re going to have more upheaval. It’s a 
social revolution, and we can’t have it painlessly.”12 Average Americans understood that the 
nation was on the precipice of a revolution. This social revolution coalesced on a variety of 
fronts, from the feminist movement to the consumer movement to the youth hippie movement; 
the issue of civil rights was at the heart of this momentous social upheaval. 
Indeed, these were the years of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, “sit-ins” and 
“freedom riders,” integration of public spaces, riots, and a new approach to being black, typified 
in style by “Afros” and in such phraseology as “Black is beautiful.”13 Another common theme of 
the era, drawn in no small way from the 1930s “Don’t buy where you can’t work” campaigns 
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and subsequent black consumer activism, was the theme “Be Black. Buy Black.”14 Equal 
opportunities for employment and consumption were driving forces of change. The civil rights 
protests in the early 1960s were a direct result of unequal employment practices,15 consumption 
opportunities, and inaccurate representations that disadvantaged minorities. A number of 
scholars have argued that the impetus for change in American society arose from the pragmatism 
of businesses in recognizing both the benefits of hiring and targeting African Americans, but also 
the repercussions of not doing so.16 Increasingly, U.S. companies, recognizing the importance of 
black consumers to their business success, were instrumental in guiding the American public 
through the social changes of the 1960s.17 Therefore, in response to this growing sense of racial 
pride of 1960s activism, American companies co-opted black culture and began promoting it to 
both white and black consumers with messages about “soul music” (the former rhythm and blues 
of previous eras) and “soul food”;18 but they suffered from a lack of authenticity.19 To alleviate 
the problem, these companies turned once again to black consultants. But even as some 
advertising professionals were not taking seriously the concerns and culture of black shoppers, 
others, and particularly those in integrated agencies, were assuming the role of changing 
representations and improving the symbolism of black Americans in advertising.20 
According to Kern-Foxworth, blacks in the 1960s increasingly were tackling the derogatory 
language and imagery of advertising and the symbolic power that it held.21 Certainly to this 
point, after years of disparaging stereotypes, negative images of blacks had become embedded in 
the advertising landscape and had become fixtures in many American homes.22 Therefore, as the 
fight for civil liberties surged, several groups began pressing businesses and advertising agencies 
to integrate blacks into their marketing and advertising strategies and imagery and to do so in 
ways that more accurately represented African American life and experience. They wanted to 
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break advertisers of the erroneous assumption that blacks could be reached by white-oriented 
messages23 and did not have unique market needs and desires; perhaps more so, they wanted to 
eradicate the underlying prejudice on which these strategies were based—the ongoing, though 
unwarranted, fear that whites would be offended by the depiction of an integrated and fully-
respected African American. 
Organizations such as the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and individuals like Jesse Jackson, who saw 
this as an issue of civil liberties, were at the helm of a movement to change advertising 
representations and compel U.S. companies to incorporate black models.24 These civil rights 
groups met with the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) and other 
advertising entities to urge them to take up the issues of black consumers and promote change 
within the industry they represented.25 When these appeals proved inadequate, black leaders 
threatened boycotts and petitioned through legal channels such as the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to take measures opposing the discriminatory practices manifested in much 
advertising and media content.26 In 1964, the NAACP called for the top 100 advertising agencies 
to examine media practices in Mississippi and urge their clients to reprove the media that did not 
uphold principles of civil liberties; in 1962, a New York mayoral commission on job 
advancement directly encouraged advertisers and agencies to integrate their advertising; in 1966 
and 1967, the New York State Commission on Human Rights held hearings that resulted in 
hundreds more black employees in top advertising agencies, in positions where they could 
influence the representation of blacks in advertising messages; and in 1968, the Kerner 
Commission reported that the mass media dominated by whites was an inadequate system and 
required integration.27  
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President Johnson established the interracial, bi-partisan National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders (NACCD) in 1967 in the wake of riots in American cities like Watts, Newark, 
Harlem and Detroit. President Johnson was criticized for comprising the commission of 
moderates; but as Tom Wicker of the New York Times argued, “A commission made up of 
militants, or even influenced by them, could not conceivably have spoken with a voice so 
effective, so sure to be heard by white, moderate, responsible America.”28 The NACCD released 
a sweeping report, commonly called the Kerner Report after commission chair Governor Otto 
Kerner of Illinois, that blamed white racism as the core cause of the riots, indicated that black 
resentment of police stemmed from perceptions of police brutality and harassment of blacks, and 
indicted mass media for its role in depicting African Americans as subordinate members of 
American society.29 The report argued that most whites were oblivious to the destructive 
environment of the racial ghetto, yet nonetheless were “deeply implicated” in the circumstances 
that led to conditions in America’s ghettos; further, these social and economic conditions created 
patterns of continued disadvantage for blacks in comparison to whites. The report concluded, 
“Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”30 
They did not dance around the causes: “What white Americans have never fully understood—but 
what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White 
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”31 
 Recognizing a complex set of social, political and economic conditions that led to rioting 
and outrage over the conditions experienced by many black Americans, the report suggested that 
“frustrated hopes are the residue of the unfulfilled expectations aroused by the great judicial and 
legislative victories of the Civil Rights Movement and the dramatic struggle for equal rights in 
the South” and what the rioters were seeking was “fuller participation in the social order and the 
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material benefits enjoyed by the majority of American citizens.”32 Though none of the Kerner 
Commission report’s major proposals were carried out, the information it provided about the 
impact of media on the African American condition, offered an opportunity for blacks in 
demanding more realistic depictions of their situations, life roles and their relationships.33 Just as 
African American leaders had been looking at specific agencies and companies to target in their 
efforts to gain greater recognition for blacks in advertising,34 they also took aim at specific media 
for their failure to reflect the changing mores of the civil rights era.  
Back in the 1940s, radio had been the site of a variety of programs that took a critical look at 
racism and segregation as the black community fused their goals with the patriotic war-era goals. 
The government’s War Department made a strategic attempt to implement a program of 
integration into some of the nation’s primetime programs.35 But when the war ended, radio 
broadcasts returned to “business as usual”36 and integration of the airwaves took a recess. The 
popularity of the rhythm and blues music was overshadowed by the 1950s white youth rock ‘n 
roll sounds that it had inspired; rhythm and blues was marginalized to black-only radio stations 
and re-coined “soul music.”37 But the mental shift occurring in the Civil Rights era of the 1960s 
paved the way for an increasing number of black-oriented radio stations to speak to the still-
growing urban listening audience.38 Until the “Top 40” radio format later upset the control that 
deejays had over radio content, black deejays commanded a great deal of influence over the 
airwaves.39 On these “soul music” stations, deejays promoted the socially conscious music of 
such artists as Aretha Franklin and James Brown, they introduced new artists to their local 
airwaves, and they held significant sway over the music industry.40 However, even while deejays 
induced a variety of changes in radio, African Americans were impeded from commercial radio 
ownership;41 though this would change in the 1970s, the ultimate control over content on black-
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oriented radio stations still rested in the hands of white owners through the 1960s. Therefore, 
even after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when radio stations responded to increasing pressures and 
began airing series that featured African Americans, many viewed these programs as simply 
accomodationist and lacking in authenticity.42 But while radio was a place of contention over 
racial issues in the 1960s, television and print were the more contested media in the 1960s.43 
Generally speaking, print advertising appeared to reflect more adequately and promptly the 
changing social environment. A 1963 print ad for the New York Telephone Company appeared 
in the New York Herald Tribune and other local newspapers featuring a black model. This was 
recorded as a significant news event in a variety of papers as the first time a general circulation 
publication had featured a black model in a non-disparaging manner—indeed, in an empowered 
position.44 Despite the hopefulness provided by this incident of integration, significant 
discrepancies persisted in advertising—particularly in television. 
In 1963, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) sought to change the image of African 
Americans by pressing for integration of television commercials and higher employment of 
blacks in advertising and media industries. This effort, called the TV Image Campaign, was 
driven by the belief that advertising was playing a significant role in the oppression of blacks and 
that with some important changes in the advertising industry, the medium instead could improve 
the image of blacks in America.45 In a few short months, CORE had succeeded in securing 
agreements to integrate African Americans into sponsored programs and advertising from three 
of the largest American companies—Lever Brothers, Colgate-Palmolive, and Proctor & 
Gamble—and were preparing to meet with many more. Conversely, the following year General 
Motors announced it would withdraw sponsorship of “Bonanza” if it featured an African 
American as a guest star; while they later reversed this decision under pressure from NAACP 
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and NBC,46 this incident was a prominent display of the tenuous nature of gains made by such 
organizations as CORE. Further, a 1964 study of television published by the New York Ethical 
Society demonstrated that despite some improvements, the television industry was failing to 
reflect political and social changes of the era.47 This trend persisted in the frequency of African 
Americans in advertising. In 1953, one of the first studies of frequency examined a series of print 
publications between 1949-1950, indicating that in the very small percentage of ads that 
contained blacks (just over 0.5 percent), they were almost always cast in unskilled labor 
positions.48 This study was reproduced in 1970 by a different author, who concluded that there 
had been a slight increase in the use of black models and they were not as heavily stereotyped in 
his survey from 1967-1968.49 But even these positive conclusions were contested. Authors David 
Colfax and Susan Sternberg (1972) argued that a mere shift in racial stereotypes had occurred, 
rather than genuine representations of African American life and experiences.50 Similar and more 
expansive studies were conducted on the frequency of blacks in both print and television 
advertising with similar results.51 
Thus, given African American leaders’ belief that one important inroad to changing the 
limited appearance and demeaning representations in advertising would be through gaining 
employment in advertising agencies, it is not surprising that in 1966, CORE joined forces with 
the Consumer Information Services (CIS) to protest defamatory and segregated advertising and 
media; in doing so, they cast their gaze on the lead advertising agency for Proctor & Gamble 
which, at the time, was Benton & Bowles.52 They chastised the agencies for failing to invest in 
the black community despite significant revenues gained directly from blacks, but their ultimate 
goal was to increase employment of African Americans in the advertising industry53. In 1968, a 
survey conducted for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders indicated that 86% 
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of U.S. employers felt obligated to make a strong effort to employ minorities; but when they had 
to rate the importance of this in a list of other social issues, the issue was rated as less serious 
than it was by a general sample of the population.54 This indicates that even though businessmen 
professed a dedication to increasing minority representation in business, they still were not 
aligned with the general public in their sense of urgency for this issue. This evidence is 
somewhat disheartening in light of the intense scrutiny lodged at businesses by government and 
civil rights activists, who were demanding change in hiring practices and had set their sights on 
advertising and other communication industries.55 Even so, the Civil Rights revolution of the 
1960s did produce substantial and fundamental changes in the way Americans and American 
businesses approached the black community.56 As Steven M. Gelber wrote in his groundbreaking 
work on the social role of businesses in integrating African Americans into American culture: 
“Through their protests, American Negroes were able to bring about increased 
government pressure for Black employment. The combination of Black and 
government demands changed the attitudes of the White public, which in turn 
created the setting in which the business community could alter its traditional 
discriminatory practices. As a result of Black activism society as a whole came to 
accept employment discrimination as a social problem, and therefore business 
attempts to eliminate unfair employment practices became socially responsible 
activity. A thread of corporate social responsibility runs throughout American 
business history, but it was not until the late 1960s that the business community 
could count employment integration in its census of good deeds.”57 
African American employment within the advertising industry did appear to have experienced a 
dramatic upsurge in the late 1960s in direct response to pressures by government and civil rights 
organizations. According to one study conducted by AAAA, minority employment in the fifteen 
largest advertising agencies more than doubled in a two year period in the late 1960s. 
The period between 1967 and 1975 has been called the “Golden Age” for African American 
agencies, which had begun opening their doors at a rate previously unmatched.58 While many of 
them would not survive the economic environment of the late 1970s experienced throughout the 
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industry, some not only survived but thrived and offered to the advertising canvas more authentic 
representations of African Americans.59 During this same period, both the advertising industry 
and black leaders were experiencing shifts in their approach to blacks and advertising. Within the 
industry, agencies had already taken some significant steps from simply hiring African 
Americans to actively recruiting and training them.60 Sparked by the assassination of Malcolm X 
in 1965 and particularly after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, the notion of 
“Black Power” began to take root. Despite criticisms of black power being invested with reverse 
racism, leaders of this movement argued that it was about the promotion of a positive black self-
identity, of pride, and of further development of black political and economic power independent 
of the historically oppressive, white-dominated mainstream institutions.61 These political ideas 
were linked artistically through the Black Arts Movement, which expressed the violence of the 
era while at the same time rejecting the “white aesthetic” and promoting a liberatory vision of 
black beauty and pride.62 The black arts movement was an effort to regain black expression and 
re-present a black aesthetic rooted in black experience and as seen through the eyes of African 
Americans. Prompted by this changing mindset, black leaders began modifying their traditional 
arguments for integration and replacing them with calls for representations that were unique to 
African Americans and that arose from genuine knowledge reflecting their lives and experiences 
through advertising.63  
However, the employment growth of the late 1960s was not replicated in the 1970s, as the 
attention of Americans and their government turned to the ensuing political and economic 
turmoil64 and the spirit of change of the 1960s gave way as many of the previous stereotypes 
subtly made their way back into the advertising landscape.65 As did many upstart advertising 
agencies in the 1960s and 1970s, the tides flowed and ebbed for black-owned agencies. 
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Nonetheless, the impact of African American agencies in the “Golden Era” laid the foundation 
for future inroads into the industry and for significant changes in its approach to representing 
blacks in its texts.66  
 
Prelude to Hip-Hop and A Changing Commercial Culture: 1970s 
The 1970s were times of continued social turbulence. The presidential election of 1968 
prefigured the political and economic disquiet to come. Republican Richard Nixon won by a 
narrow margin in a strongly contested election. While Nixon espoused some rather progressive 
ideologies, which became realities through regulatory legislation in areas ranging from 
environmentalism to civil rights, Nixon also sought party realignment with southern whites 
notorious for their opposition to civil rights and New Deal legislation.67 Nixon’s administration 
was plagued with the drawn-out conflict in Vietnam. Despite winning a second term on promises 
of phasing out U.S. involvement, he instead stepped up war efforts between 1969 and 1971.68 
With a heavy burden on the poor, the Vietnam War had a particularly grave impact on black 
communities whose faith in American politics was only further shaken.69 As the Vietnam War 
dragged to its conclusion, the Watergate scandal shook all Americans’ faith in the political 
system, and growing inflation, accompanied by federal deficits, undermined the strength of the 
economic system on which the consumption ethic rested. While the post-World War II prosperity 
had come to an end, the post-war urbanization trends continued as the disparity between blacks 
and whites in urban centers grew and was further exaggerated by white suburbanization.70 
In his seminal work The Disadvantaged Consumer (1975), Alan Andreasen chronicles the 
consumer problems faced by the disadvantaged—the poor and black—and proposes solutions to 
alleviate these problems. The issues addressed by Andreasen in this book and his other works are 
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worth some attention here. Andreasen’s work stems from a recognition that both the advocates 
and critics of the consumer movement of the 1960s had disconnected many of the concerns taken 
up by the movement from their roots in heavily disadvantaged populations.71 Indeed, in an article 
entitled “The Differing Nature of Consumerism in the Ghetto” (1976), Andreasen argues that the 
consumer movement of the 1960s was a white, middle-class movement and as such lacked the 
capacity to truly understand the nature of and therefore improve the circumstances of the truly 
disadvantaged—the poor and black.72 
This third wave of consumerism in the United States began with the writings of Vance 
Packard in the late 1950s and was propelled by Ralph Nader and the auto safety hearings of 1965 
and 1966.73 While he concedes that all consumers are to some extent disadvantaged, Andreasen 
is concerned with the question of whether the group that he has chosen to call disadvantaged—
“the individuals who are particularly handicapped in achieving adequate value for their consumer 
dollar in the urban marketplace because of their severely restricted incomes, their minority racial 
status, their old age, and/or their difficulties with language”74—have problems in the consumer 
realm that are qualitatively different than those of the rest of society. He concluded that in fact 
they were qualitatively different and that because of this, a white, middle-class consumer 
movement would not be equipped to battle the problems of poor, urban blacks,75 echoing the 
sentiments expressed in the Kern Commission Report of the white community’s blind eye to the 
destructive conditions of the racial ghetto.  
The historical and contemporary oppression and exclusion experienced by the black 
community, Andreasen argued, created “a set of shared experiences and views of the world that 
set blacks apart from the rest of society in terms of the basic goals and behavioral patterns they 
bring to the marketplace.”76 The statistics of black urban poor were disheartening. In 1970, the 8 
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million black poor made up 30% of all poor, despite the fact that blacks overall accounted for 
only about 11% of the total population. Andreasen concluded that without the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the situation might be even worse for black Americans.77 While Chapters 1 and 6 deal 
further with the issues of “disadvantage,” it is important to note here, as Andreasen does, that 
analyses of poor black consumers tend to be derived from middle-class standards of rationality 
and without proper heed to the conditions of poor black consumers and that these analyses rest 
on stereotypes.78 That is, “An integral part of the popular stereotype of blacks in America is that 
they are ‘as a race’ happy-go-lucky spendthrifts, living on the pleasures of the moment, paying 
little heed to future needs.”79 As the black community had to this point long realized, many of 
these stereotypes had been created and perpetuated through representations in mass media and, in 
particular, advertising. The importance of black presence in the advertising industry, therefore, 
remained as crucial as ever and yet, as the Society of Black Communicators decried in the late 
1970s, the number of black advertising agencies was decreasing.80 
Unfortunately, in combination with a variety of industry and economic issues, by the mid-
1970s, when businesses were struggling through the worst economic environment since the 
Great Depression, many companies dropped their black-owned advertising agencies in an effort 
to economize.81 However, some unanticipated advances arose out of these conditions. Driven to 
find areas where they could increase their revenues, many companies began to look in earnest at 
black consumers as legitimate and lucrative markets.82 “This interest sparked the emergence of 
new Black agencies, media vehicles, and spokespersons,” explains advertising historian Jason 
Chambers, “helping raise the visibility of Black consumers and the Black agency segment even 
further.”83 Two African American agencies in particular, Burrell, Inc. and UniWorld, benefited 
from these changes and they emerged promoting new concepts about the black consumer market 
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that stemmed from shifts in overall social goals.84 For example, in running his agency, Tom 
Burrell espoused a philosophy of “positive realism”—a concept with its roots in earlier leaders 
such as Claude Barnett and David Sullivan, Burrell argued that advertising should use positive 
and affirmative images of blacks in common circumstances, as they really are.85  
Concurrently, black organizations were continuing to push for the elimination of racism in 
and greater employment for blacks in advertising. In 1970, the NAACP appealed to the FCC to 
examine the continued racism in advertising.86 In 1975, Vernon Jordan of the National Urban 
League reinitiated the charge against discrimination in the employment practices of advertising 
agencies;87 and prominent figures like Jesse Jackson, along with voices from the variety of 
coalitions he formed, criticized the practices of major corporations like Coca-Cola,88 an approach 
they would continue well into the 1990s with companies such as Nike. Marilyn Kern-Foxworth 
argues, “what occurred as a result is what we now refer to as ‘integrated advertising.’”89 While 
that may be, it seems that what African American activists were seeking at this point, however, 
went beyond “integrated advertising” to form a deeper and more authentic understanding of 
black consumers—one that appealed to black pride and that depicted their lives through the 
“positive realism” espoused by Burrell. Janette Dates argues, “As we have seen, most often the 
portrayal of Blacks in advertising showed an insensitivity to the African American consumer, 
and a lack of understanding of the market,”90 particularly as the belief persisted among many 
advertisers having argued that black consumers could be reached through general market (i.e., 
white-oriented) appeals. But gradually through the 1970s, marketers appeared to gain more 
appropriate understanding of black consumer markets and realize that they were not monolithic91 
and could not all be targeted with one message and certainly not one message designed for white 
audiences.  
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White marketers could have taken a cue from recession-surviving black-owned agencies that 
understood and capitalized on the diversity of the African American market. As Jason Chambers 
writes of Vince Cullers Advertising, “The development of Soul marketing also exemplifies how 
Cullers and other black professionals highlighted divisions within the black consumer market. 
Soul marketing was not applicable to every single person… [therefore], it could not reach every 
piece of the black consumer market; indeed, it would sometimes alienate blacks from a 
product.”92 But as the advertising industry began to respond to these pressures to more 
appropriately target African American consumers, these very same practices were under 
scrutiny. This scrutiny arose in large part from the structural developments of the industry and its 
treatment of African Americans—targeting to black consumers primarily was conducted by 
black-owned agencies or by “special markets” units within mainstream agencies. Some argued 
that this was not an improvement over long-standing social issues, but rather that it constituted 
segregation in reverse. Proponents within the industry responded that targeted marketing was 
exactly the kind of deference that black leaders and consumers had been seeking throughout the 
20th century.93 Arguments against target marketing would resurface in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s in contention with specific kinds of target marketing, particularly those that singled out 
urban, black consumers for “sin” products such as tobacco and alcohol. Given the specific 
circumstances surrounding such products, however, these concerns would have greater 
legitimacy and weight because of the potential and actual negative consequences to the black 
community that arise from specific inherent characteristics of those products. But in the 
meantime, target marketing of black consumers “had the support of both the changing emphasis 
of the civil rights movement from integration to nationalism as well as developing marketing 
theories that legitimized its use.”94 
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Across a variety of media, the movement towards the incorporation of African Americans, 
with previous history as an indication, would be tenuous. For example, the film industry did 
manage to incorporate blacks more fully into major movies roles during the 1970s. But if movies 
are any accurate depiction of reality, then the reality of blacks was filled with sex, violence and 
crime. Such were the themes in particular of the “blaxploitation” films of the era. But, as Robert 
Weems argues, what these films more accurately convey is the fleecing of African American 
moviegoers.95 As in other media, the profits collected from these films went primarily into the 
pockets of white businessmen.96 However, “blaxploitation” films did offer some benefit to 
African Americans in the recording industry. These films were musically scored by popular 
African American recording artists—Shaft was scored by Isaac Hayes, for which he earned an 
Academy Award; Superfly was scored by Curtis Mayfield, whose soundtrack album went 
platinum; and Troubleman was scored by Marvin Gaye.97 
In the 1970s, African Americans made important inroads into the music industry with an 
increase in the number of black-owned and operated radio stations.98 The control over 
broadcasting content that comes with ownership status gave blacks significantly more influence 
over the tastes and movement of youth music. In particular, they allowed black deejays 
considerable weight over styles of music on the radio, which they complemented as well with 
influence on the streets. In the case of hip hop, street deejays at house parties and later in clubs 
were instrumental not only in cultivating it but in developing it.  
Hip hop is more than a music form; it is a cultural movement99 that developed in the “gang-
ridden, drug-infested streets”100 of the Bronx101 in New York City in the late 1960s and 1970s. It 
began as gatherings—“basketball court parties”—that were centered around internationally-
inspired musical sounds and were made up of urban youth who were lacking other positive social 
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outlets.102 Clive Campbell, a.k.a. DJ Kool Herc, is considered by many to be the founder of hip-
hop. Having grown up with the unique musical forms of his native Jamaica, he brought those 
sounds with him when his family immigrated to the Bronx in 1967.103 In his book Hip Hop 
Culture (2006), Emmett G. Price draws the lineage of hip-hop’s success from the Harlem 
Renaissance and similar art movements in various cities across America throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. He argues that the Black Arts movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the artistic 
expression of the Black Power movement, revisited the ideologies originally expressed in the 
Renaissance movements earlier in the century. But post-World War II Bronx had seen significant 
decline from its pre-War standing as a space to realize the “American Dream.” By the 1970s, the 
Bronx was considered to be “the worst neighborhood in America”104 and was rife with drugs, 
crime and gang warfare. According to Price, “Gang affiliation offered the social status that 
money could not buy.”105 A seminal moment in gang warfare occurred in December 1971 when 
hundreds of gang members met at the Bronx Boys Club to discuss alternatives to violence and at 
which a truce was called. A 14-year-old Afrika Bambaataa, who would become a central figure 
in the rise of hip-hop, was present at that meeting as the rising leader of the Black Spades.106  
Bambaataa believed that the importance of hip-hop was in its ability to empower and change the 
lives of the otherwise disenfranchised.107 Indeed, as one author writes: 
“Afrika Bambaataa, recognized by many as one of the central figures in the rise of 
hip hop, has consistently maintained over the years that the culture’s political 
potency can be traced back to the early days of the movement. As a pioneering 
DJ, Bambaataa experimented with the notion that in addition to being a source of 
amusement hip hop could also be a force for social change. As much as anyone, 
he understood why hip hop mattered in the lives of ordinary youths. Hip hop’s 
real power and true significance, Bambaataa professes, resides in its capacity to 
empower young people to want to change their lives. Before many others did he 
believed there was something notably serious about the pleasure-seeking 
ambitions that characterized hip hop back in the day.”108 
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Hip-hop offered an alternative as turntable, dance, graffiti, and lyrical wars in many ways 
were substituted for gang warfare.109 Early DJs such as Afrika Bambaataa and Grandmaster Flash 
“battled” each other in turf wars throughout the Bronx,110 simulating much of the same bravado 
embedded in gang behavior but with much less deadly and much more positive and empowering 
outcomes. 
Lisa Sullivan calls figures like Bambaattaa, Grandmaster Flash, Melle Mel, and Kool DJ 
Hercs the “bridge generation” because they formed the passage from the civil rights generation 
to the hip-hop generation.111 The hip-hop generation, then, is commonly considered to be the 
generation of black Americans born post-Civil Rights and, as such, is the first generation to grow 
up free of legalized segregation and with a sense, though somewhat conflicted, of “authentic” 
blackness.112 Yet many youth living in impoverished inner-city environments failed to see how 
the promises of the Civil Rights Movement had been realized for them. 
As a movement, the expressions of hip hop were deeply rooted in the urban African 
American experience—hip hop was a manifestation of that experience. The voice of hip hop in 
the 1970s was a politicized voice. As one author explains,  
“Hip hop evolved during the 1970s as a liberation movement in the form of a 
diverse culture; it was a next-generation civil (human) rights movement sparked 
by ostracized, marginalized, and oppressed inner-city youth… It is a means and 
method of expression thriving on social commentary, political critique, economic 
analysis, religious exegesis, and street awareness while combating long-standing 
issues of racial prejudice, cultural persecution, and social, economic, and political 
disparities.”113 
Continuing through the 1980s and 1990s, artists and activists used hip-hop culture to show the 
limitations of the Civil Rights Movement—“its inability to satisfy the aspirations of the 
masses.”114 Through hip hop, these youth expressed rebellion against the social institutions 
that had for so long limited them, they exerted control over their own stylistic expressions, 
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and ultimately they created an entire industry over which many of them maintained artistic 
and economic control.   
As a musical form, hip hop deejays had started out by looping breaks—“the most percussive 
portion of each record”115—on turntables to create new and innovative sounds from compilations 
of existing music. MCs soon took up the rhythmic style with “rapping” and by 1978 their 
importance on the cultural scene was outgrowing that of the DJs.116 While the definition of hip-
hop is somewhat contested,117 hip-hop is generally considered to be made up of at four or five 
components: music (DJing), dance, graphic art (graffiti), oration (MCing or rapping), dance (b-
boying and b-girling), and fashion.118 In 1979, the Fatback Band and Sugar Hill Gang recorded 
two of the first rap albums. The phenomenal success, particularly of the Sugar Hill Gang’s 
“Rapper’s Delight” album, drew outsiders to the hip hop scene.119 The cycle of “innovation, 
success, competition and crossover”120 of black artistic development across a variety of mediums 
was evident, as well, with hip hop. Somewhat of a mixed blessing, hip hop was “discovered” by 
white performers and audiences, as well as white media which have a knack for “ripping any 
cultural phenomenon out of its cultural roots.”121 At the same time, the appropriation of hip hop 
and its style into mainstream culture meant that it was here to stay,122 and its increasing influence 
into the 1980s and 1990s would have a global impact, particularly in the consumer sphere. 
Developments in advertising and other media in the 1970s—and activism such as the NAACP’s 
appeals to the FCC against discrimination in advertising—would help to pave the inroads for hip 
hop and the popularity of African American hip hop artists, as a few black actors began 
appearing in mainstream media in print and on screen endorsing a variety of products. 
In 1973, General Foods hired Bill Cosby to endorse Jell-O. Ford Motor Company followed in 
Jell-O’s footsteps in 1976, hiring Cosby on as spokesperson, as later did Ideal Toys, Texas 
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Instruments, Coca Cola, Kodak and other corporations. Research showed Cosby to be one of the 
most believable and warm celebrity figures.123 Cosby soon shared company with a host of other 
African American celebrity endorsers: singers such as Whitney Houston for Diet Coke, Michael 
Jackson, Lionel Ritchie and Ray Charles for Pepsi-Cola, and sports figures such as O.J. Simpson, 
William “The Refrigerator” Perry, Herschel Walker, and later Michael Jordan.124 While these 
were viewed as strong and positive representations long sought by the African American 
community, research in the 1970s and 1980s gave a different picture of the situation. Research 
shifted from merely looking at incidences of depiction to looking at the types of products black 
models used, the settings in which they were found, and the occupations in which they were 
depicted. These studies demonstrated that if Americans were to view their world according to 
advertising, then successful blacks would be confined to professions as athletes and 
entertainers.125 But increasingly into the 1980s, representations of African Americans in 
mainstream media increased. 
However, as representations in media signified some positive changes, urban blacks felt 
increasingly estranged in the political and economic systems. Through the 1970s, black 
Americans had increased their representation in the ranks of elected officials, with particular 
inroads in local elections.126 But confounding circumstances associated with the economic 
downturn of the 1970s took a particularly hard toll on urban blacks. On one hand they were some 
of the hardest hit economically by the crisis; on the other hand, the recession helped to carve a 
path towards the right wing politics of Ronald Reagan that reduced support for civil rights 
expansions and many of the programs that had helped to provide support and opportunity for the 
African American community.127 
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Images of Violence and Hardship: 1980s and 1990s 
“A child is born with no state of mind  
Blind to the ways of mankind  
God is smiling on you but he's frowning too  
Because only God knows what you’ll go through  
You’ll grow in the ghetto, living second rate  
And your eyes will sing a song of deep hate  
The places you play and where you stay  
Looks like one great big alley way” 
-Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five, “The Message” (1982) 
 
Ronald Reagan’s election to the presidency in 1980 signaled a change in the political milieu 
with a “New Right” that sought to reverse or eliminate many of the social welfare programs 
dating back to the New Deal.128 These changes were met with increasing instability in many 
inner-city neighborhoods, whose residents were predominantly black.129 The Reagan-era 
approach, alternately called “supply-side” or “trickle-down” economics—or as dubbed by 
challenger George W.H. Bush in the primaries, “voodoo economics”130—was to provide 
incentives for businesses and the wealthy that, as a result of their increased investment, would 
create more jobs and lower prices for the middle and lower classes.  
However, some have argued that these benefits for middle and lower classes did not come to 
fruition.131 For example, by December 1982, unemployment had risen by 10.8% and at a rate for 
African Americans that was twice that of white Americans. As the 1980s progressed, the income 
gap between the wealthiest and the rest of the population, particularly the poor, continued to 
increase.132 Black conservatives were appointed to key positions in both the Reagan and Bush 
Administration. These appointments and the conservative agenda in general were approached by 
conservative blacks as an opportunity to be viewed as respected individuals rather than as 
stereotypes;133 but the majority of blacks viewed the conservative agenda as an attack on civil 
rights, arguing that blacks appointees did not exercise meaningful power within the Republican 
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Party and that their appointments were mere tokenism.134 In contrast, black politicians within the 
Democratic Party held significant positions and represented a large and influential 
constituency.135 Since Democrats were often the majority in Congress during the Bush-Reagan 
era, black representation136 within this party was significant in quelling cutbacks in the civil 
rights agenda, as demonstrated by the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1988, and the Fair Housing Act of 1988. 
Even as African Americans overall remained the poorest group of Americans, the 1980 
census some important improvements in educational opportunities, housing options, and rising 
incomes.137 More than ever before were able to realize the opportunities from which they 
previously were excluded. Continuing the trend of the 1970s, increasingly more blacks ran for 
and many were elected to political offices across America,138 from the local to the national level. 
America’s largest cities elected black mayors, with their numbers rising over six-fold in the 
1970s and 1980s.139 Yet, these mayors were met with decreasing budgets and increasing hardship 
for residents, in large part the result of white business flight to suburban areas and severe federal 
cutbacks in funds. Between 1982 and 1989, federal funds to cities were reduced from $33.7 
billion to $12.1 billion.140  
On the national scene, a prominent example of political involvement was the rise of civil 
rights activist Jesse Jackson to presidential nominee in 1984 and again in 1988. Jackson, who 
had worked with Martin Luther King, Jr. in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) and Operation Breadbasket, went on to found People United to Save (later changed to 
Serve) Humanity (PUSH) after King’s death.141 He appealed to a “rainbow coalition” of 
disenfranchised people, providing a direct contrast to the effects of Reagan-style politics that he 
argued had served to further marginalize the already underrepresented.142  
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But with Jackson’s bids at the presidency unsuccessful and with Conservative politics 
becoming further entrenched with messages that depicted African American youth as criminals, 
many turned their attention to the disheartening statistics of black incarcerated youth and police 
brutality.143 One author argues that “the general white perception of black men as criminals 
increased following Bush’s election” in part because of campaign programs such as a Bush ad 
featuring “Willie Horton, a black convict who had raped a white woman while on furlough from 
a Massachusetts prison.”144 Jackson and others cried foul and accused the campaign of appealing 
to white racism, but Bush did not abandon the tactic.  
The perceived fear of blacks in the white community and the black community’s perception 
of the police as symbolizing white dominant culture have a precedent that extends well before 
the 1980s. The Kerner Commission Report of 1968, for example, found that there was significant 
distrust of police within urban black communities leading up to the race riots of 1967: “To some 
Negroes police have come to symbolize white power, white racism and white repression. And 
the fact is that many police do reflect and express these white attitudes. The atmosphere of 
hostility and cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of 
police brutality and in a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection—one for Negroes and one for 
whites.”145 The report also found that the government’s response to the race riots had been 
primarily “to train and equip the police with more sophisticated weapons.”146 It seems, therefore, 
that the authors of the report were suggesting that fear was prompting more fear and the resulting 
responses were fueling greater hardship. Thus, there were a complex set of historical 
circumstances feeding the political, social and economic environment of the 1980s. Among these 
enduring issues was the one of mass media representations. 
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African American participation in the advertising industry has been shown to have an impact 
on the types of appeals and representations of minority consumers.147 But in the 1980s, minority 
representation within the industry was declining. Many advertisers shifted their dollars out of 
black-owned agencies in favor of mainstream agencies, whose employment numbers 
demonstrated a decrease in the minority employment.148 Given that, perhaps it is not surprising 
that during the 1970s and 1980s, studies of blacks in advertising demonstrated that according to 
advertising, most successful blacks were either entertainers or athletes.149 Nonetheless, the use of 
blacks in advertising was heightened by these black celebrities. While it was not until 1992 when 
Cover Girl signed its first African American model for mainstream appeal that black female 
models had high-profile, mainstream contracts,150 a number of black female entertainers were 
prevalent on the advertising and marketing scenes in the 1980s. For example, Whitney Houston 
performed in national spots for Diet Coke and Pepsi sponsored the tour of Tina Turner in 1987. 
But predominantly the images were of men and in large part they are afforded the credit for 
heightening the status of African Americans in advertising. Kern-Foxworth credits the 1980s 
successes of Michael Jackson’s Thriller album and Bill Cosby’s top-ranked “The Cosby Show” 
with developments in the use of blacks in advertising.151 While Bill Cosby had already entered 
the advertising landscape in the 1970s as spokesperson for such high-profile brands Del Monte, 
General Foods’ Jell-O, Ford, and Coca-Cola, Michael Jackson’s major commercial successes 
ushered in the 1980s. Jackson’s Thriller album was released in 1982 and became one of the most 
widely sold albums in history. In the wake of this success and throughout the 1980s, PepsiCo 
hired Jackson for a series of highly publicized and popular advertisements.152 And of course, 
Michael Jordan, whose success on the basketball court and in commercial endorsement will be 
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addressed in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5, amassed more advertising endorsements than any 
other black athlete up to that time.153 
Overall, research showed some improvement both in frequency and role portrayals of 
African Americans between the 1960s and the 1980s. However, in general, the increase in 
frequency properly projected neither the proportion of African Americans in the population nor 
their relative status and spending power.154 Recognizing continued problems in the advertising 
industry regarding its approach to minorities, the Black Media Association in North Carolina 
began monitoring the advertising industry in the early 1980s. This group, made up of black 
professionals working in the media industries, began a letter-writing campaign to the advertising 
industry, addressing both positive and negative actions and portrayals.155 These efforts were 
followed throughout the 1980s by various groups, including small and local organizations, that 
spoke out against negative representations of blacks in advertising—in employment positions 
and in the imagery advertisers produced.156  
The news media, too, was ambivalent about the progress that had been realized towards 
greater and more positive representations of African Americans. While some argued “the 
question of race [had] become pretty well buried,” others argued representations had not changed 
significantly enough.157 Some placed the blame on advertising agencies, suggesting that they 
were not responding quickly enough to the rest of America despite their client’s interest in 
maximizing profits regardless of color.158 The debate was similarly unsettled in the athletic 
endorsements. A 1988 Wall Street Journal article showed two charts, one with the most popular 
athletes and one with the top sport endorsers of 1987. While eight of the top ten most popular 
athletes were black, only one of the top sports endorsers—Michael Jordan—was.159 By 1989, 
Advertising Age had said that of the top ten sports endorsers, three were black (Michal Jordan, 
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Bo Jackson and OJ Simpson) and those numbers would continue to grow; and Brian J. Murphy 
of the Sports Marketing Letter had placed the numbers of African Americans at two of the top 
five and four of the top 10 sports endorsers.160 Some argued that even though race may become 
immaterial at the level of ascent reached by Michael Jordan and Bo Jackson, it is still a major 
factor for other athletes who have not reached the same heights.161 But others pointed to the 
success of Michael Jordan and Bo Jackson with Nike, along with other black athletes whose 
sports-oriented endorsements had helped propel them to stardom, to argue that the tide was 
changing for African Americans in advertising, perhaps because a figure like Michael Jordan 
“almost has the power to change the course of attitudes and thinking all by himself.”162 
Therefore, many turned to Michael Jordan as a symbol of breakthrough in American race 
relations. 
At the same time, the urban youth of America were developing and deploying their own 
forms of black representation and expression. In large part, they were doing so through the styles 
and music of the hip hop industry they were creating—as, in the 1980s, hip-hop began its rise as 
a global industry. African Americans had long been making significant contributions to 
American music and to the music industry. Between 1973 and 1983, Berry Gordy’s Motown 
Records, which he founded in 1959, was ranked as the most successful black company in the 
country.163 Gordy founded Motown Records on the tradition of “developing, packaging, 
marketing and distributing the music of black America. His Motown sound marked not only the 
first time that black music crossed over into the mainstream white market but also the first time 
that mainstream music was black music.”164 Yet, as this history has shown, the popularity and 
contributions of black artists and music were exploited by white artists who would take over the 
sounds and by white companies who would take over the profits. While Motown Records 
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eventually went the way of many before and was sold to white-owned corporations, the company 
had successfully introduced some of the most influential sounds of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
including the Jackson Five, Stevie Wonder, the Temptations, and the Commodores.165 One noted 
historian argues, “For more than the past twenty years, the recording industry, more than radio, 
television, or film, has provided blacks with the best means of advancement into high 
management positions.”166 And some artists like Michael Jackson and Prince, who participated in 
revolutionizing the music industry, were able to gain and maintain autonomy over their own 
careers. 
Hip-hop, too, was subjected to some of the same impositions by white America as previous 
black music; however, as author Manthia Diawara argues, in making a contrast between rock-
and-roll and hip-hop, “[Y]oung blacks have retained financial control over hip-hop, reducing the 
rest of the world to consumers of its social concerns.”167 By 1980, on the heels of the 1979 
release of “Rapper’s Delight” by the Sugarhill Gang, hip-hop was being recognized as a 
legitimate money-maker and with the 1984 Fresh Fest tour of Run-DMC, Kurtis Blow, Whodini, 
Fat Boys, and Nucleus grossing $3.5 million, hip-hop was becoming a national phenomenon.168 
The “Golden Age” of hip-hop, between 1987 or 1988 to the mid-1990s, saw the rise of 
“message” or “political” rap.169 But the social and political commentary of rap music dated back 
to its early days and founders. From rap’s first decade in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, now 
often referred to as “Old School” or “Back in the Day” and before rap became commercialized, 
rappers were developing socially conscious messages that grew out of their own hardships and 
disadvantage in their communities.170  
Bambaataa organized the Zulu Nation around the principle of political action that would help 
mobilize and empower disadvantaged and marginalized youth and provide a centralized space 
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for the expressions of hip hop.171 Pioneers Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five are frequently 
credited with having recorded the first socially conscious raps.172 The 1982 success of their hit 
single, which was later featured in their album of the same name, brought the message of socially 
conscious rap into the marketplace.173 The end of the video for “The Message” subtly takes up an 
issue that would come to dominate rap music—the issue of police brutality. As Grandmaster 
Flash and the Furious Five stand on a street corner talking, the police arrive, engage them in a 
brief exchange and push them into the back of the police car: 
Freeze 
Don't nobody move or nothin'… 
Oh man, we're (Right in there) Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five 
What is that, a gang? 
No 
Shut up 
I don't wanna hear your mouth 
Shut up 
Officer, officer, what is the problem? 
You the problem 
Hey, you ain't gotta push me man 
Get in the car, get in the car 
Get in the god... 
I said, "Get in the car"… 
Rap’s graphic treatment of police brutality, other forms of violence, and of sex made it 
increasingly controversial.174 Despite the antiviolence, antidrug lyrics of many rappers, including 
KRS-One,175 rap’s more violent tendencies created great controversy and fear among both whites 
and blacks, particularly when crossing generational and economic divides.176 The success of Run-
DMC, which had “aimed at addressing racism, classism, social neglect, and urban pain”177 and 
had helped to propel the visibility and commercial appeal of rap, was also plagued with the 
criticisms that they were promoting violence.178 These fears were only increased by the 
misogynistic and defiant messages of “gangsta rap,” the late-1980s and 1990s battles between 
East Coast and West Coast rappers, the violent incidents at rap concerts across the country, and 
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violence, gangs and drugs that increasingly became associated with inner-city communities.179 
But while most people could understand a clear connection between economic depravity, gangs, 
drugs, and violence, a class of seemingly innocuous consumer products became implicated in the 
circumstances of inner-city youth. In fact, athletic wear and sneakers, in particular, became a 
meaningful part of inner-city life and what many considered a culture of violence. 
 Sneaker fashion dates back at least as far as the 1950s and was popularized in music, 
movies, and through celebrity. Tommy Tucker, and later Sammy Davis Jr., Johnson Davidson, 
Elvis Presley, and Stevie Wonder, sang a million-seller pop anthem called “High Heel 
Sneakers.” Sneakers were on the feet of Woody Allen as he escorted Mrs. Gerald Ford to a black 
tie benefit and Mick Jagger wore them to marry Bianca. By 1978, sneakers had “achieved grace, 
dignity, had crossed social, ethnic, cultural and classlines, and [had] high tailed into the world of 
high culture, haute cuisine, and heavy thinkers.”180 The sneaker phenomenon of the 1980s 
emanated from a combination of basketball and hip-hop.181 Early hip-hoppers started wearing 
sneakers for fashion and would go to great lengths to keep them clean, precisely match their 
clothes, and differentiate themselves with fat or colored laces, brand names, and shoe variations. 
An additional fashion trend came directly from the prisons in which a great number of inner-city 
youth found themselves. RUN-DMC biographer Bill Adler describes the phenomenon thus: 
“If you are wearing sneakers with no shoelaces, you are imitating the fashion in a 
prison. But in prison it’s not a fashion. They issue you no shoelaces so that you 
can’t do something desperate with them. You can’t hang yourself, you can’t 
attack somebody with them. But out on the street, you know, guys go to prison, 
now they’re back home. And they decide, A, they like the way it looks and they 
like the way it feels so guess what, even though they’re free now, they’re not 
going to put shoelaces back on their sneakers. And then you get kids, like Jam 
Master J who says, hmm, that looks really cool. And he starts wearing his shoes 
the same way, and you have a fad.”182 
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The connection between hip-hop fashion and incarceration further alienated those critical of the 
movement, both from within and outside of the black community. In particular, the older 
members of the black community expressed concern about the messages and momentum of hip-
hop messages presented through lyrics, lifestyle and fashion. An African American medical 
doctor from Queens, NY, Dr. Gerald Deas, went so far as to express these concerns through an 
amateur rap song of his own entitled “Felon Sneakers.” Here is a hint of the lyrics: 
Peace, Black Brother….. 
Your felon Sneakers can’t fit the bill 
You got to know yourself to be really chill 
And you rob, you rape, you shoot and kill 
You’re wearing those sneakers but you lost your will.183 
 
The song goes on to suggest that by tightening up their sneakers and finding different goals, 
Black youth will find success.  
 But rap group Run-DMC and manager Russell Simmons directly contradicted Deas’s 
argument when they crafted their response, the rap song “My Adidas,” which garnered the 
commercial support of Adidas and found tremendous success in doing so. Run-DMC had gone 
against the grain of the pop element of hip-hop, who wore flashy clothes in the disco-era 
tradition. Instead, Run-DMC wore clothes on stage that they would wear on the street, including 
their beloved Adidas. At a concert to which they had invited Adidas executives, Run-DMC 
performed their hit song “My Adidas” and invited the Adidas-wearing audience to hold up a 
shoe. The image of 20,000 fans holding up their brand in response to a call from a rap group was 
a phenomenal sight. As Adidas marketing director Angelo Anastasio said of his presentation of 
this event to the owner of the company, “If you can believe it, it was such an incredible coup, I 
thought, for me and my team here in L.A. to have Adidas allow me to have three young African-
Americans rap about their company, which is a German company, very conservative.”184 Run-
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DMC and Adidas signed a groundbreaking $1 million deal in 1986 and subsequently released the 
Run-DMC line. French director Mathieu said of the importance of sneakers, “Run-DMC really 
made the world understand that the sneaker is to hip-hop what the crucifix is to Christians. It’s a 
religion. It’s your identity.”185 Following in the footsteps of Run-DMC, other rappers began to 
take up their own brands, expressing their affiliations in their fashion and in their lyrics: just a 
few examples include Fresh Gordan’s “My Filas”, Heavy D and Nike, Busy Bee and Converse, 
and the Beastie Boys and Suede Adidas.186 
 But, as the documentary, “Just for Kicks” depicts, the hip-hop sneaker phenomenon 
“soared to new heights with the emergence of a winged, bald, and black superhero that would 
eventually knock the footwear industry off its feet.”187 That superhero was, of course, Michael 
Jordan. In a series of events and a confluence of social and economic factors that will necessarily 
be articulated in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5, Michael Jordan, in collaboration with the 
characters and direction of Spike Lee, helped propel Nike not just onto the hip-hop scene but to 
the top of it: “On the streets of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, the Air Jordans became 
the drug dealers and the rappers shoe of choice, worn as a status symbol and the icon of a 
flamboyant lifestyle. Rappers passed the craze down to their fans, and in spite of itself, Air 
Jordan became a hip-hop urban brand and the object of unprecedented desire and dangerous 
attraction on the streets.”188 As the Nike brand became embedded in the hip-hop scene, it also 
became embroiled in the more violent aspects with which that scene was associated. Thus, the 
next two chapters explore the historical moments leading up to the 1980s and early 1990s when 
Nike, Michael Jordan and other key players became deeply and symbolically involved in 
tensions of race relations that were erupting in violence in urban areas across America. 
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Conclusion 
While the country was experiencing significant social, political, and cultural movements 
developing in the late 1950s, the advertising industry was moving towards the Creative 
Revolution in which the creative approach to advertising was altered. The election of John F. 
Kennedy brought national attention to issues of civil rights and this charge was picked up and 
carried by his predecessor President Johnson. The Kerner Commission Report depicted a divided 
America, with white America oblivious to and yet implicated in the destructive conditions of the 
racial ghetto that created a cycle of social and economic disadvantage. In their struggle for equal 
rights and equal representation, Civil Rights activists pointed to problematic media depictions. 
The advertising industry responded to these changes, though the response was hesitant and slow. 
While advertisers were clearly cognizant by this time of the market potential of African 
Americans, they expressed an unfounded fear of white backlash. Black activists pressed major 
corporations to improve their approaches to black communities and found great success in doing 
so. But while representations of African Americans in advertising did increase in number and 
become more positive in tone during and subsequent to the Civil Rights movement, critics were 
mixed about the overall progress that had been made and some were concerned about the lack of 
authenticity in these increasing depictions. At the same time, moving forward into the 1980s a 
variety of major black figures gained a great deal of advertiser attention and made significant 
inroads into mainstream media in ways previously unimaginable. These figures included Bill 
Cosby, O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, Whitney Houston and, most notably due to his 
prominence, unprecedented endorsement support, and positive image, was Michael Jordan. 
The energy and emergent progress that was evident during the Civil Rights era was quelled 
by a changing political and economic environment of the 1970s. While African Americans 
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experienced some improvements in education, housing and incomes, many still failed to feel the 
effects of these gains. The consumer movement that built steam as a result of the economic crisis 
of the 1970s failed to represent the most economically deprived and did not provide a voice for 
the black community. The home-front effects of the war in Vietnam hit African American inner-
city communities particularly hard. In the midst of growing disparities between the rich and the 
poor and increasing alienation of some of the most devastated inner-city communities, the black 
youth who represented the first generation to grow up without legalized segregation and with the 
effects of the Civil Rights movement failed to see how that movement had benefited their 
communities. They began expressing this sense of alienation through the politicized voice that 
they developed through hip-hop. Music and sport had long provided spaces for advancement for 
African Americans; the hip-hop culture combined these two spaces with lyrical messages and 
street fashion that formed its sound and aesthetic. 
 Despite the strains of hip-hop that expressed a depoliticized violence and sexuality that were 
the source of many fears and criticisms of hip-hop from both within and outside of the black 
community, the core of the hip-hop culture and the spirit out of which it developed was one of 
empowerment and expression of the hardships of black, urban life. The sneaker phenomenon of 
the 1980s was a fashion expression of the interaction of a variety of social forces that came 
together in urban environments, including basketball and hip-hop. Sneakers were a part of the 
street fashion that had taken hold well before Michael Jordan signed his deal with Nike in 1984. 
Hip-hop artists had used specific athletic brands and developed out of them expressions of 
affiliation, solidarity, meaning and status. With emergence of Michael Jordan, whose incredible 
and entertaining athletic ability and “good” image transcended racial divides, the sneaker 
phenomenon reached new heights. As athletic wear and particularly sneakers became hot 
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commodities across the country, they held a great deal of symbolic clout in inner-city 
communities. As such, they were commodities with great potential to represent improvement in 
the greater American symbolic language; at the same time, the hyper-commoditization of 
sneakers led to tragedy that played out in media attention to the “sneaker killings.” 
 This story goes beyond successes of Michael Jordan on the court and in his endorsements of 
Nike shoes to explore the impact that he had on the advertising industry and the symbolic life of 
America. Michael Jordan’s ascent as an icon of sports and of the American dream of success and 
consumption coincides with a changing advertising landscape that began earnestly to reflect the 
struggles of black Americans for inclusion and positive representation. The history of African 
Americans’ relationship with advertising and consumption and the story of Nike, Michael Jordan 
and the “sneaker killings” are mutually informative because they contextualize the complexities 
of inclusion and representation, of the economic, social, and political situation of the black 
community, and of the physical, social and symbolic importance of consumer goods in the 
struggles of black Americans. Therefore, the next two chapters explore the history of Nike and 
the development of Michael Jordan as a hero and an icon, the complex set of circumstances 
involved in the growth of the Nike and Michael Jordan phenomenon and the discourse 
surrounding the “sneaker killings” and crimes involving Air Jordan shoes and other brand-name 
athletic wear. 
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CHAPTER 4:  NIKE, INC.—FROM RUNNING TO REINVENTION, NIKE MEETS 
MICHAEL JORDAN 
 
Phillip Knight’s Blue Ribbon Sports officially changed its name to Nike, Inc. on May 30, 
1978. But it was not until 1985, with the signing of then-Rookie of the Year Michael Jordan, that 
Nike became NIKE—the icon of American culture and consumption. This was the beginning of a 
“golden run during which Nike had been ‘reinvented,’… during which [Knight] and Michael 
Jordan and many other Nike guys (“’Guys’ is generic around here, as Knight commented one 
day) had conspired so profoundly to mark the general culture that, through their labors, Nike had 
altered the look and sound and feel and even the abiding fantasies of everyday life.”1 Numerous 
books have calculated the history and impact of this emblematic relationship between Nike and 
Michael Jordan.2 Others have included chronicles of the early days of the company and its 
countercultural running ethos.3 In contrast, this project is not a history of the Nike corporation or 
a biography of Michael Jordan, but rather it is a socio-historical analysis of the discourses 
surrounding the social concerns over the so-called “Sneaker killings” of the 1990s and the 
criticisms of advertising and consumption practices in addressing urban America.  
In order to establish the history and context of the “sneaker killings” and expectations on 
Nike, Michael Jordan, Spike Lee and their advertising campaigns, I consider the development of 
the Nike brand and the people behind it. Further, I address to what extent the collaborative image 
of Nike and Michael Jordan came at a time when the black community was looking for and 
developing new expressions of their social experiences within American society, particularly as 
it was lived on the streets of urban America.  
The distinction between Nike’s early days and running culture and its post-Jordan brand 
image are clear not only in the organization of the various histories of Nike, but also in the 
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development of the company’s economic and symbolic reach, its internal organization and 
consumer use, its advertising and its depiction in popular media. The following history is 
presented with the goal of developing a more sophisticated understanding of consumer 
engagement in the marketplace than has previously been addressed in analysis of Nike and other 
brand-name consumer goods, and is a re-conceptualization of the Nike story, as presented in 
other texts, for the purpose of understanding the social experience of Nike.  
 
The Birth and Growth of Nike Through the 1960s 
Nike’s material inception has been traced to Hayward Field,4 the domain of legendary 
University of Oregon and Olympic track coach and Nike co-founder Bill Bowerman, whose 
dissatisfaction with available options inspired him to hand-craft running shoes for his athletes. 
An undergraduate Philip Knight came under the supervision and inspiration of Bowerman as a 
middle distance runner for the University of Oregon in the 1950s. Nike’s ideological birth was 
several years later in an MBA paper at Stanford on a small business, in which Knight conceived 
a plan for running shoes made with cheap Japanese labor and distributed in the United States.5 
The original market was high school and college track team members.6 Knight began to 
implement this plan on a post-graduate trip to Japan in 1962 where he approached Onitsuka, the 
manufacturer of Tiger shoes, to discuss distributing Tigers in the United States. In his initial 
meeting with Onitsuka, Knight is said to have “created” Blue Ribbon Sports on the spot when 
asked the name of his company. Knight offered the shoes to his former track coach Bill 
Bowerman, envisioning him as a potential client; but Bowerman was impressed with Tiger’s 
offerings and suggested that he and Knight collaborate on this venture. Thus, Nike’s material and 
ideological roots were bound in a gentleman’s agreement between Knight and Bowerman on 
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January 26, 1964, with each man agreeing to contribute $500 to their new partnership called 
Blue Ribbon Sports.7 That first year, Knight sold $8,000 worth of Tiger shoes and he spent the 
next two years promoting and selling his Japanese import shoes to athletes at track meets and out 
of his parents’ basement in Portland, Oregon for $6.95 a pair, later increasing the price to $9.95 
to imply quality while still undercutting market leader Adidas.8 Through the 1960s, Knight’s 
company hung its hat on a small and specialized performance-based athletic shoe market that 
targeted serious runners.9  
In 1965, Knight hired his first full-time employee, Jeff Johnson, who agreed to work on 
commission. Like Knight, Johnson was a middle distance runner. The two had met briefly in 
1962 in an intramural track meet at Stanford. They shared a middle-distance mentality 
characterized by the fact that “middle-distance events such as the mile require both speed and 
endurance, as well as the mental agility to decide when to sprint and when to stay even with the 
pack.”10 This middle-distance mentality and a shared passion for running propelled the early Blue 
Ribbon Sports players. In 1966, Johnson opened the first BRS retail outlet in Santa Monica, CA. 
That same year, Knight and Bowerman put their gentlemen’s agreement on paper, forming an 
official partnership; and in 1967 BRS, Inc. was incorporated.11 Shortly after, another Bowerman 
runner, Geoff Hollister, joined BRS selling shoes for a $2 per shoe commission; and in 1968 Bob 
Woodell, a track and field enthusiast whose promising career was cut short by a paralyzing 
accident, joined the BRS team. The early BRS employees saw in their jobs an opportunity to 
remain disciples and become missionaries of their beloved sport.12 Knight and his company went 
from selling $8,000 worth of shoes in the first year13 to $83,000 after three years of existence14 
and had accumulated a group of men whose ardor for spreading the mission of their sport was 
seemingly more meaningful than the income associated with it. The history of these early days is 
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fraught with stories of impulsivity and debauchery, with the trappings of a fraternity, and was 
epitomized in their bi-annual management retreats endearingly termed “Buttfaces” that, in 
addition to idea-development, included drinking, practical jokes and relationship building among 
the core group of men in management.15 
Growth of the company seemed rapid, with sales virtually doubling such that by 1969 BRS 
sales were between $300,000 and $400,000.16 Despite this, BRS was faced with various financial 
and supply problems in its early years, and the company went through public offerings and 
private debenture offerings, as well as dealt with contract issues with its supplier in Japan. Their 
relationship with Onitsuka had grown shaky and Knight began plans to set his company on 
stronger footing with a new line that would bare its own trademark separate from Onitsuka 
Tigers.17 The future of BRS was under enough jeopardy at the time that Bowerman advised 
people close to him not to take investment opportunities in the company.18 In the meantime, the 
company image continued an uneasy evolution as it entered the 1970s. 
 
The 1970s Fitness Revolution 
Jeff Galloway, former Olympian, marathoner and the first athlete to compete in Nike brand 
shoes, includes Bill Bowerman in the company of seven runners and teachers whom he credits 
with having changed America’s approach to fitness. Bowerman traveled to New Zealand where, 
under the tutelage of runner and coach Arthur Lydiard, he learned the fitness routine of jogging. 
He was so impressed with the results of the jogging routine that he wrote several pamphlets on it 
and began to hold morning runs back in Eugene.19 “The seeds of the jogging movement,” 
Galloway writes, “had been firmly planted in American soil.”20 Other runners and authors 
throughout the 1970s, including Jim Fixx with his 1977 best-seller The Complete Book of 
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Running, helped to propel this movement into the mainstream. These runners were turning to 
performance shoes like those of Blue Ribbon Sports and the new Nike shoes introduced in 
1971.21 During this era, Nike went from a small company that specialized in performance-wear 
for athletes to a company that, even with marketing that continued to target the serious athletes, 
began to service mainstream, recreational runners whose numbers increased dramatically during 
the jogging boom of the 1970s. 
By the early 1970s, tensions were rising with Onitsuka. Knight developed a plan to obtain 
financing from a Japanese trading company, Nissho Iwai Corporation, in order to begin 
manufacturing and importing BRS’s first product line independent of Onitsuka. Nissho Iwai 
essentially was bailing Nike not only out of their relationship with Onitsuka, but also out of a 
variety of questionable financial practices including checks written against insufficient funds and 
banking relationships floated on reputations of athletes, suppliers and sales representatives.22 
Knight asked Carolyn Davidson, a graphic design student who he had met while teaching 
accounting at Portland State University, to design a logo for the side of the shoes BRS wanted to 
develop under a new trademark. He and his fellow BRS employees were looking for something 
to compete with the functional logos of Adidas, Puma, and even their Tiger shoes. But Davidson 
argued that the functional aspect of support, built into logos like the Adidas stripes, and concept 
of movement were difficult to unify graphically: “Support was static, she explained; movement 
was the opposite.”23 For $35 in 1971, Davidson created what looked like a fat checkmark that 
became known as the Nike Swoosh. That same year, Jeff Johnson came up with the name Nike, 
inspired by a dream he had the night before a one-day deadline to get a name on the shoeboxes 
of a new supply of shoes. Nike is the Greek goddess of victory whose wings, Johnson thought, 
looked a bit like the stripes of Davidson’s checkmark logo. No one seemed particularly to like 
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the name, but they went with it anyway. In an effort to avoid violating their exclusive contract 
with Onitsuka, the Nike line represented a variety of sports, from running to basketball, to 
wrestling, tennis and casual shoes. The new Nike line, Swoosh logo included, debuted in 1972 at 
the U.S. Olympic Trials in Eugene, Oregon and BRS saw a gross of $1.96 million for the new 
Nike brand products.24 But the Nike development was met with disorder, unpredictable quality, 
financial troubles and legal difficulties that ended in severed relations with Onitsuka, the Tiger 
manufacturer. Lawyer Rob Strasser was assigned the Nike/BRS case against Onitsuka. In 1977, 
Rob Strasser would be named marketing director at Nike and became a key, though 
controversial, figure in the development of the Nike brand and will be addressed in greater detail 
in the proceeding discussion.25 At this point in 1972, amidst the severing of old ties and the 
development of new ones, “Blue Ribbon Sports was starting over.”26 By 1976, with the jogging 
boom and with promotional endorsements of the new Nike brand by various track and field 
athletes and tennis stars such as Ilie Nastase and Jimmy Conners, revenues had increased to $14 
million and then doubled in 1977 to $28 million. 
However, it was not until May 30, 1978 that Blue Ribbon Sports officially changed its name 
to Nike, Inc., with BRS, Inc. surviving as a subsidiary. Sales having more than doubled each year 
since 1976, Nike became the top athletic shoe company in America in 1980, with $270 million in 
sales. They continued to expand their operations, opening the Exeter Research and Development 
Lab in Exeter, New Hampshire, hiring the first industrial designers in the athletic shoe industry, 
completing an initial public offering of 2,377,000 shares of Class B common stock, and 
witnessing British runner Steve Ovett become the first athlete to win the Oympics wearing Nike 
shoes. The following year, the subsidiary BRS, Inc. merged into Nike, Inc., leaving Nike as the 
surviving entity.  
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In an era of “high-tech” consumer goods, Nike became known for its performance-inspired 
high-tech shoes. Nike had introduced the Tailwind in January 1979. The Tailwind was unique for 
its polyurethane-encapsulated “supergas” chambers developed by an aerospace engineer, M. 
Frank Rudy,27 and it was the precursor to the Air Force I basketball shoe introduced in 1982 and 
to the Nike Air line that ranged from Air Jordans to Nike’s “Revolution” with visible air. 
Coupled with the development of athletic-inspired fashion that was growing the athletic-wear 
market in the late 1970s and early 1980s,28 Nike moved into a position of dominance, claiming 
one third of the global running shoe market29 and ousting German-born Adidas from its number 
one position in the U.S.30 
 
 
Entering the 1980s 
By the end of 1982, Nike shoes had made quite a name for themselves, in large part through 
promotions. In 1981, 75% of Nike’s $18 million advertising and promotions budget was 
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dedicated to promotions31 and Nike’s annual sales had jumped to $457.7 million from their 1977 
mark of $28.7 million.32 In 1982, the company’s profits had increased 80% to $49 million on a 
52% jump in revenues to $693.6 million, supported by the running-shoe base and forays into 
apparel and foreign markets.33 While running remained the largest in sales with $236 million, the 
Nike product line had expanded in a variety of directions by adding additional performance 
features and by moving into leisure and apparel, into other target markets including non-athletes, 
and into other sports such as soccer, basketball and tennis.  
The company worked to maintain its commitment to technology and its core of performance, 
spending $8 million on research and development in 1983.34 The Nike footwear line grew from 
63 basic models in 1978 to around 185 in 1983 and the shoes were being sold at suggested retail 
prices ranging from $15 to $90.35 On the Olympic track, every men’s track world record holder 
was set by athletes wearing Nike shoes.36 That same year, Nike decided it was time to introduce 
itself on a national scale through two television commercials aired during the New York 
Marathon. Up until this point, Nike had focused its advertising budget on serious athletes and 
spoke to them through targeted sports media with messages about the technical superiority of the 
shoes or the spirit of athletic endeavor.37 Some at Nike believed that the use of “stars” in ads 
should be minimized because “runners realize these people are paid large sums and wear special 
make-ups… The consumer should not feel as if we’re trying to manipulate them through ‘star’ 
emulation.”38 They were wary of potential disconnect from the athlete and the spirit of 
performance. At the same time, a competitive spirit and a desire to grow the company inspired 
them. It was time to go national and build their image. 
These two national advertising spots, created by advertising agency Wieden & Kennedy, 
were entitled “Evolution,” which gave a brief history of running from primitive to modern man 
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and “Trophy,” which demonstrated pride in the world athletes who wore Nike shoes.39 Art 
director Dan Wieden and copywriter David Kennedy had worked on Nike advertising at William 
Cain agency, creating ads that emphasized technical aspects of the shoes. The two left William 
Cain, taking the Nike account with them, and started their own agency baring their names. In 
keeping with his promotional attitude, Knight’s first words to Dan Wieden reportedly were “I’m 
Phil Knight, and I hate advertising.”40 Even when Nike conducted advertising in these early days, 
the focus remained on athletes. “The Nike empire,” writes one journalist, “was built on the 
theory that advertising should appeal to the elite athletes, and once they were won over, this 
success would trickle down to the masses.”41 Nonetheless, Wieden & Kennedy and Nike began 
to develop a fruitful relationship that earned acclaim for the advertising agency, propelling it to 
the top of the industry, and earned popular regard for the developing Nike brand. 
 
Wieden & Kennedy Enters the Ad Industry 
The story of Nike’s relationship with Wieden & Kennedy is in many ways the history or 
foundation of Wieden & Kennedy. As Dan Wieden articulated, “A lot of our creative outlook… 
and frankly some of our management style has been developed by working closely with Nike. 
Because they’re the kind of client they are, we become the agency we are.”42 Nike originally 
hired a Seattle advertising agency, John Brown & Partners, but found their work on collateral 
materials such as posters, catalogues and counter displays to be too expensive and too inefficient 
for Nike.43 In the late 1970s, Nike hired Peter Moore to work freelance developing these 
materials. Moore found himself fascinated by this growing company that was populated by 
sports enthusiasts, not business executives and whose head of marketing, Rob Strasser, did not 
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know what it meant to develop an image.44 Moore recollected a conversation in which Strasser 
asked him what it was exactly that he did: 
“‘Well, I’m a graphic designer. There are two sides to this business. There’s the 
advertising side to this business which does media and television and stuff like 
that. There’s another side to this business which does catalogue, poster, corporate 
identity programs and creates the image because I don’t think advertising 
campaigns can solely be responsible for creating the image of a corporation. And 
companies need an image to build on and that’s what I do.’ ‘What’s an image?’” 
Strasser’s response was, “‘What’s an image?’ And he said, ‘Look, I’m a lawyer. 
I’m not a marketing guy.’”45  
Moore also found that while he himself was sharp with graphics, his own treatment of words was 
less so. To alleviate this weakness as his work for Nike increased in 1980, he teamed up with 
Dan Wieden, a copywriter he knew at William Cain advertising agency in Portland.46  
In the early 1970s, Dan Wieden had gone to work freelancing for McCann advertising 
agency. During Wieden’s time there, McCann underwent some structural changes and hired a 
Chicago prominent art director named David Kennedy.47 It was at McCann that Wieden and 
Kennedy first met. After about five years, Wieden left McCann with a man named William Cain, 
and the two recruited David Kennedy over to the newly formed William Cain advertising 
agency.48 At Nike, Peter Moore was made Creative Director and Rob Strasser remained 
marketing manager; Rob Strasser and Moore “became the guardians of Nike’s image”49 and they 
hired William Cain as Nike’s advertising agency to promote that image.  
By the time that Dan Wieden and David Kennedy left William Cain in 1982 to open their 
own creative shop with Nike as their client, Nike had signed athletes from a wide variety of 
sports and the company was beginning to shift endorsement focus from running to basketball and 
tennis. According to Swoosh: The Unauthorized Story of Nike and the Men Who Played There,50 
authored by former Nike employee and wife of Rob Strasser, J.B. Strasser and her sister Laurie 
Becklund (1991), "[Rob] Strasser was signing athletes in every sport, even minor ones like 
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racquetball. But in the late '70s, he and nearly every other shoe man realized that basketball and 
tennis were the sports that meant the most in the endorsement business."51 They had also started a 
lucrative practice of signing college basketball coaches (as opposed to their competitors, who 
continued to focus on professional athletes).52 While Nike competitors like Adidas were openly 
buying athletes and sponsoring events such as the Olympics, “Nike was quietly acquiring the 
best of the ‘becoming’ American athletes, those gonna-bes that would give Nike the reputation 
of the shoe preferred by young, hot players. The decisions weren’t made by pouring over studies 
or statistics. They were made when Knight and Rob Strasser, often tipped off by good people,… 
saw an athlete and liked him.”53 This approach was a precursor to the relationship that would 
develop four years later between Nike and Michael Jordan.  
Thus, in 1982 when Wieden & Kennedy opened shop and created the first two national Nike 
advertisements—“Evolution” and “Trophy”—Nike was growing rapidly enough that they would 
soon require a large-scale, national branding campaign to coincide with the Olympic Games in 
Los Angeles. They wanted to make a shift in their marketing budget from athlete promotions to 
advertising in preparation for the Olympics, but Wieden & Kennedy, with five employees, was 
too small.54 In 1983, just one year after Wieden & Kennedy opened its doors with the Nike 
account, Nike did an account review and divided their advertising budget between Los Angeles-
based Chiat/Day and Wieden & Kennedy. Chiat/Day managed the horizontal advertising, 
including the famous I Love L.A. campaign and the Cities billboard campaign, as well as some 
apparel advertising.55 While the effectiveness of these campaigns was debated, they were highly 
publicized and drew a good bit of industry attention.56 In the meantime, Wieden & Kennedy 
maintained the vertical advertising. Dan Wieden speculated that Nike maintained a relationship 
with them because they knew the market, they understood that the advertising had to be real to 
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the individual market segments and that Nike did not want to cut themselves off from an agency 
that knew and understood their ethos.57 Wieden was right. Even as Nike was making the shift to 
Chiat/Day, there was evidence that what they really wanted out of an advertising agency was one 
that knew them and knew sports. Rob Strasser philosophized about what a Nike advertising 
agency should be: 
“Authentic. We know sports and we think we know guys. The agency must know 
sports. They don’t have to be stat freaks or trivia buffs, they have to know sports. 
Competitiveness, camradery, face, all the gut that makes sport, sport. They must 
feel or know the thread that weaves it’s way through the athletes. That same 
thread in Moses Malone, Alberto Salazar, John McEnroe. They must know guys, 
not fashion. They must recognize hot, not fashion.”58 
In 1985, Nike reviewed its agency situation and determined that they needed to pick one agency. 
In a memo to Rob Strasser and Peter Moore,59 Cindy Hale outlined the strengths and weaknesses 
of Chiat/Day and Wieden & Kennedy. In her evaluation, Chiat/Day was aggressive and produced 
big ideas such as the Cities Campaign and a more recent Michael Jordan “NBA” television spot 
that was the first in a long line of popular Jordan ads, but the agency was self-promotional, 
slower, operationally weaker, their big ideas also sometimes turned out to be sensationalistic, and 
they had a tendency to blame Nike for their own advertising failures. On the other hand, Wieden 
& Kennedy believed in Nike as something special, they were improving operationally, and they 
had a proven record of demonstrating Nike’s important technical superiority with “flair.” 
However, they remained a risk because their work was untested on a large scale and their growth 
had made them hungry for more, which made them vulnerable to their own self-promotion.  
 But importantly, Wieden & Kennedy did an excellent job of promoting the air technology 
and had developed that as an idea on which Nike could hang its hat. In addition, the wildly 
popular Lou Reed spots developed for Honda by copywriter Jim Riswold impressed Nike. 
Riswold joined Wieden & Kennedy in 1984 and went onto create some of Nike’s most popular 
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and powerful advertising, including the “Mike and Spike,” the “Bo Knows,” and the Charles 
Barkley “I am not a role model” campaigns, landing him among Newsweek’s top 100 most 
influential people.60 In 1985, soon after the initial Chiat/Day-developed Michael Jordan spots, 
Nike began to shift its business back to Wieden & Kennedy, and Riswold began contributing his 
“keen sense of cultural pitch and tone”61 to some of the most important creative material in 
advertising history.  
 As far as Nike’s decision went, a 1985 Nike brief reiterated, “We want to continue to work 
with a tight group of people. We are not interested in planning, research, or squads of account 
people.”62 They wanted “chemistry and creative force, not account service or media buys,” 
according to advertising manager Cindy Hale.63 For Dan Wieden, Wieden & Kennedy was 
growing, maturing, and preparing to accept Nike back. He recounts that the whole time Nike was 
with Chiat/Day, “we never dropped the ball with Nike because we knew that was our home. That 
was our emotional and spiritual home.”64 By 1986, Nike had withdrawn its business from 
Chiat/Day and returned the entirety of its $10 million in billings to Wieden & Kennedy.65 
 
Nike Shoots for Basketball 
The hugely popular advertising developed by Chiat/Day surrounding the 1984 Olympics was 
not enough to make up for the slow in market growth that had begun by 1983, when Nike posted 
its first drop in earnings,66 and for the fact that Nike had made some grave miscalculations along 
the way that ranged from structural and managerial to sport orientation and image control. In 
June 1983, Knight stepped down as president and COO of Nike, Inc. and named Robert L. 
Woodell, who had been with the company for 15 years, as his successor; Rob Strasser, who had 
been managing director of European Operations for the previous two years resumed his 
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responsibility as vice president for U.S. marketing.67 This change in leadership occurred at a time 
when the athletic shoe business was experiencing a major downturn in business and consumer 
tastes were shifting, with sales of Nike’s less expensive running shoes down 25 percent.68 Phil 
Knight noted in the 1984 Annual Report, “Our domestic footwear marketing is changing, edging 
away from athletic looks to a renewed demand for fashion and traditional styles. These changes 
resulted in inventory valuation losses over three times greater than in 1983.”69 And while the 
company argued that they were not imitating trends and competitors and that their focus 
remained on the athlete, one response they had to this decline was to introduce their first casual 
line, the “Freestyle.”70 Nike documented its first losses ever in 1984 with a 29% decline in 
earnings in that fiscal year,71 citing a downturn in gross profit margins and increases in operating 
expenses in areas like apparel and advertising and promotion.  
Beyond its structural problems and internal struggles that eventually led Knight to reassume 
his position from Woodell, the company had neglected opportunities in the aerobics market, 
which had grown 56% from 12.1 million participants in 1981 to 18.7 million by 198372 and 
allowed way for Reebok to make significant strides.73 Reebok had entered the U.S. market in 
1979 in the midst of the running boom. Its predecessor, Foster & Sons of Great Britain, had 
outfitted the feet of the 1924 British Olympic track team nostalgically rendered in the 1981 
movie Chariots of Fire. Reebok began distributing their leather sneaker to aerobics instructors 
around the country and it was not long before they were spotted on the feet of movie stars and 
musicians. Reebok’s growth began to outpace that of Nike,74 with a significant jump in sales 
from $13 million in 1983 to $66 million in 1984 propelled in large part by the aerobics boom.75  
Nike, on the other hand, had either overlooked or dismissed the aerobics market. When asked 
who was responsible for missing aerobics, Peter Moore suggested that much of the blame rested 
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with Phil Knight: “He missed, you know. He didn’t miss often, but he missed that, clearly. Just 
didn’t see it. Didn’t believe that a woman’s thing, one, didn’t believe that a woman’s thing could 
have that much impact; two, didn’t believe that the soft leather thing could have any potential 
because it was not performance.”76 Charles Robinson, who had helped arrange Nike’s 
relationship with Nissho Iwai and sat on Nike’s Board of Directors, argued that because Nike’s 
ethos had developed out a macho athletic environment, “In the eyes of the company, 
psychologically and theoretically, women are second rate citizens” and therefore historically had 
limited participation in Nike.77 On the other hand, Nike’s early advertising demonstrated gender 
parity, with both men and women in the ads. Rob Strasser attributed this to the spirit of running, 
which was enjoyed by men and women; but clearly, Nike was a company with male-dominated 
management.78 This focus would have serious consequences for Nike. By the fourth quarter of 
1984, Nike was citing declining earnings, which they attributed to slow moving products and 
writedowns on some of the Nike products to market value.79 However, some promising growth 
was found in racquet sports (tennis and squash), field sports, and basketball shoes, the latter of 
which was up 22 percent.80 
Just over a year after Woodell’s ascent to the Nike presidency and under declining profits, 
Knight would take back the reigns.81 Strasser and Becklund (1991) speculate that some company 
insiders believed Knight had set Woodell up in office to take the fall for a decline that had been 
long in the making. While it appears that Woodell himself did not accept that argument, it is 
clear that there was tension building among some of the early employees and Knight. This 
tension presaged the eventual departure of many of the original Nike men who helped Knight to 
build the company and to launch the promotional careers of Michael Jordan and other famous 
sports stars. 
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But in the meantime with Knight back in full charge, part of his turnaround effort was 
increased advertising and fewer athlete sponsorships,82 with more support behind the ones that 
they maintained such as the recently-signed Michael Jordan. In the midst of several losing 
quarters and a declining outlook for Nike’s base, the Air Jordan line would be Nike’s shining 
star. As Phil Knight said, “I believe we can take pride in the fact that despite losing quarters we 
were still able to produce the hottest selling product the athletic shoe industry has ever seen—the 
Air Jordan line.”83  
Nike, still with the image of a running shoe company, had developed momentum based on 
passion for and legitimate ties to sport and the athlete; this passion manifested in locker-room 
style strategy meetings that Peter Moore likened to the movie Animal House84 and rowdy boys’ 
club relationships, all revolving around a love of “the game.” Rob Strasser articulated the kind of 
people Nike sought by saying, “I want mistakes, I want fucked ideas. Failure makes for better, in 
a lot of cases. I want people who listen, who hear, who think, who bleed, who laugh, who don’t 
worry about time sheets and looking good. People who sweat, who work and who love what they 
are doing.”85 By the mid-1980s “Nike was a slightly countercultural, decidedly down-in-the-
dumps, somewhat cash-strapped running-shoe company at the far end of a jogging boom. 
Industry experts and securities analysts agreed that Nike had ‘run out of feet’.”86 Up to this 
moment in Nike’s history, Knight had focused the company’s marketing on promotions, which 
had seemed more cost-effective than advertising. But as more and more athletes entered the 
promotional market demanding increasingly large compensation for brand associations, the value 
of such promotional activities declined.87 At the same time that Nike was citing their promotional 
and advertising budgets as part of their expense woes, they determined that Nike needed to make 
cuts in athlete endorsement contracts and to move their energies to superstars88  and “from small-
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event sponsorships to television commercials”;89 and they decided they needed to make these 
moves in the basketball arena. They looked to Converse, who was making significant inroads 
with only a handful of NBA players, in contrast to Nike’s more than 120 players.  
The sport of basketball had changed since 1972, when Nike had signed its first 
endorsement.90 But by the early 1980s, Nike had learned some hard lessons about endorsement 
deals. NBA star Darryl Dawkins, well-known as a Nike man, walked onto the court in 1982 
wearing different shoe brands on each foot, one Nike and one Pony. For the first time ever, Nike 
sued an athlete for not wearing its shoes.91 Instigated in no small part by budgetary concerns, 
Nike came up with a plan to “let” players out of their Nike contracts if they were able to find 
better deals elsewhere; this would free up their financial obligations to players and allow them to 
focus on a few carefully picked rising superstars.  
Among the list of players considered was Michael Jordan, who was a self-proclaimed 
“Adidas nut” but wore Converse on the courts because it was part of his team’s uniform.92 Nike 
guys, including Rob Strasser and Peter Moore, had started watching Jordan his junior year at the 
University of North Carolina, at a time when the company was in deep trouble with inventory 
overhang, with Reebok vying for position, and with Knight’s departure.93 Sonny Vaccaro, a 
basketball promoter who had been in the ranks with Nike since 1977, had pushed Jordan’s name 
to the top of the list. Vaccaro had long suggested that Nike quit its concentration of the NBA, 
which was too expensive, and focus on college basketball and had been instrumental in 
orchestrating this early move towards NCAA coaches in the late 1970s. Vaccaro bet his job with 
Nike on Jordan, arguing, “I’d pay him whatever it takes to get him,”94 opting to sign Jordan alone 
over ten other guys for the same price. Hesitant to spend the money it would take to get Jordan, 
Strasser decided, “unless it was possible to make one big marketing package—tie the brand, the 
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product, the advertising, and the athlete into one personality--…they should forget it.”95 Having 
forayed into various other markets, such as leisure wear, in an attempt to regain position and 
recoup their losses from having missed the aerobics boom from which Reebok profited, Nike 
“was clearly a company in a frantic search for its thing.”96 Nike was also a company that was 
about to have to face its shareholders with quarter-ending results in August 1984 of a 65% 
decline in earnings.97  
Thus, as Strasser put it, “If Jordan does what we think he can, and if we can execute, this can 
be big. Nike is going back to sport, where we belong.”98 But for Nike, these were a lot of “ifs.” 
The company was taking a huge risk. What if Jordan did not perform in the NBA? What if he 
was injured?99 Contracting Jordan would be a huge risk taken not only on his potential, but also 
on the potential of the market to support signature products. He was little known by the public 
other than serious college basketball fans.  Creative Director Peter Moore described the 
movement toward Jordan thus: 
“It’s pretty clear that he’s a hell of a basketball player and he seems to have a 
pretty decent personality. At least our guys, the guys that were scouts for Nike, 
you know, say that the guy is a good kid. So Rob comes to me and says, I wanna 
get this guy because we need to get, we need something to happen, but I don’t just 
want to sign another basketball player. I wanna make something out, I think we 
can make something out of this guy. So, we meet with his agent, a guy named 
David Falk, and we go back and forth, and David Falk says I wanna call this thing 
Air Jordan. Um, and in addition to that, we built a whole program around it where 
it was an autographed shoe and nobody in the team business had ever done this. I 
mean, a signature shoe in a team business has not ever been a big thing. So we did 
it…”100  
 
Such signature endorsements were generally reserved for athletes in individual sports, like track 
and field or tennis, whose successes could be attributed to their own personal success and could 
be more directly connected to the brand.101 Despite this precedent, Rob Strasser shook hands with 
sports agent David Falk, with whom he had already done about fifty athlete endorsement deals, 
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at a Saturday night post-Olympics party “on a deal that would leave Nike’s past in track and field 
behind, and catapult the company into a very different future.”102 Thus, a new era, not only for 
Nike but for sports promotions as well, was born. 
 
The Air Jordan Launch 
 Never having met Michael Jordan, the Nike executives flew the rookie and his family to 
Portland for the Nike pitch. Peter Moore had already discussed the Jordan concept with Falk, 
whose idea it was to call the potential brand “Air Jordan,” and began to conceptualize the 
creative image that they would ask Jordan to build. Moore felt that “Air Jordan” was not a bad 
name and that it made sense because “Nike had this thing called Air that nobody ever understood 
yet, but we had it and it was sitting in these shoes. And this guy could fly and his name was 
Jordan, so it seemed a pretty good idea.”103 So at the same time that the Nike executives were 
watching the investment in the Olympic athletes of their Chiat/Day-produced Cities advertising 
campaign, they also had their eye on Jordan as he helped lead the U.S. to a victory over Spain in 
the Olympic Finals in Los Angeles. People were amazed by his performance and thought, as the 
Spanish coach articulated, “He’s not human. He’s a rubber man… Michael Jordan? Very, very 
good. Very quick. Very fast. Very, very good. Jump, jump, jump.”104 Rob Strasser and Peter 
Moore took the lead in developing the presentation for Jordan and they only had a few weeks to 
do it. As was typical of the Nike marketing and promotional process, these two men relied not on 
market research data to develop their strategy, but rather on sports news—the morning sports 
page and ESPN at night—and on their understanding of the athlete. They would talk about what 
type of design and image would be comfortable for the athlete, and they made their decisions 
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about this by listening to Jordan and by examining their own reaction to and feelings about 
him.105  
 Nike had Chiat/Day put together a video of Jordan highlights using the Pointer Sisters 
“Jump.” They offered him a trademark, print ads, posters, and perhaps most importantly, 
drawings and samples of the unique shoes and clothes in the colors of the Chicago Bulls that 
would become Jordan’s signature. Basketball players had always worn white shoes. But 
according to Moore, “Nike had been one of the first companies to bring in bright colored 
basketball shoes. So, the idea was to say let’s take this symbol, put him in some colored 
basketball shoes because he’s going to be spectacular and let’s call attention to him by doing 
this. Because otherwise, he is just gonna be another guy just wearing a logoed shoe.”106 Thus, 
between Nike, who had been the running shoe company that got away with marketing bright 
athletic shoes and Jordan, who they felt could get away with almost anything, they were going to 
break the color barrier on the basketball court. Even more, they were going to build a program 
around an autographed shoe, something that had never been done in the team business before. 
Upon Falk’s urging, they were going to treat Jordan like a tennis star.107 They told Jordan, “You 
are going to be a brand. Air Jordan is going to be a sub-brand of Nike.”108 
 But both Jordan and Knight seemed to lack initial enthusiasm for the proposed relationship. 
Knight had stopped by the meeting to say hello to the Jordans but, according to Moore, Knight 
“was scared we were going to spend a fortune doing it. Basically, he was disgruntled with the 
company and couldn’t figure out what to do with it. Basically, he had been a performance athlete 
all of his life, started a company that had become a performance company, had skyrocketed, and 
then suddenly hit some competition, some hard times, and didn’t know quite what to do with 
it.”109 At the same time, Jordan attended the meeting with Nike only because his mother 
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persuaded him and he did so with Adidas still in his mind. It seems that even as Jordan left the 
meeting with Nike, he was still intent on signing with Adidas.110  
 As yet unconvinced by the Nike pitch, Jordan saw Converse and Adidas. Converse told 
Jordan he would be an athlete at the same table as—and with no more pay than—basketball’s 
best like Dr. J and Larry Bird. And Adidas, with a bevy of basketball endorsements and a lack of 
motivation to front the money for another, was not prepared to support Jordan in the way Nike 
was.111 Even so, Jordan was so intent on Adidas that he told them that if they even came close to 
matching the Nike deal, he would go with them.112 Falk had secured Jordan the third highest 
package for an NBA rookie when he negotiated a $4 million, five-year package that would score 
him about $600,000 in his first season with the Bulls;113 and despite the earnings losses of Nike at 
the time, Falk was able to negotiate a Nike offer of $2.5 million over five years, plus annuities, 
signing bonuses, and most importantly a stake in the success of the Air Jordan signature brand. 
Rather than giving Jordan a lump sum only, they offered a percentage of the profits of the 
products bearing his name and, in doing so, gave him investment in the success of the brand. To 
back up the efforts, Nike also guaranteed to spend at least one million in promotion, an amount 
that they actually far exceeded in the end.114 Adidas did not come close and a legendary 
partnership between the rising star and the struggling Nike was born. 
 Nike executives announced the still-unsigned deal with Jordan, along with corporate 
restructuring moves that included Phil Knight’s return from hiatus as Nike’s president, at the 
1984 shareholders’ meeting in an apparent attempt to pacify concerns about the company’s 
financial struggles. Stock was at $9.00, close to book value, and Nike would be tightening the 
rope on manufacturing costs, inventory, and would be laying off about 10% of its work force.115 
As accounts of the meeting suggested, “There didn’t seem to be much response from the crowd 
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to the deal they hoped would turn the company around. Clearly, few shareholders had ever heard 
of Michael Jordan, who had yet to play a regular season game in the NBA.”116 Fortune did a 
short article questioning Nike’s decision to sign such an unprecedented deal at a time when the 
company appeared to be sinking.117 But they were searching for something to give the company a 
boost, and Jordan seemed to be just that. Jordan’s relative anonymity would turn to infamy 
beginning with a 1985 spot from Chiat/Day called “Jordan Flight,” which highlighted the 
incredible grace and prowess of Jordan and his new relationship with Nike.118  
 In fact, the very thing that Moore had developed to call attention to Jordan was also what 
reinvigorated attention on Nike—color. Jordan wore his red and black Air Jordan Nike shoes for 
the first time in a preseason Bulls basketball game at Madison Square Gardens in September of 
1984.119 The NBA banned the shoe for violation of the league’s “uniformity of uniform” clause, 
the violation of which would be result in a $1,000 penalty to the player the first violation and 
$5,000 the second, and a Bulls forfeiture for the third time. Strasser advised Jordan to wear the 
shoes for the opening home game and promised that Nike would cover the fine, but they relented 
to the stress of Chicago Bulls general manager Rod Thorn and Jordan ended up wearing a white 
Nike shoe with a red Swoosh that first night. In his next game, Jordan wore his new signature red 
and black shoe for $1,000. 
Figure 2. The famed red and black Air Jordan I 
(www.air-jordans.com) 
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The shoes were the hit of the game. Steve Aschberner, sports writer for the Chicago Journal, 
said, “Michael Jordan is not the most incredible, the most colorful, the most amazing, the most 
flashy, or the most mind-boggling thing in the NBA. His shoes are.”120 This was strong publicity 
for the new signature shoes. Moore summed up the move by saying, “So, anyway, we ended up 
signing him. Big deal, got the shoes made, then had the shoes banned which was even better 
because now everybody wanted to buy them. And we did the ad, we did a television thing around 
him and I think the closing line was, ‘Who said man was not meant to fly?’”121 Strasser and 
Moore planned a television advertisement that would take advantage of this new publicity and 
the appeal of shoes that had been banned.  
 With the shoe not yet even in retail stores, the men worked with Chiat/Day to create a thirty-
second spot featuring Jordan simply bouncing a basketball, while the camera scanned him from 
head to toe. The voice-over spoke, “On September 15, Nike created a revolutionary new 
basketball shoe. On October 18, the NBA threw them out of the game. Fortunately, the NBA 
can’t keep you from wearing them. Air Jordans from Nike.” Thus, the commercial did not clearly 
state that the shoes were banned because of their colors, and instead implied a connection to the 
revolutionary features. NBA Commissioner, David Stern, who had banned the flashy shoes 
approved the ad because it was funny and because by that time he had realized the benefit that 
“Air” Jordan was going to have for the growing NBA. The NBA’s last big superstar, “Dr. J.” 
Erving, had entered the scene over a decade ago, but with Jordan’s arrival the league felt a 
revival, as cable television ratings shot up 20% in a year and game attendance rose:122 “The NBA 
figured that Jordan pulled in fifty season tickets every day at about $500 a shot. By the fourth 
week in the season, Bulls attendance had doubled over the previous year, and gate revenues were 
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up 50 percent. The Bulls had won 65 percent of their games.”123 The New York Times Magazine 
related the following: 
“Rod Thorn, the former general manager of the Bulls, called Falk and 
complained, “Dammit, David, you’re turning the guy into a tennis player.’ 
‘Exactly,’ said Falk. The league office backed the Bulls. And although all the 
principals deny that the confrontation was choregraphed in advance, the result 
was a Punch and Judy show in which the team and the league played heavies and 
everyone—Jordan, Nike, the Bulls and the league—benefited from the 
publicity.”124 
 Jordan’s popularity quickly began to grow. And, for the first time, Nike had an opportunity to 
pull together the product, the athlete, and the demand for an unprecedented success in 
America.125 Unfortunately, with ten weeks left until the December launch to the sales force, Nike 
did not yet have a product in development. Rob Strasser felt that he had learned some lessons 
about the process of marketing in his role as Marketing Director. He felt that marketing was not 
primarily about ideas, but rather about execution, and to execute the launch of Air Jordan, he was 
going to have to reach his hand in every part of the company. Rob Strasser considered this 
realization to have been the moment “Nike discovered marketing, and the day Knight would get 
his wish to ‘make it all tie’.”126 Nike Advertising Manager Cindy Hale considered the Air Jordan 
campaign to be not only Nike’s but also the athletic footwear and apparel industry’s first 
integrated marketing and advertising campaign.127 But the execution of this new understanding of 
marketing not only changed the way Nike did business; it was disruptive for the company, as a 
new “Launch Group” headed by Rob Strasser was developed to streamline the rollout and was 
taking precedent over other projects long in the pipeline. Nike was continuing to make cutbacks 
and saw Reebok sales for 1984 multiply to $65 million from just $3.5 million in 1982. In the 
quarter ending in February 1985, the Nike that had been one of the fastest rising companies in 
corporate history was now reporting losses of $2.1 million. 
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 The energy surrounding Jordan was building as Nike came closer to the launch. A May 1985 
launch memo out of Exeter, Nike’s research and development lab, suggests “Air Jordan is Nike’s 
answer to the necessity of bringing ‘Air’ packaged in full grain leather, into an affordable price 
range. This product is a functional statement from the outsole clear up to the upper design.”128 
According to this memo, the wholesale price was $35.00, with the retail to be set at $64.95. A 
children’s Jordan line retailed for less at $39 a pair and an expected fall launch of infant Baby 
Jordan would retail the shoes at $24.95 a pair.129  
 The uncertainty overshadowing the movement toward the launch was, as it always is, the 
consumer response. Nike aired Chiat/Day’s commercial that showed Jordan’s developing 
trademark flight through the air and ended with the question “Who says man was not meant to 
fly?” during the NCAA Final Four Tournament on April 1, 1985.  The advertisement was a 
testimonial of “Jordan’s ability to fly like a bird and the implication that the padded technologies 
bound to his feet had something to do with his agility and grace.”130 The Air Jordan line was 
released in stores that month and Nike received the answer to the consumer response question. 
The initial sales projections of 100,000 pairs of Air Jordan shoes were exceeded by over one 
million,131 with sales topping $100 million in Jordan’s first season of 1984-1985.132 Critics 
accused Nike of hyping the demand before the supply was ready. The initial release was, in fact, 
in limited quantities and limited to markets such as Detroit, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago. Sales exceeded company expectations with more than 1 million pairs sold in less than a 
month.133 Sports supply stores had waitlists of buyers. While 90 percent of retailers were selling 
the shoes at the $64.95 suggested retail price, others were selling them for as much as $80,134 
while still other buyers were purchasing shoes not even in their sizes and reselling them on the 
street for $100.135 Retailers were reporting that kids and their parents were fighting in stores to 
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get the shoes. One retailer was quoted as saying, “Imagine, these young kids are coming in who 
will grow out of them in a few months and their parents are buying them at $64 a pair.”136 
Regardless of the price Nike had set for the shoes, the over-demand for them was creating a 
situation in which consumers themselves were inflating the price of these coveted shoes. NBA 
spokesperson Terry Lyons, when asked if he had a pair of Air Jordans, replied, “I can’t wear 
them around here… I’m afraid they’d be taken away from me on the way to work by some kid 
with a gun.”137 This statement would foretell things to come. 
 Peter Moore summed up events by saying, 
“That television commercial, together with the shoes, together with the poster of 
the flying man, together with the whole in-store thing, it was just an instant 
success. It was just bam. And that showed us that with a small group of people–
the whole thing was put together by 8 people at Nike–controlling the whole 
package from the product to the advertising to the in-store to the way the kid 
dressed and acted, you had this whole entire thing together and you control the 
image. And you could also control the volume. How loud did you wanna make it? 
How scarce did you wanna have it? We had kids, we had people lining up in 
stores before they opened, an hour before they opened, to get this product. You 
know, it was a phenomenal thing. And it was the first time it had ever been done. 
And it did break the fever. I mean, it did take, it broke the fever, didn’t solve the 
illness, but it broke the fever.”138 
 
Retailers cited the limited releases, the outrageous colors, Jordan’s charisma, and Nike’s 
commercials for the tremendous success.139 By the end of fiscal 1986, sales of Air Jordan shoes 
hit $88 million.140 Nike saw Jordan as their shining star and determined that he “ought to be a 
part of the brand” in the future.141 The news media proclaimed the Air Jordan basketball shoe “a 
slam-dunk success at $65 a pair.”142 In the basketball category, Nike was leading.  
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 In the ensuing eight years, Nike’s advertising budget went from under $20 million to over 
$150 million,143 and new Michael Jordan shoes came out with each new selling season. Soon 
after the initial Jordan advertising, Nike reevaluated their advertising agencies. Cindy Hale, 
Nike’s advertising manager, argued in a memo to Rob Strasser and Peter Moore that they no 
longer needed two agencies and should pick one. Wieden & Kennedy, who believed “Nike was 
special,” had built themselves up operationally and were more prepared than before to take on 
bigger projects,144 and they had a strong ability to communicate technical information. While 
their media planning was as-yet unimpressive, there was evidence of movement to improve on 
this. Hale concluded, “Wieden-Kennedy has turned out some real turds but their work the past 6 
months has been increasingly mature and right-on. I think Wieden-Kennedy is a better long-term 
investment.”145 In the end, they chose the agency that they felt would treat Nike’s future like their 
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own, the agency that had been formed around Nike back in 1981—Wieden & Kennedy. A memo 
on the matter concluded that effective on November 1, 1985, Wieden & Kennedy would recoup 
all new business with a monthly fee of $60,000.146 
 Initial industry reports indicated both Nike and Chiat/Day had denied rumors of having 
severed their relationship even as November 1985, but by June 1986 it was clear that Chiat/Day 
would no longer hold the Nike account.147 Advertising Age reported the decision as having to do 
with cuts in their promotional budget after two quarters of loss, and a decision to deemphasize 
their television and image-based advertising that had been the jurisdiction of Chiat/Day. Instead, 
Nike would focus on less costly print campaigns and would “retain a consistent look, dictated by 
the company’s Creative Director Peter Moore and VP-Marketing Rob Strasser, who played a 
major role in the determining that look.”148 Other indications suggested that physical distance and 
relationships between the agency and Nike played an important role in the decision. Moore 
complained that Nike did not get enough of the “heart of Chiat/Day, which was a guy named Lee 
Clow, who was their Creative Director.”149 Clow attributed the change additionally to the 
relationship between the agency and Nike. Clow described it in this way: 
“I was basically the creative director Los Angeles, Chiat/Day Los Angeles at that 
time but basically if you ask Peter or Rob, as they got more annoyed with some 
things I’ll tell you about, I’d like to not make this overblown in this deal, but it’s 
true. When they came to the agency, they said, “we don’t want all the bullshit that 
comes with an agency. We want some guys that know how to make ads. And they 
basically latched onto me and said Lee’s the guy that we want. And, as we had 
some successes with our work, Jay would be seen quoted in the press talking 
about Nike and he’d be seen talking about Nike with a… taking a little bit too 
much credit for finding Nike’s center, finding the athletic core and showing Nike 
the way kind of shit… first I heard Moore and Strasser saying “what is this shit 
Chiat’s talking, we never even met, we never even talked to Chiat. What does he 
know about Nike?” And pretty soon I found out that Phil Knight had also seen Jay 
talking about Nike and that gave Phil an uncomfortable feeling. Here’s this guy I 
never met taking some kind of credit for Nike. And I think that was one of the real 
detriments to our ongoing relationship that, you know, that these people at 
Chiat/Day, who weren’t the people that they believed worked for Nike, were out 
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there taking some kind of credit for this thing, combined with, very interesting 
dynamics, combined with Reebok was on a role with stuff, and they were sitting 
there questioning everything, saying, well, what’s Reebok doing that we’re not 
doing.”150 
 
Despite Chiat/Day’s impactful and award-winning advertising for Nike,151 Wieden & Kennedy 
recouped the entirety of Nike’s business and took over advertising for the Air Jordan line; they 
thus continued a relationship that would be the foundation of one of the most popular icons in the 
world, developing creative material that would secure a place for Nike, Jordan and Wieden & 
Kennedy in corporate, marketing and advertising histories. 
 
Jordan Broke the Fever, But Didn’t Cure the Illness 
 Nike still needed to come up with the next big thing. Air Jordan had helped reinvigorate Nike 
but was not going to save the whole company,152 nor did the Jordan line enjoy a smooth upward 
climb. Nike still had to contend with the growth of Reebok and their soft leather aerobics shoe, 
along with the female market that Nike did not seem to understand. Additionally, Nike had 
allowed retailers to over-order on the second round of Air Jordans, they had too many products 
in the market, and the inventory of shoes and apparel was rising, as was retailer demand for 
fashionable Reeboks instead of performance Nikes. When Jordan broke his foot and was forced 
to sit out for sixty-four games, Nike had to face the risk they had taken by investing so much in 
one man.153  
 The first years of Jordan’s collaboration with Nike have been touted as a turn-around for the 
company. But in order to turn around, they had to contend with some troublesome internal 
problems. The mid-1980s was a tumultuous time for Nike. By May 1985, Nike had already laid 
off ten percent of its work force and closed down their domestic Exeter, NH factory, moving the 
research and development lab closer to Nike headquarters. Nike’s “Black Friday” of December 
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5, 1986 did not help the situation, as they fired another ten percent of the domestic workforce.154 
Through 1985 and 1986, there was an exodus of “old-timers” as they quit or were fired “because 
they couldn’t, or wouldn’t, work through the system… [W]hen sales plummeted, profits slipped, 
and another company was succeeding in the same market, blame fell close to home.”155 Gone 
were the days when an employee would be mocked for wearing a coat and tie, when tequila 
fountains and practical jokes were staples at sales meetings, and where the locker-room mentality 
that had defined the ethos of Nike dominated. Nike and news reports insisted that Rob Strasser, 
who had recently taken a 5-month hiatus from the company, was not a part of the layoffs of 1985 
and 1986. Discord had been growing and Strasser had become a controversial figure among Nike 
employees. John Jaqua, a member of the Nike Board of Directors and an attorney himself like 
Strasser, felt that while Rob Strasser had made significant contributions and did well with the 
Jordan launch, he did overstate his own role at times and was at least partially responsible for 
mistakes in the aerobics market that led to Nike’s decline in the early 1980s.156 Advertising 
manager Patsy Mest Stobie, who worked under Rob Strasser, also concluded that he was a 
controversial figure, but attributed this to his “creative mind.”157 And Nelson Farris, who joined 
the company in 1973, just after Strasser, and who eventually become Director of Internal 
Relations, considered Strasser’s risk-taking nature to have been a major contribution to the 
company, in line with the contributions of Phil Knight.158 By 1987 he and other company insiders 
who had grown their careers as they grew Nike, would resign from the company under a strained 
connection with Knight and the Nike they once knew.159 The company had changed. 
 Nonetheless, the long-term financial picture was looking up thanks to Air Jordan sales and 
some tightening of the company.160 In 1986, Nike reached the coveted billion-dollar mark, but 
this accomplishment was overshadowed by the fact that Nike was number two to Reebok and 
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was dampened by the major layoffs that occurred that year. Knight was disgruntled and Rob 
Strasser knew that they had to come up with something that would rebuild the brand. Once again, 
Nike turned to Air. 
 
The Air Apparent 
 From the first air shoe, the Tailwind, in 1978, putting and keeping air cushioning in the shoes 
posed technical problems that resulted in heavier shoes and shoe blowouts. Over the years, the 
air pack had gotten smaller and smaller because of the difficulty of putting the bag in 
polyurethane. When the Air Jordan shoes came out, the air bag was so small it seemed almost 
ridiculous to claim, but no one seemed to care. But in 1985, when Rob Strasser and Peter Moore 
were looking for their new idea, an old one resurfaced. The research and development people at 
Exeter had played with a concept soon after the rollout of the Tailwind called “visible Air” to 
deal with consumer uncertainty about what benefit the cushioning Air provided. The Exeter 
people had been trying to construct bigger bags and showed Rob Strasser and Moore a shoe with 
a hole cut in it so that you could see the bags. Moore recounts,  
“Well, I thought that was an ingenious fit and I told them I didn’t give a damn if 
the thing worked or didn’t work, I mean, if the hole did something or didn’t do 
something. But, it was a great way of finally showing somebody what this thing 
with air was. Because people didn’t grab, they didn’t understand, we could do 
diagrams and anything else you wanted, but they didn’t get it. They didn’t really 
know what it was. This thing you could feel it, touch it, if you poked a hole in it, 
it would go sssss. I mean, it was visual… and they had had it for awhile.”161  
Nike had been sitting on this idea for a while, but now they knew they needed something to 
make the technology tangible to consumers. 
 Not everyone was enthused. Some Nike men still maintained the old Nike mentality that 
Moore called the Sports Illustrated attitude. He was referring to Nike’s counterculture attitude 
that exalted the purity of the sport. For years, Nike snubbed the idea of doing a Sports Illustrated 
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ad because it would be too commercial.162 The flashy, hyped commercial sphere epitomized for 
them in the Sports Illustrated style was at odds with their notion of the Nike they knew, a 
company connected directly to the athlete and built on the athlete and whose message was one of 
performance and function, not flash. These attitudes, he argued, were surfacing in some of the 
response to the “visible Air.” In other words, “It wasn’t pure. It didn’t do anything”163—the 
visibility of Air did not change its functionality and was for show. But others like Moore felt that 
showing Air provided consumers with something tangible to connect them to functionality of the 
technology. Moore’s response to it took precedent, and the potential he saw in it began to take 
shape.  
 At the same time, other ideas were brewing that soon became packaged together under the 
Air line as the Air Pack, with the Air Max shoe that included the visible air concept, and a cross-
trainer called the Air Trainer. But the Nike name had taken some crippling hits and key Nike 
executives began to think that Nike’s brand value had diminished so much that the Nike name 
was going to hurt the Air Pack. As Lee Clow explained it, “Nike had been having this incredible 
success—success that sometimes comes to these young entrepreneurial companies and can 
almost get out of hand if you don’t manage it properly. The kind of euphoria of ‘Hey, we can put 
our logo on anything and it will sell.’ And the idea that you can design all different kinds of 
fashion and because it’s Nike and the success was mushrooming.”164 Previously, Nike had been 
able to sell products that may not have lived up to the name simply because they had Nike on 
them; now that they had the right product, they worried that the Nike name would devalue it.165 
Clow explained that Nike had been in a euphoric, “we can do anything” phase; coupled with the 
overwhelming success and proliferation of the brand that the company was not equipped fully to 
manage and the free-form and disunified communications strategy that had developed as a result, 
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this “we can do anything” approach was coming back to haunt them.166 With every misstep, their 
shoes had been showing up in discount houses and inventory dumps—Rob Strasser likened Nike 
to “a whorehouse.”167 Coupled with near-ubiquitous brand recognition in the United States, 
which would make their renegade posture hard to maintain, devaluation of the brand was a 
problem that would take quite some time to rectify. 
 But Rob Strasser and Peter Moore had a strong investment in the Nike image they had helped 
develop. Rob Strasser introduced a discussion of “what is Nike?” Nike executives knew that the 
majority of sneaker purchases sold for fashion, but the company was built on the belief that their 
job was to serve athletes and to promote performance technology. Fashion was simply referred to 
as “the f-word” if it was discussed at all.168 In reexamining Nike’s core, they determined, “It’s not 
soft leather. It’s great athletes and great endorsements and great posters using those 
endorsements… And it was this only technical thing we had called air. The only thing that made 
us different from Reebok or Tiger or New Balance or anybody. We had this thing called Air.”169 
They decided to rebuild the equity of the Nike logo and brand based on Air and a return to the 
core of performance on which Nike had been built.170 
 While Nike had built its brand on strong endorsements, this new Nike Air package was being 
developed without an athlete. Instead, it was built on a “Revolution” that was based on the 
technology unmatched by their competitors.171 Wieden & Kennedy developed the famous Nike 
“Revolution” ads featuring the Beatles’s song of the same name and suggesting that Nike Air 
technology would revolutionize the industry. Nike dedicated $7 million of their total $22 million 
advertising budget to the “Revolution” campaign that would run from March through May of 
1987, with the majority of the exposure on television. They further supported the launch with 
$40 million in promotions and endorsements. With sales and earnings continuing to drop in the 
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1987 fiscal year,172 Nike had turned to the 12 models of the Nike Air line to reposition the 
company and counted on this line to present a message of quality and performance.173 Many, 
including Knight, attributed Nike’s rejuvenated run for the position of industry leadership to the 
Nike Air line of shoes, which retailed for up to $110 to $135 per pair and helped bring the 
company to the $1 billion mark.174 The new Nike Air models that had started under Rob Strasser 
were a huge hit and enough to have industry insiders thinking that Nike was back.175 Nike had 
returned from its venture into fashion marketing to its core as an athletic performance 
company,176 and they were looking for ways to continue to reinforce that message. On the heels 
of the “Revolution” campaign and after a bit of trial-and-error, Nike would reiterate to the world 
their core as an athletic performance company and their theme of empowerment with the now-
infamous “Just Do It” tagline.  
 One barrier to unifying Nike’s overall philosophy as one of empowerment comes in the form 
of a commercial that ran in the Spring 1988, just before the “Just Do It” slogan broke. The 
commercial, “Lesson about Intimidation” was criticized in the advertising trade press. Steven 
Silberman of Advertising Age wrote, “The ad for Nike basketball shoes is certainly one we can 
do without. Showing three black youths ascending the subway steps and associating their 
appearance with ‘intimidation’ is precisely the sort of stereotyping that the black community 
finds offensive. The fact that the characters are wearing Nike shoes does not soften this 
impression, and may even be lost among other images. I hope Nike will reconsider this ad.”177  
There are several problems with Silberman’s critique. The ad depicts five young men, with three 
in the foreground, exiting the subway at Uptown and the Bronx, New York. Of the five, only two 
of the three in the foreground are black and neither of the men in the background appears to be. 
One man is carrying a basketball, and since five men could make up a basketball team a viewer 
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could reasonably assume that the message is one of intimidation controlled by the rules of sport. 
However, the music is menacing and the men are wearing street clothes, complicating 
interpretations of the message and conflicting with messages of empowerment since intimidation 
implies disempowerment on the receiving end. 
 But with the first “Just Do It” commercial that aired on July 1, 1988 and featured 80-year-old 
distance runner Walt Stack,178 Nike’s focus returned. The impact of this campaign was 
tremendous. The message was one of empowerment—“it speaks to the restraint and inhibition in 
everyday life that keep people from the experience of transcendence. Nike provides a language 
of self-empowerment—no matter who you are, no matter what your physical, economic or social 
limitations… The phrase is wonderfully ambiguous… The Nike philosophy challenges us to 
confront, and hopefully, to overcome barriers.”179 In 1999, Advertising Age ranked the tagline 
“Just Do It” as second only to DeBeers’ “A Diamond Is Forever” among their list of most 
memorable slogans of the 20th Century and the slogan became so much a part of social milieu 
that Time magazine would use those three words—Just Do It—to capture the ethos of the baby 
boom generation.180 The “Just Do It” campaign contained a variety of athletes and popular 
figures, including the cross-training Bo Jackson.  
 While the Air Jordan and the “Revolution” campaigns had been pushing various types of Air, 
Nike was looking for a way to advance the cross-trainer. Bo Jackson, who was tracked by Nike 
representatives since his college days, seemed a perfect fit. Coming up on 1986, Bo Jackson was 
known well enough to be able to expect a large incentive to go with Nike. Like they had done 
with Jordan, Nike pitched an athlete image with a logo and apparel line. Nike signed a $100,000 
a year contract with Bo Jackson and only days later, the Heisman Trophy winner turned down a 
very lucrative contract to play football for the Tampa Buccaneers so that he might take up a 
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“hobby” of playing baseball with the Kansas City Royals that would earn him a comparatively 
meager salary.181 The potential of this risk did not go over well with Phil Knight, and Rob 
Strasser was not pleased with the initial result, either.182 But the longer-term payoff was the stuff 
of legends. By 1988, Nike had leveraged the impeccable image and graceful skill of Michael 
Jordan, had introduced one of the most famous slogans, “Just Do It,” into the lexicon and had 
capitalized on Bo Jackson’s multisport capabilities in advertising their cross-trainers in spots that 
gained both industry and popular acclaim.183 Revenues were up 33% over the previous year and 
Phil Knight proclaimed, “We had a glorious youth, a stumbling adolescence, and we hope to 
come out as a tall, strong adult.”184  
 The following sections explore the growth of Nike’s image through the development of the 
Spike and Mike campaigns, which made a commercial connection to the inner-city, hip-hop 
culture that had long been associating itself with name-brand athletic wear, the introduction of 
Bo Jackson into the “Just Do It” campaign, and the development of the wildly popular “Bo 
Knows” advertising. On the heels of the “Revolution” campaign, which brought Nike back to its 
core of performance technology and put the company in position to vie for industry leadership, 
the Spike and Mike and the Bo Jackson campaigns helped solidify their return to the top. 
  
It’s Gotta Be the Shoes 
 By the mid-1980s, Michael Jordan and Nike had become so closely linked that a Chicago 
Bulls teammate suggested to Sports Illustrated that they should call the company “Mikey.”185 
While Nike was called “Mikey,” Jordan was being called “Air” and “His Airness.” In the minds 
of many, Nike and Jordan were tantamount. Jordan’s cultural clout was growing and his heroic 
image was building. But still, the second round Air Jordan shoe was ahead of its time and Nike 
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was not putting dollars behind it because it was not selling. Wieden & Kennedy copywriter Jim 
Riswold along with agency producer Bill Davenport came up with a concept that would team 
Jordan with up-and-coming film director Spike Lee. 186 Riswold recounts that he and Davenport 
saw a movie trailer for Spike Lee’s She’s Gotta Have It (1986) and noticed that Lee’s Mars 
Blackmon character never took off his Air Jordans.187 Air Jordans were so essential to Mars 
Blackmon’s “sense of identity that he refused to take the shoes off while making love.”188 
Intrigued by this idea, Riswold penned the :30 “Hangtime” ad, the first in a series of up to 
seventeen spots in a sixteen year long “Spike and Mike” campaign189 of ads featuring Mars 
Blackmon that include “Cover,” “Nola,” “Can/Can’t,” “It’s Gotta Be the Shoes,” and 
“Aeronautics,” all of which are based on characters in Lee’s films. Riswold and Davenport easily 
recruited Lee, whose interest in basketball and Michael Jordan was incentive enough to accept 
the idea of a Mike and Spike spot.190 When the idea was initially conceived, Rob Strasser was 
still on leave from the company and was not comfortable signing off on the idea, so they filmed a 
tape of Jordan pitching to Knight from the lines of Lee’s film She’s Gotta Have It, asking, 
“Please baby please, do a commercial with Spike,”191 referencing scenes from the film in which 
Mars begged Nola Darling not to dump him. Consumers eventually would see these lines 
recycled in Lee’s “It’s Gotta Be the Shoes” spot for Nike, in which Mars Blackmon begged Nike 
to send him a pair of new Air Jordans. 
 However, Knight did not respond to the initial pitch and pleas to the newly-instituted vice-
president, Brendan Foster, were fruitless. Foster felt that Air Jordan, with its supply problems 
and inability to bring Nike completely out of the market chasm, had been a failure and he was 
not willing to supply the line with more advertising dollars. According the Strasser and Becklund 
(1991), “Moore walked out of the meeting thinking that Nike no longer gave a shit about the 
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athlete. Nike had come full circle from the days when it was out to service athletes, not merely 
profit by them. Now the marketing manager and the owner of the company barely even 
acknowledged Jordan’s existence.”192 Whether that was true or not, the idea was tabled for the 
time being and at the very least Jordan clearly was not forgotten by all. 
 When Rob Strasser returned from leave and filled an undefined position working with Peter 
Moore, the two men turned their sights back to Michael Jordan. They met with the Jordans and 
discussed a concept of longevity. Increasingly, Michael Jordan was contributing to the Nike 
meetings and his maturity seemed evident to the Nike men.193 Rob Strasser and Moore presented 
three options to move forward, the last of which entailed making Michael Jordan a label in his 
own right and updating the now-juvenile logo to better reflect the distinctiveness and 
timelessness that they knew Jordan could represent. With that, they unveiled the “Jump Man” 
logo—a simple and clean silhouette of Jordan’s famous poster dunk—that has since been 
emblazoned on Jordan shoes, apparel and in the minds of millions around the world. 
Figure 4. Nike Jumpman Image 
(www.nike.com/jumpman23) 
 
 
Moore argued, “You should never change a logo unless the brand it represents has changed. We 
have that case here.”194 But the men were worried that Knight wouldn’t approve of it and Moore 
speculated, “We have probably the one human being in all of sports history we can make 
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industry history with here. I sure hope Knight knows that.”195 Soon thereafter, both Rob Strasser 
and Moore left Nike; but Wieden & Kennedy’s Jim Riswold remained persistent about the 
concept of a Spike and Mike campaign and “badgered his Nike contacts” for several months 
until they agreed to support the idea.196 The campaign broke in February 1988 to promote the 
new Air Jordan II line with a series of commercials that built on the original “Hang Time” 
concept to include the character of Mars Blackmon in Air Jordans.197 
 
Inspiration from the Street: “Spike and Mike” 
 The development of the idea for the “Spike and Mike” commercials was inspired by Spike 
Lee’s independent use of Air Jordans as signifiers of a specific aesthetic of the cultural style and 
moment he was portraying in his films. The movies were referencing cultural products, the 
meaning of which had been developed on the streets, on basketball courts, and through the 
advertising which, in turn, referenced Lee’s films and played off of decades of advertising that 
had implied various athletic abilities resulted from the consumption of branded products.198 Lee 
has been credited with having made “a more indelible impact on Hollywood and the Hip-Hop 
generation” than any other filmmaker.199 Spike Lee’s films countered Hollywood’s exploitation 
of the African American and hip-hop culture, and offered powerful social commentary that he 
also translated into the advertising work he did. Whatever impact one might attribute to Lee, few 
could argue that he has not been controversial; in fact, Lee himself has admitted to seeking 
controversy, even at the risk of offending, if it brings important issues into public discourse.200 
Indeed, Lee helped issues of race and prejudice to the forefront of late 1980s and early 1990s 
concerns. His 1989 film Do the Right Thing has been called “the standard bearer for Hollywood 
  
155 
on race relations”201 and was named the most important film of the 1980s.202 Lee himself has been 
labeled a cultural hero.203   
 When Spike Lee included a scene in Do the Right Thing in which the character “Buggin’ 
Out” was outraged by a cyclist who inadvertently scuffed his bright and clean Air Jordans, he 
was doing so not as part of a paid deal with Nike, but rather as a reference to the sacredness 
instilled in this commodity through inner-city cultural practices and his desire “to wardrobe as 
realistically as possible.”204 His “rebelliousness and candor” have brought attention to his films 
and have also made him appealing to the core market of 14 to 24 year olds so desired by 
advertisers like Nike.205 But some scholars have critiqued the reciprocal use of Lee’s characters 
in Nike advertising. One author calls Mars Blackmon’s appearance in Nike ads an insidious 
example of cultural colonization: “Through that character above all, Lee set the power of street 
style and speech to work not just in the service of an imagined racial community but an 
imaginary blackness which exists exclusively to further the interests of corporate America.”206 
Others have countered that the manner in which appropriation occurs is an important factor in 
determining how a message should be judged, and that Nike avoids appropriation for the sake of 
“badge-value” in the Mike and Spike campaign and in some of its subsequent social 
responsibility ads.207  
 In contrast to critics who have argued that Nike has, with no sense of subtlety, claimed that 
Michael Jordan’s incredible athletic ability is a direct result of his Nike shoes and thereby has 
misled consumers, others have argued that in fact the Spike and Mike campaign relies “on an 
assumption that consumers would not be persuaded by the old claims anymore—that the 
advertisers are sharing an in-joke with viewers that this stuff has always been baloney.”208 With 
such an unlikely candidate for dunking as Mars Blackmon, viewers know that no shoe will help 
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them dunk like Jordan and so the idea is for laughs.209 The ads poke fun at Michael Jordan, Mars 
Blackmon and Nike. In this view, the ads are much different from and more than attempts to 
convince consumers that they, too, can “Be Like Mike” (to draw from a Gatorade slogan) if only 
they wear his signature shoes. The ads are ironic and reflexive, drawing from consumers’ 
historical understanding of advertising conventions and developing Nike as “a self-effacing 
company with a sense of humor.”210  
 These commercials were also an important creative break for Nike; as copywriter Jim 
Riswold claimed, the Spike and Mike ads were some of the first Nike ads to use humor. The use 
of humor, in his view, while still centered on Nike’s core of sport and performance, was a 
friendly way of introducing a large company to individual consumers.211 But a cultural reading of 
the ads demonstrated to many viewers, through Lee’s use of language and imagery, that Nike 
was now engaged in a larger social history of race and advertising. For some, this was another 
example of white corporate appropriation of black style. But the relationship between Spike, 
Mike and Nike represents and is embedded in a history and system of cultural exchange more 
complex than white corporate appropriation of black language and imagery, and the relationship 
had a tremendous impact on American understanding of race relations as criticisms and debate 
over the affiliation developed and flourished, building both a brand and an icon.212 
 If recall is a measure of success, these campaigns were just that, having been listed among 
the top 10 best-recalled ads by Advertising Age in late February and March 1990.213 Fortune 
magazine called the spots legendary: “You can’t really overstate their importance in painting 
Nike as the brand of athletic performance… These ads changed the mechanics of everything we 
do. They redefined what is celebrity.”214 They also redefined the relationship between advertising 
and race. Of this new relationship, Spike Lee indicated, “Never before in the history of American 
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business has a company put a black individual as the face of a company, and what Phillip 
[Knight] did was revolutionary.”215 Others recognized the collaboration similarly as a 
groundbreaking shift in representations of African Americans and as just good business sense. A 
Newsweek article pointed out, “The athletic-wear giant is one of a growing number of companies 
that have begun to use ads made not only with, but by, blacks. The reason isn’t hard to figure 
out: blacks have become a powerful consumer force… To reach them… marketers are striving 
for ads with an ‘authentic’ feel for black music, language and lifestyles.”216 Indeed, the authors 
argue, the Spike and Mike ads had “the look and feel of a rap video.”  
 Nike had given Spike Lee creative control over the series of ads. And copywriter Jim 
Riswold deferred to Lee’s understanding of the culture, with Lee adjusting the scripts “to fit 
Mars’ hip-hopping patter.”217 Indeed, there is evidence to the fact that Nike recognized as early as 
1986 the importance of urban youth in setting trends, and they did organize at least some of their 
marketing around the potential of this market. Advertising Age reported that for the first time, 
Nike was focusing on the black consumer market in a national campaign with Wieden & 
Kennedy-developed print ads to run in Ebony, EM and Essence and cable television commercials 
on Black Entertainment Television (BET). The decision was based on market research that 
indicated the trend-setting potential of the black community.218  
 But according to both Spike Lee and Nike representatives, the use of black language and 
imagery did not mean they were “targeting” black youth any more than other youth 
demographic. They employed this strategy because they believed it would appeal to a more 
general consumer market—that is, anyone in the market for a sneaker.219 Having black endorsers 
in basketball was more authentic, according to a Reebok spokesperson, because basketball was 
dominated by black athletes. Consumers, particularly in the youth market, were turned off when 
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they sensed that a message lacked authenticity.220 Phil Knight, not one to shy away from 
controversy, said of their decision to use figures such as Michael Jordan, “Distinctive 
personalities are important, but you don’t have to be loved. And color really doesn’t matter. A lot 
of people have written that we’ve signed these black stars to sell to kids in the inner city. We 
didn’t… We are looking for great personalities who cut across racial lines.”221 In fact, only 
13.8% of Nike’s shoe sales in 1990 were to minorities. The trend-setting power of the black, 
urban market was the inspiration for this relationship and by the mid-1980s the urban market 
liked Nike. Nike would work to solidify that connection through some of its most prominent 
advertising campaigns. 
 
Jordan’s Nike Career 
 In the meantime, the outward success of Nike and their advertising was not fully reflected in 
their internal relations. Michael Jordan, having watched the much of the Air Jordan team leave 
and hearing the news of departures by top management including Rob Strasser and Peter Moore, 
grew concerned that his line would not get the attention he expected. He met with Strasser and 
Moore, who had started their own company together, to discuss his future. The three agreed that 
he should never leave Nike and relinquish the successes there; but they also agreed that since 
Nike had never acted on a Jordan-based casual sportswear line previously suggested by Strasser 
and Moore, it would not be a conflict if Jordan started his own company to develop this idea with 
Nike a part of it. According to several accounts Knight refused the idea outright saying, 
“Michael Jordan without Nike won’t mean anything.”222 Knight’s remark took aim at the three 
men, Strasser, Moore and Jordan, who under Nike had built an icon. Nonetheless, on Strasser 
and Moore’s advice, as well as that of his parents, Jordan accepted an approximately $20 million, 
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7-year Nike offer in March 1989, essentially ensuring Michael Jordan’s entire basketball career 
would be in Nike shoes.223  
 For Nike, this multi-million dollar agreement was a good investment. Of the $1.2 billion in 
Nike sales in 1988, basketball accounted for $213 million, and the Air Jordan line was given 
much of the credit for this success.224 For the first time since 1986, when Reebok had secured 
Nike’s previous position as market-share leader in domestic athletic shoes, Nike had regained its 
position with 26% of the domestic market to Reebok’s 23%.225 While this success ran across 
Nike’s business lines, the basketball shoe segment showed a 35% sales increase with the 
prominent Michael Jordan advertising campaigns and the cross-trainer, promoted by Bo Jackson, 
posting a 51% sales jump. Of the market share duel between Nike and Reebok, the Wall Street 
Journal’s G. Christian Hill wrote, “Reebok evidently has regained some of that valuable 
commodity with The Pump, which competes with the Nike Air Pressure shoe in two categories: 
the highest-priced sneaker ever, and the most gimmick-laden sneaker ever.”226 For almost five 
years, Reebok and Nike had been battling it out to gain the lead in the $5 billion U.S. athletic 
shoe market. Reebok had debuted The Pump, which retailed in 1989 for $170;227 Nike’s nemesis 
to the Pump was the Air Pressure Shoe that was part of a 1990 line-up of shoes featuring Air 
technology and retailing between $100 and $135.228 Nike also unveiled in 1990 the new “Air 
Command Force” basketball shoe with a campaign featuring NBA rookie David Robinson229 and 
claimed a solid lead in the close battle with Reebok, securing 28% market share after several 
years in which it was too close to call.230 
 For Jordan’s part in his new deal with Nike, he had secured a larger marketing strategy that 
created a specialized segment based around Air Jordan, “a package that connected the shoes, 
colors, clothes, athlete, special Air Jordan logo, and other visual images, and the television 
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advertising that would set the other elements of the marketing onslaught into motion.”231 The Air 
Jordan III was developed with the now-famous Jumpman image, fashioned after the spread-
legged pose of Jordan in flight towards a dunk. According to former architect-turned-Creative 
Director Tinker Hatfield, who took over the design for the Air Jordan line, this was the first shoe 
to truly reflect Jordan’s personality at the time.232 
 
The “Bolympics” 
 After the Spike and Mike series, Riswold turned his efforts back to Bo Jackson for a series of 
spots that was termed the “Bolympics” in Nike circles.233 He had already debuted promoting the 
cross-trainers in three ads of the “Just Do It” series. In 1989, Jackson signed a lucrative deal with 
the L.A. Raiders. In a commercial that broke on July 11, 1989 during the Major League 
Baseball’s All-Star game, Bo was seen playing eight sports (an international version added 
soccer and cricket for a total of ten).234 A series of athletes offered testimonials of his various 
abilities and he was paired with Bo Diddley in a revelation of Bo’s limitations. The 60-second 
spot written by Jim Riswold, art directed by David Jenkins and directed by Joe Pytka was 
pronounced a Nike and Wieden & Kennedy success.235  Nike reportedly paid Jackson $1.4 
million over four years between 1986 and 1990 to endorse their products236 and dedicated $10 
million on the campaign.237 In fact, Nike advertising manager Scott Bedbury had encouraged 
Knight to double their investment in the “Bo Knows” spots to $12 million. The financially 
strapped company put all advertising support for running and basketball on hold to invest 
everything they could on the campaign for the back-to-school season.238 The incredible risk paid 
off as fans watched Nike stars like Michael Jordan and John McEnroe line up in a testimonial 
that Bo knows everything… but Diddley.239  
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 As Adweek critic Barbara Lippert points out, much of the hype surrounding Bo Jackson 
comes not from a consistently proven record (he had not yet played an entire football season and 
his stats in baseball were yet to prove him an all-star) but from the promise of his potential: “In 
our culture of hype, it’s actually fitting that the only place he’s reached his full potential is in 
advertising. Nike TV spots have brought attitude advertising to sports.”240 A great deal of media 
attention offered free, added value to Nike’s investment in the campaign, and as sales of the new 
cross-training shoe rose, Nike commanded 80% of that market.241 Of the ads featuring Bo 
Jackson, even Reebok Chairman and CEO Paul Fireman thought them some of the best he had 
ever seen.242 Media critic Bob Garfield attributed the success of the Bo Jackson commercials to 
the authentic connection between a multisport player whose “cross-training grit is legendary” 
and Nike’s message: Just Do It. Jackson, in his actions and his reputation, stands for the idea.243   
 Together, a relentless effort from the Nike Air “Revolution” campaign, the Spike 
Lee/Michael Jordan commercials and the “Just Do It” campaign series with “Bo Knows” brought 
Nike back to its core of performance—making performance fashionable—and helped the 
company regain its market lead in 1989.244 More than that, these campaigns became deeply 
engrained in American culture and vernacular, and secured Michael Jordan’s and Bo Jackson’s 
places as the first and second most famous athletes in the world and placed them on the thrones 
of “demigods.”245 Certainly the story does not end here and Nike, as any company, continued to 
rise and fall in the market, but these campaigns in the latter part of the 1990s helped to make 
Nike a icon, emblematic of the complex processes of globalization—the swoosh, the revolution, 
the empowered call to action “Just Do It,” the company of Michael Jordan, the once 
counterculture running shoe company that became a badge and a casualty246 of urban cool; it was 
also the company that purportedly had low-wage, underage, foreign workers laboring in 
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shameful conditions to sell shoes for a company that had black kids killing each other in the 
name of their brand. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Histories of Nike tell of a company born out of a strong, passionate, and inspired connection 
to sport and competition. The company was founded by former track and field athlete Phil 
Knight, and employees were either athletes or sports enthusiasts. In the early days, sport was 
primary and competition was embodied in dedication to the company as in dedication to a team. 
Nike co-founder and track coach Bill Bowerman was instrumental in popularizing jogging as a 
mainstream activity in the United States, the derivative of which was growth of the Nike 
business. He was attracted to Knight’s idea to build an athletic shoe company because of his 
dissatisfaction with the current market for performance shoes, and he saw in BRS and Nike the 
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potential to provide athletes with more advanced shoes that were developed with their 
specialized needs in mind. Bowerman himself created some of Nike’s most advanced prototypes, 
such as the waffle sole, and was an inspiration for Nike’s research and development focus.  
 In the face of disputes with their supplier, Knight and BRS created Nike—not from consumer 
research data and sophisticated strategic market calculations, but off of a deadline and a dream. 
Carolyn Davidson’s $35 fat checkmark was coupled with an image of the winged goddess of 
victory that predates the supergas technology known to consumers as “Air” and any thought of 
the unified grace and power of Michael Jordan flying through the air to the net. The Swoosh of 
the logo did not yet reverberate with the swoosh of a Jordan net shot. The iconic imagery of Nike 
was constructed from an amalgam of serendipity, skill and calculated risks. The rapport built in 
the public eye between Nike and superhero Michael Jordan was not “magic,” but it was the result 
of the gravitation of various and complex forces that both shaped and was shaped by the world in 
which it exists. 
 In the early days of the company, BRS employees were selling the shoes out of their cars at 
various sporting events. Knight’s hiring practices were not based on previous experience or 
formal education in a position, but rather on his perception of people’s passion for sport. Based 
on this approach, he placed his friends and early insiders in key positions. When Rob Strasser 
was named head of marketing in 1977, he did not even know what an image was. As the 
company grew, they put the majority of their promotional budget into endorsements. Reflecting 
on their business success Phil Knight told Forbes, “The secret to the business is to build the kind 
of shoe professional athletes will wear, then put them on the pros. The rest of the market will 
follow.”247 With the introduction of the first Nike shoe to the market in 1972, with strong 
endorsements from and ties to track and field, and with the jogging boom, Nike began to 
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compete for market lead and by the early 1980s outpaced number one Adidas. With such growth 
in the market, Nike finally decided it was time to introduce itself on a national scale through 
advertising.  
 But financial and supply problems were looming for this company whose growth had 
overtaken its capacity. Phil Knight stepped down as head of the company, only to return a year 
later among image and control problems, and Reebok’s looming threat to their recently secured 
market lead. The company lost focus and dabbled in fashion as they tried to recoup from the 
neglected aerobics market. To regain position, they were determined to move away from the “f-
word” they had courted to compete with Reebok and return to their core of athletic performance. 
Nike cut the number of endorsement deals and instead turned to potential and rising superstars 
like Michael Jordan. Their history of intuitive decision making aside, the risk of putting all of 
their resources on only a few athletes was not lost to the top Nike executives. Not only were they 
facing the potential that Michael Jordan could be hurt or not reach his potential, they were testing 
the market with the first signature shoe connected to a player from a team sport. By most 
accounts, the risk was far outpaced by the reward. 
 Air Jordans were launched at a suggested retail price of $64.95, not atypical of athletic shoes 
at the time; but facing over-demand, retailers and consumers alike took matters into their own 
hands, pricing and selling the shoes for upswards of $100. Some critics claimed that Nike had 
purposefully over-stimulated and undersupplied, but Nike was a company trying to come out of 
difficult times instigated by problems of oversupply. Their Air Jordan launch provided the 
company with the necessary support to trudge forward, but the mid-1980s were difficult years 
for the Nike, as they went through several rounds of layoffs and losses both financial and of 
seasoned executives who had helped build the company. Michael Jordan, too, entertained the 
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idea of leaving Nike but by that point the two had become synonymous in consumers’ minds and 
Jordan recognized the power of this relationship, deciding to reinforce it further with a long-term 
Nike contract and the eventual development of his own Nike-based Jordan brand. 
 Nike’s advertising budget grew significantly over the 1980s as the company began to reclaim 
ground in the market with their visible air that made their technology accessible to the consumer, 
and that they supported with now legendary campaigns including “Revolution,” “Just Do It,” 
“Bo Knows,” and the “Spike and Mike” advertising. Nike enjoyed incredible growth since the 
introduction of Air Jordans in 1985 and the basketball category was registering $415 million by 
1989; with the help of Jackson’s image, Nike regained its position from Reebok as the number 
one sneaker company by the end of 1989.248  
 By 1990, Nike was back on top. But as leaders, they were called to account for their 
involvement in a variety of social concerns, from their labor practices abroad to their 
endorsement practices at home. In 1990, media attention on a series of crimes involving inner-
city, black youth and athletic wear took aim at Nike. Numerous reports had surfaced of violence 
in the inner-cities in the name of Air Jordan shoes and other brand-name athletic wear and goods. 
These reports gained great media attention after New York Post columnist Phil Mushnick lashed 
out publicly at Nike, Michael Jordan, Spike Lee and Georgetown basketball coach John 
Thompson for inciting violence by promoting their high-priced goods to poor, urban youth, 
instigating an equally public response in The National by Spike Lee. A series of high-profile 
media reports in the early 1990s addressed the issues brought up by Mushnick and Lee and 
brought the situation to the attention of mainstream America. The following chapter builds on 
this understanding of Nike’s history to explore the company’s cultural clout and their connection 
to the black community with whom they were increasingly associated. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DO THE RIGHT THING—MICHAEL JORDAN, SPIKE LEE AND NIKE 
IN MARKETING TO BLACK CONSUMERS 
 
“Took a poll ‘cause our soul took a toll 
From the education of a TV station… 
I like Nike but wait a minute 
The neighborhood supports to put some money in it 
Corporations owe dey gotta give up the dough 
To da town or else we gotta shut ‘em down” 
-Public Enemy1 
 
 In the late 1980s, despite what many perceived to be the dominance of black athletes in 
sports, race equity was still an issue. Some critics argued that regardless of their 
accomplishments, black athletes could not get as many endorsements, would not be paid as 
much, and would not be projected as positively as their white counterparts.2 The Wall Street 
Journal’s charts of the most popular athletes had demonstrated that while eight of the top ten 
most popular athletes were black, only one black athlete was represented among those with the 
most endorsements. In contrast, Advertising Age reported that three of the top ten endorsers—
Michael Jordan, Bo Jackson, and O.J. Simpson—were black and argued that those three 
examples were only the beginning of a growing trend, but this did not alleviate continued 
concerns that adequate and appropriate representation was an issue. 3 For example, despite the 
immense success in public response to the Bo-centered Nike ads, some felt that Jackson was 
underappreciated by marketers and pointed to the comparatively fewer endorsement deals he 
had. 4 But others argued that black athletes such as Charles Barkley, Wilt Chamberlain and James 
Worthy had increasingly entered the endorsement business over the past decade, and turned to 
Michael Jordan and Bo Jackson as “the biggest team-sports figures in the 10-figure sports 
endorsement industry” to point out the impact of black participation. 5 And the impact of these 
two sports celebrity figures was indeed immense. 
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 Jackson was named the best-known sports endorser in 1989 and was second only to Joe 
Montana in 1990; even despite a hip injury, Jackson was ranked in the 10 most sought-after 
sports endorser of 1991.6 And Sports Illustrated named Michael Jordan Sportsman of the Year in 
1991, calling him “a hero for the wired world” and “the first new age athlete.” Author David 
Halberstam considered Jordan and “pre-HIV” Magic Johnson, with Bo Jackson as a possible 
contender, to be the only two black men to have become true crossover heroes—“that is, they 
receive more commercial endorsement deals from the predominantly white, middle-class 
purveyors of public taste than do white athletes”7—in the 45 years since Jackie Robinson broke 
the color barrier in baseball. The 1980s was the first decade to see the rise of an African 
American athlete to a truly global icon. For many, this icon was symbolic of the realization of a 
long struggle for positive representation and acceptance and a beacon of change to come. He was 
the right person in the right sport at the right time. Others were more skeptical that Michael 
Jordan symbolized a new world for African American opportunity, not only pointing to the 
destitute circumstances of many blacks living in impoverished circumstances with little access to 
quality education, positive and realistic role models and workplace opportunity, but also arguing 
that through representations of Michael Jordan, black culture was once again appropriated for 
white commercial gain. While some felt he transcended race and signaled a symbolic space 
where people of all backgrounds could come together, others felt that representations of Michael 
Jordan presented a “neutered” identity8 or whitewashed race. 
 Thus, recounting Nike, Inc.’s history and relationship with Michael Jordan does not do 
justice to the greater impact experienced not only in the American cultural landscape, but 
globally, as well. Since Michael Jordan has been such a persistently discussed and explored 
figure since his rise to fame, this chapter examines the discourse about Michael Jordan in popular 
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and scholarly work and how he was interpreted and implicated in the controversy over sneaker-
incited violence in the early 1990s.  
 
The Price of Nike, the Cost of Violence 
Chapter Three discussed a brief history of sneakers and demonstrated how as early as the 
1970s, sneakers worn in a specific style and in certain communities were considered “felon 
shoes.”9 As Erin Patton, form Jordan brand manager and self-proclaimed member of the hip-hop 
generation pointed out, 
 “Some companies, including Nike, have received their fair share of criticism for 
manipulating the desire and the aspirational nature of certain consumers, 
particularly those within the inner-city environment who may not have necessarily 
the means or the ability to reconcile their own value system against a commercial 
message and make appropriate decisions. But as it relates to the notion that I was 
suggesting—aspirational being connected to lifestyle—and because of dire 
circumstances or just making ends meet and being in an environment where times 
are tough and the budget, the belt, is always tight, there was a consistent desire to 
aspire to a better lifestyle. And that’s where hip-hop music began to 
communicate, in many ways in a positive sense, began to communicate what that 
looked like to many of us who couldn’t walk outside and see it… what the finer 
things in life looked like… There are other brands, and we’ll stick with Nike for a 
moment, who inadvertently have found themselves representing that kind of 
badge or that same symbol associated with an aspirational lifestyle.”10  
The criticism to which Patton was referring erupted in the early 1990s, but had roots in the 
1950s as editorialized in John H. Johnson’s “Why Negroes Buy Cadillacs”11 and resurfaced in 
the 1980s; the 1980s and 1990s version of the criticisms of black consumption were centered on 
the issue of the high prices of some popular brand name goods, later incorporating concerns over 
the influence of celebrity sports heroes in promoting them. 
As early as 1983, critics were taking issue with the high price of certain athletic brands.12 In 
the Dallas Herald Times, Lori Gray (1983) wrote, “While Nike is a magic name among 
American children, Nike sneakers are not necessarily any better than more modestly priced 
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sneakers such as Converse, Kinney or Thom McAn. These sneakers are well made, but they 
don’t have the same glamour.”13 Nike’s response to Gray, by way of Jack Welch, Director of 
Corporate Relations, was that Nike products are superior and that other lower priced sneakers are 
not truly athletic footwear. Further, he argued that Nike would spend over $9,000,000 in the 
following year on research and development in their state-of-the-art research laboratory14 and 
that Nike worked with top athletes and record-setters. Welch writes, “If Nike is indeed a magic 
name among American children, as you wrote, it is so because they are wise enough not to be 
deceived by counterfeit appearances and a few dollars off.”15 That same year, a 14-year-old was 
shot and killed in Harlem Park Junior High, reportedly for his Georgetown jacket,16 and was only 
one in a line of media-reported crimes in the name of brand name goods, including Nike. 
Critics were citing promotional expenditures, particularly in the practice of college athletic 
endorsements and in advertising dollars spent, as the bulk of the cost of high-priced athletic 
wear. In response to criticism by Pete Calabro in the Enterprise (Ala.) Ledger,17 Welch defended 
Nike’s use of promotions by arguing, “You are totally in error when you state that promotional 
expenses increase the retail value of Nike shoes. They do not since they are a normal cost of 
doing business.”18 Calabro’s intention was to expose a connection between the increased price of 
shoes that is passed on to the consumer and the amount of advertising and promotional dollars 
spent by the major athletic shoe companies, including Nike.  
This connection between advertising dollars and the cost of shoes was not put to rest. In an 
Advertising Age article on June 29, 1987, Jon Wiener discussed the outrage surrounding the use 
of the Beatles’ “Revolution” to promote the new Nike Air line.  Wiener was relating people’s 
annoyance over Nike’s use of a song that represented part of their political lives to sell $75 a pair 
of sneakers, but the real contention was over the use of the Beatles’ song rather than the price of 
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the sneakers. Not everyone was critical of the “Revolution” campaign, though. Adweek critic 
Barbara Lippert wrote, “I’m still not convinced that a running shoe makes a revolution. But 
Nike’s use of the Beatles’ original recording of Revolution in last year’s campaign seems to have 
worked. The new campaign is not about co-opting ‘60s songs or memories. Rather it’s direct, 
intense, beautifully shot and very smartly written series of spots that makes a place for everyone 
on the athletic chain, from Olympians to the sports-impaired.”19 The “Air Revolution” campaign, 
which was touting what was known internally as the “Air Pack,” was indeed innovative for a 
variety of reasons. Not only did it introduce what Nike considered breakthrough air technology, 
but it was the first time a Beatles song was featured in an advertising campaign.20  
Nike spent $23 million in advertising in 1987, the year that the “Revolution” campaign was 
introduced, and dollars dedicated to advertising continued to rise such that by 1989 Nike was 
spending $50 million. Similarly, Reebok increased its advertising expenditures from $12 million 
in 1987 to $60 million in 1989. Correspondingly, sneaker sales rose approximately 23% a year 
during those years.21 In a 1990 Sports Illustrated article, E.M. Swift reasoned, “those costs, 
obviously, are passed on to the consumer. It costs only $15 to $20 to manufacture a pair of 
sneakers that retails for $60 to $100. The rest is profit and promotional hype.”22 The debate over 
the cost of high-priced brand name athletic-wear started to heat up in 1987 and flared in 1990 
with a series of news reports specifically associating Nike products with violence on the streets 
and reigniting questions of Nike’s relationship with the African American community. 
 
False Promises? Fashion Frenzy? 
A 1987 Washington Post article outlined one issue of the overarching debate—the issue of 
false promises from branded and advertised goods. The question was: 
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“How many kids are being suckered by such ads into believing that a particular 
athletic shoe can turn them into stars? How many young boys are being misled 
into abandoning their academic studies for dreams of riches in the National 
Basketball Association?” But the underlying question was “why do we believe 
that youngsters who buy Adidas ‘Patrick Ewings’ or Nike ‘Air Jordans’ expect to 
wind up as NBA all-stars?... The unspoken premise of [the] outrage is the widely 
held view that what is normal for middle-class or white kids is unhealthy and 
exploitative for lower-class black ones. It’s not the suburban Little Leaguer who 
comes to mind when we think of child athletes pursuing false dreams; it is the 
ghetto youngster working tirelessly on his spin move.”23  
And a growing concern, though by no means a new one, was how much young people (and their 
parents) were willing to spend—or what they were willing to do—to obtain the products of these 
false promises. Parents were spending thousands of dollars more on clothes for their teenagers 
than for themselves; teenagers were spending the entirety of their own money earned from jobs 
and “sometimes drug sales” to outfit themselves in Fila, Louis Vuitton, Guess?, Polo, Pierre 
Cardin, and a variety of other fashionable brands at the time, including Nike; school Principals 
were banning various fashion trends to try to refocus attention on studies.24 Some argued that 
these youth were susceptible to the styles of their favorite musical groups, to advertising, and to 
the expensive tastes of peers who resorted to dealing drugs and stealing to obtain high-priced, 
highly fashionable items; further, these tastes reportedly were class-differentiated. While 
wealthier students went for more understated fashion to appear as if fashion just happened, the 
appearance of wealth was more important to lower-income students for whom expensive clothes 
meant status.25 When the desire to maintain expensive tastes seemed to turn increasingly violent 
people wanted to know who to blame. The sneaker companies, visibly outfitting so many urban 
youth and drawing public attention with multimillion dollar branding campaigns, attracted 
increasing attention. Among the campaigns, and ones that used the vernacular and aesthetic of 
the urban America linked to media images of branded violence, were those developed by Nike, 
Wieden & Kennedy and Spike Lee.  
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 According to Adweek, Lee felt that the images he presented in Nike spots like “Hang Time” 
and “Cover” were “fun” and went beyond the stereotypes that are found in most advertising 
targeted to black consumers by a corporate America that “is not unaware of the fact that the 
purchasing power of black consumers ranks in the billions… Those companies know it. They’ve 
got market research and they go after a specific audience. They know we smoke more Kool 
cigarettes, drink more Old English, and Schlitz Malt Liquor.”26 Historically, advertisers had been 
criticized for targeting black, urban consumers with harmful products like alcohol and tobacco. 
But Nike marketed shoes and athletic wear and promoted sport, all considered part of a healthy 
lifestyle for mainstream America.  
 Others, however, were not inclined to let sneaker companies like Nike off the hook and, in 
1990, critics unleashed a swell of criticisms and debates about what came to be known as the 
“sneaker killings.” That year, Americans purchased 393 million pairs of brand-name athletic 
shoes for $11.7 billion dollars.27 Many were concerned about the chunk of that corporate profit 
earned from the inner-cities. The developing argument was that sneaker companies were 
exploiting, if not creating, circumstances in which impoverished inner-city youth were going to 
greater and greater lengths to obtain high-priced brand-name goods that they could flash around 
to gain acceptance and status. Nike marketing chief Tom Clarke responded by arguing, “Our 
higher-end shoes are basketball shoes and basketball is in its highest form in the inner city. The 
fact that our shoes sell well there is a function of how important basketball is to those 
communities.”28 Indeed, at least by the late 1980s, much of the inspiration for the Nike product 
aesthetic was drawn from early adopters and trend-setters in the inner cities. Tinker Hatfield, the 
Nike architect-turned-Creative Director who was responsible for some of the most famous shoe 
designs ever produced, recounts, “We go into the streets, looking for the early adopters, people 
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who start fashion trends. We traipse around in dangerous places. I spent most of last week in the 
inner city of Los Angeles.”29 In this way, there was an exchange of cultural material between 
Nike and the urban street and court environments. 
As reports began to surface of several incidences in which young men were killed 
specifically for their Nike Air Jordans, the media began building a pipeline from the All-
American hero and icon Michael Jordan to violence and drugs on the street. In March 1989, 
when 17-year-old Demetrick James Walker was handed a life sentence for killing 16-year-old 
Johnny Bates for his $125 Air Jordans, New York Post columnist Phil Mushnick equated Michael 
Jordan and other athletes with prominent endorsement deals to drug dealers. In his article, 
“Shaddup, I’m Sellin’ Out… Shaddup,” he accused Lee of turning on the very community he 
professed to help by bringing their plight to the mainstream public. The prosecutor in the 
Houston case against Walker pointed the finger at sportswear marketers for the kind of images 
they created.30 In response to criticisms, Nike’s Director of Public Relations, Liz Dolan, said, 
“It’s a little unfair to blame us, a sneaker company, for the problems in the inner city. What we 
can do is put forth positive role models. There may come a day when we do advertising using 
our athletes to do some public service message.”31 But critics were not stayed by Dolan’s public 
relations efforts. Not a week after Dolan made those remarks, The Washington Post writer Tony 
Kornheiser challenged Michael Jordan to use his position to influence industry prices of sneakers 
in an effort that he felt would minimize the conflicts on the streets.32 
Between February and May 1990, there was an upsurge of media attention on and debate 
about athletic and Nike-related crimes. Critics argued sneakers represented status that was either 
implanted or fostered by advertising,33 and Nike and other sneaker companies were directly 
targeting and selling overpriced shoes to kids who couldn’t afford them;34 kids were skipping 
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school out of embarrassment when they didn’t have the right shoes or the newest shoes,35 schools 
were banning brands because they were disrupting education and imposing on safety in schools,36 
which was only exacerbated by sportswear companies’ courting of high school and college 
coaches37 and through sponsorship of the new programs and materials for schools;38 that kids’ 
desire for these status symbols led to a life of crime as they turned to selling drugs to fuel their 
shoe habits,39 that basketball was the sport of choice for drug dealers40 and, as such, Nike had 
become the uniform of choice for gangs and drug dealers,41 and Nike reps were encouraging 
retailers to court drug dealers as a lucrative market.42 “Bejeweled and sneaker-clad drug dealers” 
had supplanted the pimp as the model for emulation for many inner-city youth.43 Critics placed 
blame on “dollar-driven athletes”44 who exploited their power as role models45 to help develop 
mass appeal for sneaker companies’ products. The combination of this mass popularity and pure 
greed led sneaker companies like Nike to hike the prices of their products46 and to defend their 
actions by disingenuously arguing that the high prices were warranted because they were high-
tech athletic-wear when, in fact, the majority of the sales were for street style and not athletic 
use.47  
The issue was not just that sneaker companies were marketing high-priced shoes—to whom 
they were marketing these high-priced sneakers was underlying the criticisms. Some articulated 
their concerns more bluntly than others. U.S. News & World Report columnist John Leo, for 
example, felt that Nike in particular should shoulder some of the responsibility for incidents over 
their high-priced sneakers because, he wrote, “the line ‘Just Do It’ means one thing to the middle 
class, and something else to people mired in the ghetto. To the middle class, it means get in 
shape, whereas in the ghetto it means, ‘Don’t have any moral compunction—just go out and do 
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whatever you have to do in your predicament.’ There’s an immoral message imbedded in 
there.”48 Such transparent discriminatory and single-minded remarks did not go unchallenged.  
Dan Wieden of Wieden & Kennedy called Leo’s comments racist and argued that advertisers 
do have social responsibilities, but “you have to look at the product you’re selling and, in the 
case of Nike, it’s an excellent product. How can you say you’re not going to advertise that 
product to a certain group because they might not be able to afford it? You’d be making a lot of 
assumptions about that group. And how, exactly, would you go about excluding that group from 
all the other customers?”49 Nike public relations director Liz Dolan reiterated Wieden’s 
sentiments, arguing “Because we use black endorsers, some people seem to make the assumption 
that we’re targeting this unruly mob of black youths out there that would do anything for a pair 
of Air Jordans, that you show a black kid a $100 sneaker and he’ll go steal it. That’s really a 
racist perspective.”50 While it is not surprising to hear Nike and their advertising agency defend 
themselves against the outcry of critics claiming the company was engaging in socially 
irresponsible and immoral behavior, others outside of Nike, the athletic wear industry and the 
advertising trade press took issue with the criticisms.  
Critics of the critics argued that everyone, adults and kids alike, are prone to reach for status 
symbols,51 that it was absurd to hold superstars and Nike accountable for human nature,52 that 
there was a clear double standard, if not blatant racism, to hold black athletes to higher 
expectations than white athletes who were left untouched by critics,53 that it was patronizing to 
presume to tell poor people and black people how to spend their money,54 that stars like Michael 
Jordan appeal to a mass market, not just black youth who make up only 9.8% of sneaker 
buyers,55 and that part of Jordan’s appeal was that he was a positive role model56 not just for 
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conquering the basketball court but for his business success57 and for the fact that he had attained 
status by working hard within the social system and through legal means.58  
Further, they argued that sneakers are just a symptom of much larger social issues—issues 
larger even than Michael Jordan59—and that it is unfair to pin systematic social ills on athletes 
and sneaker companies,60 particularly since the actual number of incidences involving Nike and 
other athletic brands were relatively few in the context of all other violent crimes in the United 
States61 and because statistics on shoe sales did not indicate that high-priced sneakers dominated 
the market. Rather, Reebok’s $170 Pump sales accounted for only one tenth of 1% of the entire 
industry and Nike’s top-selling sneaker went for $58, with half of all units in the basketball 
category selling for between $30 and $60.62 Further, they argued that companies cannot be 
blamed for responding to consumer demand63 and that the market would correct itself as the 
companies responded to criticisms and concerns from the public.64 
 Some news articles reported on specific cities such as Atlanta, where police estimated that 
more than 50 robberies occurred in four months in the name of branded athletic wear, and 
Chicago, where in one area police were receiving an estimated 50 reports of incidents over 
jackets and a dozen over athletic shoes each month.65 However, there are no strong statistics on 
exactly how many youth or adults were attacked or killed for athletic wear in general or for 
Nikes in particular. News articles on the issue recycled the same few examples and the same 
arguments, most of which were addressed in a Sports Illustrated article by Rick Telander (1990). 
 
The Development of “Sneaker Killing” Reports in the 1990s 
Phil Mushnick, the New York Post columnist who had likened Michael Jordan to a drug 
dealer, has been credited with igniting the media debate. A common theme across Mushnick’s 
  
189 
arguments, as he himself suggested, was that of the high prices of sneakers and, because the 
endorsers he was criticizing were pushing wears with such high costs, he believed that the 
company and endorsers lacked social responsibility. Mushnick had taken such direct aim at 
Michael Jordan, Spike Lee and Nike, as well as Georgetown basketball coach John Thompson, 
that Lee made a very public response of his own through The National Forum, blaming 
Mushnick for building controversy in an attempt that Lee called “thinly veiled racism.” Lee 
argued that since the commercials are directed at a much larger audience than only black youth, 
Mushnick’s logic suggested that “poor whites won’t kill for a pair of Jordans, but poor blacks 
will… It is crazy to think that all black kids who can’t afford the sneakers are resorting to selling 
crack to buy them. Any kid who is selling crack is not doing that just to sport a pair of Jordans.”66  
Further, Lee questioned the value of singling out three of the most important and positive 
role models for black youth when white athletes have sneaker commercials that are reaching the 
same markets as those by Jordan and Lee. Michael Jordan called the criticism ironic arguing, 
“You build me up to be a role model, then you blame me for the crimes that kids commit.”67 Lee 
proposed that there are much more pressing problems to address, such as the conditions that 
might lead black youth to place so much import on a pair of sneakers. In other words, he 
repositioned Nike shoes from the cause of violence as Mushnick purported to a symptom of a 
larger social issue and perhaps even as victims in an ideological system that relentlessly works to 
denigrate successful and positive popular black figures.  
Mushnick, however, did not stand down, calling Lee a “Snike oil salesman.”68 Speaking 
directly to Lee, Mushnick wrote, 
“You’re working off a copy of the plan Rev. Al employs. You’re taking heat, so 
you press the ‘R’ button and everything’s supposed to go away. Clear-thinking 
people are sick of that garbage. Afro-American educators, for example, are 
reporting an epidemic that’s breeding violence in their institutions. No Spike, I 
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didn’t tell them, they told me, and I’m telling you—inner-city kids are not 
attending classes because they’re embarrassed by the condition of their sneakers. 
Kids are being robbed and murdered for the latex perversions you pitch as status 
symbols.”69  
Mushnick pointed to community program coordinators and police officers who indicated from 
the ground level that high-priced, high-status sneakers led poor, black youth to drug dealing and 
served as clear indication of power and status in their communities. He concluded, “Your Nike 
job, Mars, is to pitch sneakers to children who can’t afford them… You’re making chumps of the 
people who admire you, Spike. You’re just the messenger for a white-owned company that’s 
paying you to suck the cash out of kids’ pockets that were empty to begin with.”70 Mushnick’s 
argument was picked up and reported in other media venues, as in Rick Telander’s Sports 
Illustrated cover story on the issue. 
Figure 8. Sports Illustrated cover of May 14, 1990 
 
The situation hit the cover of Sports Illustrated on May 14, 1990, reaching a national 
audience with the seemingly ironic headline, “Your Sneakers or Your Life.” Author Rick 
Telander’s headline was a reference from a classic Jack Benny skit in which a robber threatens, 
“Your money or your life.” In the skit, Benny remains silent as the robber repeats his demand 
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and Benny finally replies, “I’m thinking.”71 The implication is that youth are so tied to branded 
athletic wear that they might contemplate the value of their own lives against it. Indeed, this 
seems to be part of the impact of Telander’s opening story of the 15-year-old Michael Eugene 
Thomas of Anne Arundel County, Maryland, who was strangled by a basketball buddy, 17-year-
old James David Martin, in the Spring of 1989. Telander begins his article with a recounting of 
Thomas’s affection for his Air Jordan shoes:  
“Thomas loved Michael Jordan, as well as the shoes Jordan endorses, and he 
cleaned his own pair each evening. He kept the cardboard shoe box with Jordan's 
silhouette on it in a place of honor in his room. Inside the box was the sales ticket 
for the shoes. It showed he paid $115.50, the price of a product touched by deity. 
‘We told him not to wear the shoes to school,’ said Michael's grandmother, Birdie 
Thomas. ‘We said somebody might like them, and he said, 'Granny, before I let 
anyone take those shoes, they'll have to kill me.'"72 
The article juxtaposes Thomas’s death with the proceeding lines that depict Michael Jordan, on 
the verge of tears, reading an account of the young boy’s murder, connoting to the reader what 
had been building in the news media over the previous months—a clear connection between 
Jordan and the violence on the streets. Indeed, while Telander explores the variety of arguments 
that had been presented in the media, he does place blame squarely on the shoe companies who, 
he argued, with their annual $200 million advertising and promotion budgets targeting 
impressionable young people (young black males) who are desperate for self-esteem, “have 
played a direct role” in “a society that has created an underclass that is slipping into economic 
and moral oblivion, an underclass in which pieces of rubber and plastic held together by 
shoelaces are sometimes worth more than a human life.” Nonetheless, Telander does depict a 
more complex and nuanced situation previous than media accounts.  
 Jordan responded in disbelief that the image that he had promoted could be used for such 
harm. In his words, “I thought I’d be helping out others and everything would be positive. I 
thought people would try to emulate the good things I do, they’d try to achieve, to be better. 
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Nothing bad. I never thought because of my endorsement of a shoe, or any product, that people 
would harm each other. Everyone likes to be admired, but when it comes to kids actually killing 
each other then you have to reevaluate things.”73 Most if not all of the social commentators who 
had addressed the issue agreed with Jordan’s assessment that the situation needed to be 
reevaluated, but there was little consensus and much debate over how to do that and, once 
evaluated, what actions to take. Even though critics like Mushnick, who felt that the 
responsibility rested on specific big-name companies and endorsers who held a great deal of 
cultural influence, Telander acknowledged that it was not just the “heavyweights” of Reebok and 
Nike or even just sneakers that were the material for crime, but “smaller players” like Adidas, 
Puma, Fila, Starter and other products like hats and jackets and sweatsuits. And it was not even 
really the material value of the products that led to crime, but the status—“these assailants aren’t 
simply taking clothes from their victims. They’re taking status.”74 The shoes have held value on 
the streets that is not simply quantitatively different but qualitatively different than anything 
invested into the image by the company. While many felt that it was the high-price of sneakers 
that invested them with status, not all information from the streets corroborated this argument. A 
manager at Foot Locker, a major retailer of name-brand sneakers, was quoted by Telander in 
saying that the Nike Cortez at $39 was the hottest thing at the moment for reasons that were 
unclear to him.  
 A compelling part of the argument against Nike and other sneaker companies was that sales 
of the shoes were fueled by drug money and gang affiliation, and that not only were the sneaker 
companies aware of this fact but encouraged it.  Telander asks, “Could any respectable U.S. 
corporation support the use of its products in this way? Absolutely not, say most shoe company 
executives contacted for this article. You better believe it, said a number of sports apparel 
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retailers, as well as some of the more candid shoe execs.”75 But the evidence that this occurred 
was anecdotal and the retailers who made the accusations were unwilling to name the companies 
whose representatives they accused of encouraging them to court drug dealers for fear of 
economic retribution. Nike, of course, flatly denied encouraging drug dealers and instead 
publicized an incident when they refused to fill an order from a large retail company that 
requested sneakers in new colors because they realized the retailer was requesting gang-affiliated 
colors.76  
 While the issue of Nike’s and other companies’ involvement in specifically targeting and 
catering to drug dealers certainly is an important one, there is no clear evidence on which to 
publicly indict them. Given that, it is worth asking what effect this argument might have on 
Nike. In other words, if these companies were not pandering to drug dealers or even were 
actively discouraging them, would drug dealers quit wearing Nike shoes and would kids stop 
trying to emulate their fashion? Rick Telander’s interview with former drug dealer and Crips 
gang member Michael B. Green implies that the answer would be no. Green explained, “The 
shoes, the jackets and the hats are just symbols; everybody’s got a symbol.”77 Green, himself, 
was pursuing his education and making good grades in school before joining the Crips. 
According to his own account, he was not being served by the education system or his family 
structure and he was searching to be a part of something. The brand-name goods were the 
trappings of inclusion. These symbols represent something meaningful for those wearing them, 
whether it is status through the ability to buy or status through inclusion. Given this, Telander 
concludes by asking, “what should the shoe companies, the schools, the advertising industry, the 
endorsers, the media, parents—all of us—do about it? Do you know? Do you know? Do you 
know?”78 But neither he nor any of the other critics offered a response, except to suggest that 
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Michael Jordan tell drug dealers not to buy his shoes or tell Nike that he won’t promote their 
expensive, high-end shoes. For Nike’s part, they did pick up on the call, at least publicly, to deter 
drug dealers through a series of public service campaigns using their top athletes that were 
designed to promote education and, in at least one commercial, directly address drug dealers. 
 While Nike insisted that their public service campaign was not reactionary and had been 
planned before the controversy over sneaker crimes arose, the campaign was at the very least 
conveniently timed. Nike Director of Public Relations had intimated as much in March of 1990 
when she spoke in response to the criticisms of Nike and other athletic shoe companies in saying, 
“What we can do is put forth positive role models. There may come a day when we do 
advertising using our athletes to do some public service messages.”79 And, in fact, that is what 
Nike did.80  
 The company spent $5 million on the development and media for anti-drug, pro-education 
spots that were connected to their campaigns for the basketball, cross-training and tennis shoe 
lines. These commercials would not be relegated to late-night television but rather would run 
during the same major sporting events as their other ads and would feature heavyweights such as 
Bo Jackson, Georgetown basketball coach John Thompson, Michael Jordan, and David 
Robinson, all of whom had been implicated in the sneaker killings, and other athletic stars on the 
Nike roster such as John McEnroe.81 As part of each general campaign, Nike created an extra 
spot oriented towards a public service message, the first of which was a “stay-in-school” spot by 
Wieden & Kennedy featuring The San Antonio Spur’s David Robinson and Nike’s Force line of 
basketball shoes and apparel.82 In one spot, Robinson played off of his “Mr. Robinson’s 
Neighborhood” campaign to send a very direct anti-drug message: “Garbage is anyone who’s 
into drugs. If you’re into drugs, don’t get into my shoes. Mister Robinson doesn’t like garbage in 
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his shoes…”83 Ads written by Jim Riswold and directed by Joe Pytka and running during the 
Major League All-Star game in July 1990 showed that “Bo knows Shakespeare, calculus and 
philosophy because he stayed in school.”84 Another four spots in August and November featured 
Michael Jordan and Spike Lee as Mars Blackmon.85 As Nike pledged, these spots were featured 
in prime slots such as during the 1991 NBA All-Star Game where, after an intense discussion of 
gravity, Jordan and Lee tell kids, “Don’t be stupid; stay in school.”86 
 
Operation Push Pushes Nike Boycott 
 Just as Nike was rolling out the new pro-education, stay-in-school campaign with some of its 
major athletes, both black and white, presenting the message, Nike encountered another public 
relations challenge involving the black community. The Chicago-based organization Operation 
Push, founded by civil rights activist Jesse Jackson, initiated criticisms of Nike in late July and 
announced a boycott on August 11, 1990.87 As previous chapters discussed, PUSH had a long 
history of successfully implementing consumer boycotts to advance a civil rights agenda. In 
1980, the group had successfully led a boycott of Coca-Cola that lasted over a month and ended 
with a $30 million agreement from the company to buy products and services from black-owned 
businesses.88 The organization, led by executive director Rev. Tyrone Crider, contended that 
Nike was reaping profits from the black community by using high-profile, highly-paid black 
athletes like Bo Jackson and Michael Jordan to sell their products to black youth but that Nike 
was not giving back to the black community in their own hiring practices of employees and 
black-owned businesses.89  
 When black Nike endorsers defended the company, Jesse Jackson (who was no longer at the 
helm of the organization) argued that the athletes were not qualified to speak to corporate policy 
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because while they could defend the shoes they wore, they could not defend the corporate policy 
machine of which they were not a part.90 In their own defense, Nike pointed to the 75% of their 
charity efforts that went to minority-based projects, to their use of black endorsers, and to their 
affirmative-action hiring practices and 14.4% of their workforce that was minority.91 The 
company further charged that they had been targeted after Reebok purchased a full-page ad in 
PUSH magazine and called for an audit of the organizations revenue stream and membership list, 
a claim and request that the organization denied.92 PUSH pointed to the inequity between the 
profits generated from the black community and the lack of African Americans in top 
management positions and Nike advertising in black-owned media, as well as Nike’s refusal to 
engage in a dialogue on the issues.93  
 Indeed, the general industry statistics of black employment and participation were 
discouraging. When Nike appointed Georgetown coach John Thompson to its board of directors 
in response to these criticisms, he was the only high-ranking African American among the ten 
largest companies in the industry. Some within the industry argued that the underlying reason 
was that it was hard to find qualified blacks; but as a 1992 issue of Sportstyle pointed out, the 
discrepancy was more likely due to a combination of the “closed ranks of the industry” and 
larger social issues.94 Nike was no exception. For much of Nike’s history, Phil Knight had 
demonstrated a preference towards populating executive offices with close associates. Business 
expertise was not necessarily the criteria for hire, as company had grown up under the direction 
of former athletes and sports enthusiasts. Former marketing manager Rob Strasser was a lawyer 
whose understanding of image and brand development was learned on the job.  
 Further, historical evidence indicates that this was not the first time that Nike was lambasted 
for its hiring practices. In 1983, Nike faced a $1.5 million suit by three black employees who 
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claimed Nike had discriminatory practices that harbored racial slurs by other employees and 
included preferential treatment in promoting less qualified white employees.95 For his part, Spike 
Lee acknowledged the problems in the industry, but he argued that Nike was more open-minded 
than other companies and was working to rectify the problems, saying, "They want to do the 
right thing. No pun intended."96  
 But Nike was facing a double-edged sword. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Nike 
recently cited its absence from black media in response to another race-related controversy. The 
Beaverton, Ore., company has been under fire for marketing its expensive sneakers directly to 
poor black youth.”97 Nike was criticized both for sponsoring in black-oriented media and for 
failing to do so. One author likened PUSH’s efforts to extortion, questioning how placing a few 
blacks in top management positions was going to help poor black kids who desired the shoes.98 
Despite PUSH’s relatively high-profile boycott, which gained national attention and was 
spotlighted through pickets of various Nike retail outlets in major cities, the boycott appeared to 
have little impact on Nike sales and, on the contrary, Nike sales were booming.99 Advertising 
Age’s Joe Cappo argued that what PUSH learned was “that young blacks are more loyal to Nike 
than to PUSH.”100 Further, Portland’s own leaders did not support the boycott.101 In the end, the 
major problem with the PUSH boycott was that it received little support from the consuming 
public. After a year and a half, claiming significant inroads and suggesting that Nike had made 
significant movement to increase African American leadership, PUSH called off the boycott.102 
However, the failure of PUSH’s boycott does not represent a lack of concern in the black 
community for the problems to which they were drawing attention.  
 In 1991, the socially-conscious lyrics of Public Enemy’ “Shut Em Down” pointed to Nike’s 
failure to reinvest in the black community. As demonstrated in the lyrics at the beginning of this 
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chapter, Public Enemy suggested that they liked Nike but expected more from them. As Erin 
Patton articulated:  
“The positive consciousness movement within hip hop started to look at 
companies and say, you know, wait a second, you’re reaping a lot of profits and 
benefits from this community so there should be some reciprocity… with Chuck 
D and Public Enemy with their song ‘Shut Em Down” where they say, I like Nike 
but wait a minute, the neighborhood supports or puts the money in it. So it did 
create sort of a rub and pit the consumer at odds with those very companies they 
helped create and stimulate growth and market share for.”103   
Thus, a legitimate concern existed within the black community over their relationship with Nike, 
and these issues continued to resurface in a variety of ways. 
 In 1992, Spike Lee presented six commercials for Nike trainers as a film at Black to the 
Future 2, a British black film festival. The commercials were not backed by Nike, who paid 
nothing for them, but despite the fact that organizers at the festival felt they held cultural value, 
critics raised concerns that the commercials might contribute to sneaker crimes.104 As 
discrepencies between management salaries and day-laborers in third-world countries like 
Indonesia became increasingly prominent stories in the media, the reports implicated Jordan and 
Lee in the system.105 These issues have become a part of the sign value of Nike. A 1996 article 
suggested that Nike, Phil Knight and even Jordan and Lee had a “racket” going because “there is 
absolutely no better way to get rich than to exploit both the worker and the consumer.”106 That 
same year, Democratic Congresswoman Marcia Kaptur announced that the Jobs and Fair Trade 
Caucus Come Shop with Me campaign’s first “corporate vulture label” would be awarded to 
Nike. She presented this award, explaining: 
“[T]hey have been spending $250 million a year out of the money they make off 
of you trying to convince you how good they really are. They bought so much 
advertising it is hard to turn on television without seeing it. Nike has virtually 
bought off the entire American sporting world to delude the American consumer 
about what is really… Now here at home Nike threatens to tear up our 
communities with their relentless marketing to our most vulnerable kids. You 
know what is happening. In some places in this country our children are killing 
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one another for these shoes. As Phil Mushnick, a sports writer for the New York 
Post, courageously pointed out when he refused to endorse Nike shoes, he said, `I 
saw the prices going from $40 to $90 to $100 and then $150, and in full 
cognizance that people were dying for these shoes, inner city kids, too, the kids 
that Nike was targeting with their inner city role model marketing binge.'”107 
 Representative Kaptur, as critics increasingly and consistently had been doing through much 
of the 1990s, contrasted these problems of poorly paid foreign laborers and lost American jobs 
and the targeting of underprivileged consumers with inner-city role models with the profits 
reaped in by Nike executives and Phil Knight. The outpouring of criticism over Nike inevitably 
was bound in the very symbolism of the company. In September 1998, The New York Times 
reported, “the swoosh has become emblematic of all of Nike’s troubles: a fashion statement 
losing its edge; a sports pyramid that starts with cheap day labor and ends with poor kids trying 
to pony up $140 for the shoes, and the lost innocence of young athletes.”108  
 
Nike’s Strategic Response to Criticisms 
 The cumulative effect of criticisms lodged at Nike regarding their relationship with the black 
community did have an effect on the company’s practices. In the Fall 1990 Nike hired Los 
Angeles-based Muse Cordero Chen, the company’s first minority-owned advertising agency, to 
act as a “strategic adviser” for their anti-drug, pro-education campaign; they contracted with 18 
minority companies;109 they planned $2 million to $3 million in spending in “highly specialized, 
ethnic media”; and they increased focus on minority hiring, reaching a self-reported 18 percent 
by 1992,110 and appointed the Georgetown basketball coach John Thompson as the first African 
American to their board.111 Though the company insisted that the high-profile anti-drug, stay-in-
school campaign was planned before the criticisms of the company began to take root, the timing 
of and sports endorsers in the advertisements was at the very least fortuitous.  
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 When Nike received feedback from parents and schools because kids were skipping school 
on release date to get the “freshest” pair of Air Jordans, the company changed their release dates 
to Saturdays to alleviate the problem.112 “Sensitive to the impact its four years of TV ads have 
had on kids,” suggested columnist Fred Pfaff in Inside Media, Nike pledged $5 million to a $20 
million integrated communications literacy project.113 When the Los Angeles Riots following the 
Rodney King verdict shook the nation, Nike sponsored commercials directed by Spike Lee in 
which, as himself and in the face of a slew of racial slurs demonstrated in the ad, Lee says, “If 
we’re gonna live together, we gotta play together” in an effort to promote racial tolerance. The 
ad premiered during the NBA Eastern Conference final114 and was touted as an example of an 
“authentically integrated ad.”115 In late 1991, Nike underwrote a five part, year long “Nike Cross 
Training Challenge” that kicked off with a “Bo Knows” program to combine athletic and 
academic education.116 We might assume that in developing social responsibility programs and 
campaigns that Nike was, on some level, accepting responsibility, even if it was reactionary.  
 In 1993, Nike took a different slant on the issue of responsibility with Charles Barkley’s 
direct gaze and firm stance telling viewers “I am not a role model. I am not paid to be a role 
model. I am paid to wreak havoc on the basketball court. Parents should be role models. Just 
because I can dunk doesn’t mean I should raise your kids.” Barkley, who had initiated that 
conversation in remarks he made two years prior, wrote the matter-of-fact lines for that 
commercial, which was part of a campaign featuring other athletes. A media debate ensued over 
the validity of Barkley’s comments and what the public might expect from star athletes. While 
many were infuriated by his remarks or felt them naïve, others wondered how naïve the critics 
believed the consuming public to be. Goldman and Papson (1998), in examining the message of 
the ad, suggest that the significance of the ad rests in the fact that Nike had fore-grounded an 
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issue of social morality and sparked the kind of dialogue generally lacking in consumer-brand 
advertising.  
 Ironically, in 1994, Charles Barkley showed up in ads promoting Nike’s P.L.A.Y. program. 
Nike initiated P.L.A.Y., an acronym for “Participating in the Lives of America’s Youth,” to help 
improve children’s sports programs, including support in Boys and Girls Clubs of America, and 
to encourage volunteerism and the community level.117 To support the program, Wieden & 
Kennedy developed a campaign featuring Michael Jordan, Jackie Joyner-Kersee, and Charles 
Barkley that asked viewers to imagine a world without sports. In examining the aesthetic and 
cultural power of Nike advertising in their book Nike Culture (1998), Robert Goldman and 
Stephen Papson write, “Nike’s P.L.A.Y. campaign drew on race as a visual proxy for class 
relations… This campaign stressed the social alienation of poverty and its possible transcendence 
via sports. Nike positioned this campaign as motivated by a sense of crisis in our communities 
and playgrounds.”118 This campaign was one method by which Nike could publically and 
powerfully address the criticisms that it had been taking through the early 1990s. Goldman and 
Papson (1998) call this campaign “legitimation advertising” because in the context of scandals 
surrounding Nike and inner-city crime in the 1990s, the ads positioned Nike “as taking the moral 
high ground, apparently placing community interests above their own narrow market 
interests.”119 Critics considered it another way that Nike could put its name in front of young 
emerging consumers.120 
 The role model issue was an important one because ultimately what many critics wanted to 
see was a hard and direct stance from Michael Jordan. 121 Jordan did respond publicly and had a 
hand in the decisions about how to approach the criticisms. According to Erin Patton, the 
architect behind Jordan Brand launch in 1997, “MJ demonstrated real concern and compassion 
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for youth and was vocal and instrumental in the decisions we ultimately made.”122 When a 
Nightline producer approached Jordan to do an interview as part of a piece on violence and Air 
Jordans, Jordan agreed to participate. According to Patton, who also appeared on the show, he 
encouraged Jordan to respond to criticisms through the interview because “it would send a 
powerful message to parents and educators that he did care about youth and was not 
disconnected from their lives.”123 Jordan responded to a line of questioning about his response to 
violence over the shoes, to hero worship and to his own responsibility in the system: 
“It’s a scary responsibility. It’s a responsibility that I really didn’t ask for but it 
was bestowed upon me and I have graciously accepted it. And I’ve tried to do 
everything possible from a distance to give motivation to the parent’s kids or the 
kids who don’t have parents or whatever respect. It is a responsibility and it isn’t 
something that you can constantly live up to each and every day because no 
matter how you look at it, you’re still just a human being… I think the importance 
of the shoes is truly materialistic. If it’s a situation to join in on a trend or a fad, 
it’s not as valuable as someone else’s life or someone’s safety. I think if you want 
to use it as a motivational factor… I think that’s ok… But the purpose in mind is 
to put out a product that suits the basketball enthusiast and hopefully it can be 
used in that way.”124 
That tactic worked, said Patton, because the issue soon after died down. Michael Jordan did not, 
however, ever publicly tell Nike to lower the prices of shoes bearing his name nor did he tell 
consumers not to buy them, as some critics had called for him to do. That did leave the market 
open for other athletes to promote lower-priced sneakers on the basis of concerns expressed by 
critics of high-priced shoes. 
 In early 1990, Advertising Age reported that New York Knicks center Patrick Ewing entered 
a sneaker contract with Phoenix Integrated, a licensee of Champion Products, to create an Ewing 
brand line that purposefully priced shoes between $50 and $60 a pair to make them more 
affordable for kids and to send a different message than that sent by over-priced brand athletic 
wear.125 The first line of the basketball shoes in 1989 were priced at $25 to $40 to compete with 
mark-down brands and provide consumers a branded alternative to private label shoes.126 They 
  
203 
were envisioned as a mass-market shoe, but met with little early success until they were 
repositioned as a higher-end shoe targeted to specialty stores. The brand did well as a “strong 
East Coast, inner-city brand,” with sales of Ewing shoes were at $10 million in 1990.127 By 1991 
when Next Sports received a multi-year license to selling and distribute the shoes in the U.S., the 
new price points for the shoes were between $45 and $110.128 Of the change, one executive 
commented, “Our shoes were probably overdesigned for the market they were intended to be 
sold to,” and another indicated that the target market with Ewing was high-end, inner-city 
retailers where the brand had become “much more of a success… through the stores that wanted 
top-of-the-line product.”129 They responded to retailers and the original vision of an affordable 
alternative to the high-priced sneakers touted by other athletes was altered to accommodate the 
market. 
 But there was a concert of voices from the athletic world interested in lowering the cost of 
shoes. Chris Webber was quoted as indicating that he left Nike because he did not want to 
promote $140 shoes to the inner-city where people could not afford them.130 Hakeem Olajuwon 
of the Houston Rockets signed with Spalding in 1995 to retail a shoe model for under $40 
because he wanted to sell a shoe that people could afford. The company wanted to capitalize on a 
market trend toward lower-priced athletic shoes.131 Of the contrast between his own shoes and 
those of Olajuwon, Jordan indicated an appreciation for his intention but argued, “I think that 
what we’re trying to attack is your basketball enthusiast who looks at the game in a very serious 
sense and looks for the best quality that enhances that ability.”132 He expressed that his game was 
different from Olajuwon’s and that it depends on the kind of product someone wants and the 
kind of game they play. In 1997, Footwear News reported that sales of shoes priced at $100 and 
more had risen by 34% in 1996 and, after several years of growth in more modest price-ranges 
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and with a new $180 Nike basketball shoe indicative of the trend, the market appeared to be 
turning back to premium brands. However, with the “nuts and bolts of sales” still in the $60-$80 
range,133 some basketball players concerned with the prices and companies interested in 
addressing the median and lower price points continued to court the more affordable market—
Nike included. 
  Speaking of the developing Nike “Jordan” brand, Jordan indicated to Nightline’s Forrest 
Sawyer that they company was going to try to develop numerous Jordan shoes and various price 
points. He indicated that this move was a direct response to feedback he and the company had 
received from parents concerned over the prices. This way, he suggested, Nike could meet a 
variety of needs from those of consumers looking for a shoe to fit a fashion trend to those 
basketball players looking for the best equipment available. This line, he indicated, would debut 
in the $75 or $85 to $145 price range. Still other players and companies went even lower. 
 Shaquille O’Neal, for example, sold his Dunkman line at Payless with some success.134 And 
in 2006 Stephon Marbury launched his signature shoe, Starbury One, for $14.95 a pair at Steve 
& Barry’s retailers.135 Marbury had previously endorsed a $79.99 basketball for urban youth 
through the basketball apparel company And1.136 One of the unique aspects of Steve & Barry’s 
business is that their success, landing them in Business Week as the “fastest growing retailer 
you’ve ever heard of,” relied on word-of-mouth and not major marketing campaigns.137 Erin 
Patton, former brand manager for the Jordan brand, who helped Steve & Barry’s launch the 
“Marbury” line, recounts, “One of the first things I told the guys at Steve & Barry’s was they 
were not going to be able to scream the $15 price for an NBA athlete’s shoe and get the attention 
of urban consumers… That would have the opposite effect as these consumers equated price to 
status and would immediately discard the brand before it reached the shelves, rendering even 
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their budget-conscious parents helpless to force the buying decision on them.”138 The idea, 
instead, was to get consumers involved in the underlying “inspirational” philosophy of the 
Starbury brand by grounding it in Marbury’s story as a boy from Coney Island’s housing projects 
who could relate to the many youth who could not afford high-priced sneakers.  
 With the hip-hop culture as the framework for this philosophy, they developed a tagline: 
“This is my life, my vision. You feel me?” The campaign included subtle backhands at the 
dissatisfaction long brewing in urban areas over high-priced athletic shoes and drew from 
Stephon Marbury’s genuine connection to his community and desire to offer an alternative. The 
“Starbury Movement” was an initial success, garnering a great deal of attention from the press 
and from consumers who stood in long lines to get the shoes. The initial production run sold out 
in an unanticipated three days.139 Marbury responded, “To be a part of something like this. To 
change people’s lives is such a blessing. It’s bigger than basketball.”140 But, as Steve & Barry’s 
president said of the phenomenon, “Steph’s been the right guy at the right place at the right time. 
He really wanted to eliminate the pressure that parents and kids would often feel, when their self-
esteem was so frequently tied to higher-priced items.”141 Though it is difficult to evaluate the 
long-term potential of this market plan because Steve & Barry’s, due to management issues 
having nothing to do with the Starbury line, folded two years later,142 it is clear that a market has 
developed in response to the criticisms lodged at Nike and other marketers of high-end, high-
priced athletic shoes. 
 
 
Conclusion: Jordan’s Cultural Impact 
Many in both the popular press and in scholarly works have tried to define and assess the 
importance of Michael Jordan in contemporary life. But before evaluating the impact of Michael 
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Jordan, one must ask from whence it came. Why Michael Jordan? Why with Nike? And why at 
that particular historical moment did this cultural phenomenon develop? Some of the reasons 
behind Jordan’s success as a cultural figure have been addressed in this chapter. And while any 
attempt to explicate the circumstances of his popularity in a unified statement is certain to 
neglect some measure, there are several key factors that offer insight into this phenomenon. 
First, Jordan’s success rests on years of hardship and struggle endured by the black 
community in the United States as they fought for representation in the consumer market, as a 
symbol of and driving force behind inclusion as equal participants in American society. While 
there are yet other timely factors involved in this story, such as developments in communication 
technologies that projected Michael Jordan into American homes and around the world, it is 
difficult to imagine a prior point in American history in which a black athlete, regardless of 
athletic ability, would have been able to flourish in the popular conscience to the extent that 
Michael Jordan has. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the historical relationship between race, 
consumption and advertising and demonstrate the difficulty that African Americans encountered 
in trying to gain recognition by American companies. This history includes the struggles of 
previous black athletes in trying to enter mainstream sport much less rise to the top, important 
gains of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s that helped to garner increased 
frequency and quality of representations in the media, and the development of a black, urban 
youth voice in the sounds of hip-hop, to styles and language on urban courts and their use of 
athletic brands in creating an urban fashion aesthetic. 
Speaking of Run-DMC’s hit “My Adidas,” music and hip-hop icon Russell Simmons 
explained, “When hip-hop become cool, so did the sneakers… This is who we are. It was a 
cultural statement but it was also a statement of our highest aspirations, who we wanted to be, 
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what we thought of ourselves. The clean sneakers was part of that. We’re gettin’ ahead.”143 As 
explained in Chapter 3, the song was a response on the part of hip-hop artists to the 
criminalization of sneakers. According to Darryl “DMC” McDaniels, “You can’t just look at us 
cause we wear these sneakers and judge us… My Adidas went around the world. My Adidas 
changed people’s lives… I stepped on stage at Live Aid, which was unheard of.”144 The music 
and the culture of hip-hop created images of the aspirational lifestyle that represented social and 
economic advancement long sought by the black community, images that many in urban 
environments could not access by looking out their own windows.145 Erin Patton, speaking from 
a position of personal experience, argues: 
“There are other brands, and we’ll stick to Nike for a moment, who inadvertently 
have found themselves representing that kind of badge or that same symbol and 
associated with an aspirational lifstyle. I think the notion that very savvy inner-
city consumers and urban consumers look at a commercial with Michael flying 
through the air and say, well I can do that so let me go out and do whatever it 
takes, go to whatever measures to get that shoe so I can be like Michael Jordan 
and play like Michael Jordan, even if it means I have to rob or steal or whatever. 
Coming from that same place, I know that that’s just not the case, that it was more 
of a desire to access that sort of product to reaffirm status and in some cases 
provide self-affirmation for a generation that was seeking that desperately and just 
by virtue of their own DNA, their own creativity and ability to brand-create and 
create brand and product attributes uniquely to their own preferences and 
consistent with their own behavior, that was sort of the nature of that generation 
and their ability to become brand creators… because there was a desire, it wasn’t 
so much how can Nike influence me to wanna be or think I can be whomever. I’m 
gonna take Nike and I’m gonna create around that brand or any other brand.”146 
Michael Jordan was a rising star at a time when Nike, reassessing its position within the 
athletic wear market after having encountered image control problems and its first ever market 
losses, determined that it needed to return to return to its core of performance and invest more in 
fewer athletes. When Nike signed Jordan in 1984, the company thought “it was getting one of the 
better players of the year. It did not know it was getting the greatest athlete of all time.”147 The 
Nike of 1984 was a company built by sports enthusiasts, competitive and willing to take risks. 
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Other companies like Reebok and Adidas were not interested in or willing to offer Jordan the 
kind of brand package that Nike wanted to develop. Had Jordan not lived up to his potential, 
Nike’s bets would have paid off quite differently. But Jordan’s performance in the 1984 
Olympics helped showcase his ability, differentiate him as a player in ways that the more 
structured North Carolina offense from which he came did not allow, and start to build a 
legend148 for both the man and the company.  
Nike’s offer in signing Jordan was unprecedented for a player in a team sport—they were to 
promote him on the level only known by athletes in solitary sports like track and field and tennis. 
Further, with changes in the media environment, new communications technology and satellite 
that would broadcast images of Michael Jordan to vast audiences around the world, Nike could 
promote Jordan in ways unknown to previous decades. As one of the more readily 
understandable team sports, with five recognizable team players whose movements and 
expressions were clearly visible, basketball was poised to provide a player of international appeal 
and fame. And Michael Jordan, with his camera-ready, balletic athleticism and style and his 
good-mannered personality and competitive spirit, was poised to be that player.149  
Enter the National Basketball Association (NBA), which was reeling from various scandals 
involving athletes and drug use and was looking for ways to increase support for the sport and 
attendance at games. When Nike developed the first Air Jordan shoe to match the colors of the 
Chicago Bulls, the shoes violated uniform regulations. Open to controversy and willing to take 
risks, Nike and Chiat/Day capitalized on the NBA’s ban on the new Air Jordans by turning 
controversy into consumer appeal with a rebellious ad that reported the NBA could ban the shoes 
on the court, but not from consumers. Thinking the commercials funny and recognizing the 
potential for the NBA in Jordan’s success, commissioner David Stern allowed the ad to run 
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during game time. And recognizing the game attendance and fan support that Jordan’s 
performances on the court were bringing, Stern and the NBA saw fit to capitalize on Jordan’s 
appeal. Indeed, the NBA’s rise as an international sport in the 1980s dovetailed with Michael 
Jordan’s career.  
Having faced serious risks from oversupply in the past, Nike was underprepared for the 
consumer response to the new Air Jordan shoes. They company thought they would see about 
$10 million in sales from the Jordan line in the first year; instead, they had $130 million.150 
People accused them of purposefully undersupplying the market to create frenzy over the shoes. 
While Nike retailed the shoe for $64.95, some retailers increased their price as high as $80 or 
more based on demand, and consumers turned pairs for over $100 on the street. Nike maintained 
through the 1990s, “The illusion of being exclusive is created by the incredibly high demand that 
even we didn’t anticipate.”151 The media, however, continued to insist that Nike deliberately kept 
the shoes in short supply.152 While there is no indication that Nike’s intention on the first release 
was to inflate the value by undersupplying, Nike would tightly control allocation in subsequent 
releases of the shoe such that demand would exceed supply.153 
With Jordan’s reputation building but with a championship unrealized, Wieden & Kennedy 
copywriter Jim Riswold saw a movie trailer for a film by rising director Spike Lee in which the 
Air Jordan was depicted as an integral part of character and plot formation. Riswold, with a gift 
for capturing cultural milieu, developed an advertising campaign with sports-enthused Jordan fan 
and up-and-coming director Spike Lee. Lee’s films captured urban life and brought it to the 
attention of mainstream America—not as depicting a bunch of drug dealers and thugs, but with a 
variety of characters trying to navigate their worlds like everyone else.154 Some saw Lee as an 
angry black man or as “too black,” others as a champion for improvement of the black condition. 
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Lee, himself, did not envision his purpose to provide all of the answers, but rather to incite 
discussion about difficult and controversial social issues.155 Of his influence, one author 
proposed, “If it can be said that blacks carry the lead in American culture—in music, sports, 
vernacular and dance—then Spike Lee is carrying one hell of a lot of it on his bony little 
shoulders.”156 Wieden & Kennedy and Nike paired the articulate movement and style of Jordan 
with the “nebbishy, deadpan character”157 Mars Blackmon as his foil, all while reinforcing a 
performance-based and athlete-centered message and resonating with a broad audience that 
would never step onto a court in their new Air Jordans. 
Nike spoke to and through elite athletes with their performance message. As Nike ad man 
Scott Bedbury indicated, “The Nike empire was built on the theory that advertising should 
appeal to the elite athletes, and once they were won over, this success would trickle down to the 
masses.”158  Figures from the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA) in 1990 
indicate that athletic-styled shoes accounted for 4 out of every 10 shoes sold in the United States 
and that only 9% of those were purchased solely for athletic performance or sports use.159 While 
children’s athletic shoes accounted for under a quarter of the $7.6 billion in athletic footwear 
sold in the United States in 1990,160 that market was growing and kids set the tempo for athletic 
fashion.161 Further, industry analysis indicates that while urban youth accounted for a relatively 
small percentage of overall sales, their influence on the fashion of was tremendous. People 
became concerned over and fearful of the connection that had grown between Nike and inner-
cities and had been cultivated through advertising, and the power of figures like Michael Jordan 
in forging that relationship. 
The story of Michael Jordan and Nike is not simply a story of a sports celebrity or the sale of 
shoes. It is the creation of a myth and an icon, both carefully cultivated in an ever-broadening 
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story “made year-by-year by Jim Riswold,”162 and the consuming public, and packaged and 
repackaged by the media. As one journalist wrote: 
“Jordan’s popularity has something to do with his acrobatic elegance and 
something to do with his sweet personality, something to do with how shrewdly 
he is promoted and something to do with how responsible he is with his image. It 
has something to do with what the nation expects of its athletes, and what kind of 
fame it makes available to black men. It also has something to do with joy.”163 
The experience of and the experiencing of Jordan have been characterized as transcendent. He 
has been said to transcend race and his grace and elegance, his seemingly superhuman feats and 
untarnished image, have been equated to religious experience. Divinity scholar Arthur Droge 
explained, “Going to a Bulls game is like going to a temple. There’s definitely a religious 
component about it and Jordan is the demigod.”164 Jordan, after all and unlike mere mortals, can 
fly. In doing so, he helps us to understand more of ourselves. He is, according to scholar Michael 
Eric Dyson, “a public pedagogue, a figure of estimable public moral authority whose career 
educates us about productive and disenabling forms of knowledge, desire, interest, consumption 
and culture.”165 In Dyson’s estimation, there is not precedence from which to judge the meaning 
of Jordan because while he may have encompassed previous incarnations of fame, he has 
transcended them. Again, this is not simply a narrative about athletic prowess or even athletic 
heroicism, but rather Jordan’s “transcendence” represents a historically-situated ritualizing of 
“racial achievement against socially imposed barriers to cultural performance.”166 He embodies 
the contradictions of a belief in “sport’s pastoral past” and the rhetoric of global capitalism and 
postmodern spectacle.167 His image works amidst a history of forged racist and sexist meanings 
of the African American male with innate physical ability that connects him with animality, 
hypersensuality, and eroticism;168 but he has also has “given us a new definition of male beauty” 
that defines or redefines the new age athlete.169 As an athlete and performer on a global stage, he 
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creates “sports as ballet, something utterly new and modern, its roots African-American. Ballet 
as a contested sport.”170  
 Jordan was particularly adept at managing his public image. He was not too political, much 
to the chagrin of some who wanted to see him take more of a stand on issues, and he either 
presented himself or was presented by the media as a national moral compass, a symbol of 
achievement, hard-work, competition and fair play, and of family values. But Jordan was not 
perfect, either. He was not the perfect teammate and was particularly hard on his fellow 
basketball players; he came across as venal when he fought over brand presence at the Olympic 
ceremonies, refusing to wear the Reebok gold medal uniforms; he encountered personal scandal 
when checks bearing his signature popped up at the estate of a murdered bail bondsman and the 
media began to implicate him in scandal over big gambling debts; and, of course, he was 
implicated in scandals over low-wage foreign labor and the fleecing of inner-cities that plagued 
Nike.171 
 These contradictions run deep. Given this, no satisfactory framework has been offered by 
which to understand and critique Jordan and Nike that allows us to understand the public on 
which he was said to have such a tremendous influence—inner-city African American youth. 
While some scholarly works have presented a more sophisticated and nuance examination of the 
meaning of Jordan,172 media discourse of the popular influence of Jordan and Nike have with few 
exceptions173 presented insular examinations that either represent inner-city communities as 
vulnerable and manipulated into believing in an unfounded and unrealized promise of 
consumption or as being the curators of their own destiny without regard to the complex social 
and historical systems within which they exist. To address this important absence in scholarly 
works, Chapter 6 presents a dialogic ethic as a framework for understanding consumer power 
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and vulnerability as they exist within the social and historical structures against which they react 
and within which they negotiate their existence. 
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CHAPTER 6:  DEVELOPING AN ETHICS OF CONSUMER EMPOWERMENT 
 
Introduction: Literature on Advertising Ethics and Vulnerability 
 Advertising and marketing have been criticized for violating various ethical standards and 
creating ethical problems. Research on advertising and marketing ethics has addressed the social 
and economic role of advertising,1 ethical perspectives of advertising practitioners,2 structural 
issues faced by practitioners as they are beholden to their own agencies, their clients, consumers, 
industry codes of ethics and regulatory systems, and as they navigate their own professional and 
cultural norms,3 by researchers as they explore consumer research,4 and in the realm of marketing 
ethics and consumer ethics—or as marketing scholar Morris Holbrook says, “what is done to 
consumers” and “what is done by consumers.”5 Cunningham (1999) uses Hannah Arendt’s 
communicative conceptualization of power and social contract theory to propose a contractualist 
approach to advertising ethics in which advertisers’ power is granted by the public and thereby 
requires responsibility to the public. Teleological and deontological research has also addressed 
more specific issues such as ethics and sexuality,6 representation and stereotyping, harmful 
products such as tobacco and alcohol, and targeting of particular audiences.7 For example, Park, 
Weigold and Treise (1999) conducted a cross-cultural study of perceptions and ethical 
evaluations of advertising to children, using sex appeals, for tobacco advertising, and perceived 
offensive advertising, as well as more general advertising issues such as prevalence and 
influence.8 Borgeson and Schroeder (2002) suggest an ontological approach to representation in 
advertising, arguing that discourses of marketing and advertising influence and are influenced by 
cultural knowledge, including values stereotypes and norms. This approach acknowledges the 
complexities of representation in the interaction of persons and messages, and politicizes the 
consequences by suggesting, “Every representation has the potential to construct the way 
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societies see other cultures and genders.”9 But with Borgeson and Schroeder’s approach, power 
remains in the hands of marketing and advertising practitioners to supply more just 
representations and avoid bad faith. This is not an adequate framework for understanding 
consumer vulnerability as it is rooted in social and historical context and to circumvent the 
exertion of power inherent in the very act of defining vulnerability. 
 Scholarship in advertising and consumer research in the 21st century has taken strides to 
reposition the literature to affect a concern for social well-being and responsibility.10 A task force 
for the Transformative Consumer Research movement of the Association for Consumer 
Research, for example, noted that the study of vulnerable consumer groups should be prioritized 
in consumer research.11 However, while advertising and marketing ethics has been an issue of 
concern for decades among scholars and consumers and even in light of recent directives to 
study vulnerability, the literature and discourses to date have not offered an ethical framework by 
which to understand consumer vulnerability in the context of complex historical and social 
structures. Further, advertising and marketing policies have tended to proceed on utilitarian 
perspectives that prioritize individual liberties and grant the greatest happiness or greatest good 
for the greatest number.12 Utilitarianism has been handed down in the American system through 
John Stuart Mill and the argument that this principle must be guided by neutral and empirical 
logic. But as communications scholars have pointed out, despite the democratic appeal of 
utilitarianism, a result-oriented ethic is inadequate because “results are frequently complicated 
and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate 
guidelines for morally acceptable action.”13  Accordingly, a utilitarian ethic is not sufficient in 
considering vulnerable audiences because vulnerability displaces autonomy. Instead, I suggest a 
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dialogic ethic, which allows us to acknowledge and navigate personal and community 
empowerment and the social systems of power and ideology.  
 
Defining Persuasion 
 Participants in a communication exchange enter the experience with the premise that the 
intention of the communicator is appropriately encoded in the structural characteristics of 
language and imagery of the communication and likewise that the recipient of the message has 
the ability both to perceive and decode the communication appropriately.14 Though the 
communication process may not proceed seamlessly, to deny such relationship is, in the words of 
Edwin Black, “to deny the possibility of language, as we ordinarily understand the term.”15 The 
market philosophy of caveat emptor prematurely and improperly disengages the intention of the 
communicator from the communicative process and thereby imposes the full burden of the 
message on the recipient. Yet this same tradition that proclaims “buyer beware” for 
consequences in the market exchange has also, to varying degrees in history, characterized the 
recipient, or audience, as naïve, foolish, incapable or unintelligent. Further, critics charge 
advertisers with appropriating and manipulating cultural imagery and discourse for market gain.  
 Advertisers and critics alike thus have debated issues of accountability in persuasive 
communication, and these debates have had an impact in both popular understanding and on 
formal and structural implications in communication regulation. Accordingly, “although our 
society strongly favors individual freedom, we also recognize that without community we are 
simply isolated and self-interested beings.”16 Because of the social context of communication 
media–and particularly of advertising–continuing discussion and development of ethical 
standards that consider social iconography and social accountability is critical. Because a 
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dialogic ethic is grounded in the social and historical context of communications, I begin by 
providing an overview of the ways in which communication—specifically persuasive 
communication—has been understood and how that legacy has been handed down in 
contemporary thought.  
 Different definitions of persuasion not only offer differing ethical dilemmas, but primarily 
determine whether or not persuasion should be situated within the context of ethical debate at all, 
perhaps most astutely doing so through the control the definition allocates to the message 
recipient in the communication environment. A review of historically dominant approaches to 
persuasion betrays varying degrees of confidence in message recipients’ abilities, portraying 
them anywhere from utterly insipient and dependent on the skill of intelligentsia to fully engaged 
and competent participants. Thus, definitions of persuasion can determine contextual approaches 
that situate the audience as capable or incapable, as active or passive, and thereby delineate 
ethical concerns or disputes that are carried to the present. Further, as theories of rhetoric have 
developed, scholars have readdressed persuasion to move beyond the formal, structural roots of 
rhetorical study and to expand the acknowledged tools of persuasion to encompass not just 
verbal, but visual means, as well. The impact of visual means of persuasion and inadequate 
theoretical understandings of their effects in modern media environments, together with 
expanding technological capabilities, impose further urgency on questions of accountability. 
 I proceed on the argument that persuasion is not, in and of itself, a deleterious act—nor have 
students of persuasion always considered it such, despite historical developments in the usage of 
the word “persuasion” that have provided the structure for commonly held negative associations. 
I discuss, with the legacy of persuasive theory in mind, ways in which power struggles to define 
persuasion and to delegate responsibilities in the persuasion environment have affected ethical 
  
226 
and regulatory approaches to advertising.  Specifically, I will offer an ethical framework for 
understanding and approaching the concept of vulnerability, and will ground this discussion in 
the historical circumstances of the “sneaker killings.” 
 
Persuasion in Historical Context 
 Persuasion is defined generally as communication with the intent of “inducing belief or 
action.”17 But full consideration of the term is contingent on an appreciation of the historical 
roots of rhetorical and persuasion theories, as well as their social and political underpinnings.  
Further, because communication, in its various linguistic and symbolic forms, is engrained in the 
experience of being human, attempts to define a form of communication for which the purpose is 
inducing belief or action is inherently a struggle of power.  Barry Brummett, in his book Rhetoric 
in Popular Culture noted, “Power is the ability to define both events and meaning.”18 And so, 
from the very birth of rhetorical theory disagreements over its meaning and place in society have 
surfaced and have been the site of power struggles. 
 Conflicts in defining rhetoric, or methods of persuasion, began early in its development as a 
concept of theory and practice.  For example, “For the Sophists, rhetoric was the heart of 
persuasion carried out through public speaking, the art of determining how to speak to popular 
audiences on the wide range of subjects that might come before them for review and decision.  
For Plato, rhetoric was an art of fooling people, of flattering them, of getting the public to make 
decisions based on oratorical technique rather than on knowledge or a grasp of the truth.  These 
definitional arguments arose precisely because power was at stake.”19 While the “Sophists and 
Plato initiated arguments over rhetorical theory… Plato’s pupil Aristotle wrote the most famous 
work on the subject, the Rhetoric, which in one way or another influenced all subsequent 
  
227 
rhetorical theory.”20 According to Aristotle, humans are moral, and moral insight involves 
cognitive and rational deliberation developed through language and interpretation.21 He defined 
rhetoric as “‘the faculty wherein one discovers the available means of persuasion in any case 
whatsoever.’  Although the phrase ‘available means’ clearly gives permission to go beyond 
speech, many academics invested in the power of the word… have insisted on defining rhetoric 
as the exclusive province of verbal language.”22 However the scope of rhetoric has been defined, 
Aristotle’s position has been described in discussions of modern usages of persuasion as “the 
first comprehensive theory on persuasion.”23 
 One can see debates early in the development of rhetorical theory revolving around issues of 
speaker and audience capabilities, issues of truthfulness and deceit, and the legitimacy of 
persuasion as a venerable form of communication. Further, as is evidenced in these early 
definitions, that which is rightly considered rhetoric and is placed in a system of persuasive 
technique is delegated and, for these early theorists, limited to formal oral communications.  
Theoretical embellishments on the definitional scope of rhetoric have varied in degree 
throughout history and have influenced modern thought perhaps as much as their classical 
precedents. The Greek and Roman legacy received renewed interest in the eighteenth century, 
after a period of relative suffocation, and alternatives to this delineated approach began to be 
explored, as well, “thereby planting the seeds of alternative ways of thinking.”24 For example, the 
developing field of psychology offered methods for rhetorical critiques,25 and shifted the focus 
from the communicator to the effects on and abilities of the message recipient.  Further, as Barry 
Brummet argued, 
“This concern for criticism also created a possibility for thinking about the 
rhetoric of popular culture, because it is as critics, or as consumers, that most 
people confront the artifacts of popular culture… During all these centuries in 
which rhetoric was defined primarily in terms of traditional texts, people were 
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experiencing signs, artifacts, and texts that were not in that traditional form…  
[Today’s] rhetorical theorists understand the rhetorical dimension of that wider 
range of cultural artifacts. In other words, many theorists today would choose not 
to limit the rhetoric to those traditional texts.”26  
To understand the newly expanded perspectives on the scope of rhetoric, one must acknowledge 
both changes in theory and changes in society as effecting definitional alterations. Indeed, the 
twentieth century was a period in which “both the expression and conceptualization of 
persuasion changed.”27 With developing technologies expanding the means and methods of mass 
persuasion, the very notion of persuasion was augmented with accounts of nonverbal forms of 
communication.28 
 Modern western philosophies on persuasion, also the context for modern advertising theory, 
reference Greek and Roman classical rhetoricians, drawing heavily in particular from Aristotle, 
and apply them to modern political and economic processes. While it is important to explore the 
theories of the ancient philosophers, it is equally important for functional purposes to explore 
how they have been handed down and translated into modern theory. Pratkanis and Aronson, 
who credited Aristotle with providing the first theory of persuasion, explained it thus:   
“For Aristotle, the purpose of persuasion was the communication of a point of 
view or position.  Although the Sophists believed persuasion was needed to 
discover important facts, Aristotle believed that knowledge could be gained only 
by logic and reason.  Unfortunately, according to Aristotle, not everyone was 
capable of reasoning clearly about every issue.  For these denser souls, the art of 
persuasion is needed to communicate truth to them in such a manner that they 
might come to the right conclusion.”29 
 This is one way by which Aristotle has been handed down and from this view the artfulness 
and potential dangers of persuasion are drawn from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, contingent in these 
terms on a communicator who is skilled and a recipient whose understanding of issues depends 
on the guidance of the skilled communicator. This accounting of Aristotle’s position, however, is 
somewhat rudimentary when considered in the context of other derivations of his work and it 
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neglects the potential contributions of creativity in communication. Thomas Bivins allowed for a 
more creative aspect to the Aristotilian approach, suggesting that while he probably would 
emphasize individual over community rights, Aristotle “would also probably favor the creative 
aspects of advertising, since the messages creatively expressed are often those with the most 
impact (a fact that advertisers know well).”30 But communications scholar Clifford Christians 
wrote of a more complex Aristotelian system of communication that affords greater opportunity 
for ethical engagement and discussion: 
“We are unitary beings with our various human capacities depending on and 
interacting with one another. This third feature31–the interpretive–was recognized 
by the classical Greeks as the primordial home of language. From the 
mythological Hermes, inventor of language, they coined the term hermeneia 
(hermeneutics, interpretation). Aristotle’s genius brought hermeneutical 
consciousness into focus as a constituent feature of the human species, and in the 
Nicomachean Ethics he gave the interpretive art its richest meaning… In making 
a moral decision, Aristotle argues, hermeneia discerns the appropriate action, in 
the right amount, and with proper timing. This is Aristotelian language 
confirming that we are moral beings with an orienting system beyond the senses 
yet one differing from logic… If the interpretive domain is lingual, and if 
language is the matrix of community, then human bonds are not constituted by 
reason or action but through finding common meaning in hermeneia.”32 
 
Thus Aristotle’s legacy, particularly in implicating an interpretive domain in the communication 
process, offers the opportunity not only to contemplate a more complex view of rhetorical 
communications, but also to treat all parties involved in the communication as constitutive of the 
communication itself.   
 Broader theories on persuasion may widen our understanding of the communication process, 
but also offer more opportunities for expanding fears about the communication process, for 
misinterpreting and misunderstanding responsibility within this environment, and for using 
misinformation as a source of power in the marketplace. Pratkanis and Aronson posit, “Our age 
of persuasion is populated with short, catchy, and often visually oriented messages. Although 
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such persuasive images are frequently successful in capturing our attention in the message-dense 
environment, they substitute slogans and images for well-reasoned arguments and can turn 
complex issues into vulgar black-and-white caricatures of reason.”33 These authors’ way of 
addressing advertising is dangerous if unfounded because it obscures the multiplicity of 
persuasive conventions and the complex methods of verbal and written language, signs and 
symbols, art and imagery that are involved in persuasive communication. Further, it implies first 
that those of the past did not have forms of or engage in complex communications such as the 
visually-oriented messages that “our age of persuasion” offers; and second, it implies that people 
of today are not equipped to participate fully in the communication process by understanding and 
interpreting complex messages and images. This approach lacks cultural and historical 
perspective; the practice of approaching methods of communications in consumer culture as 
unequivocally unique to modern and western environments disengages advertising conventions 
and critiques from the legacies and perspectives from which they stem. So, just as it is important 
to explore the classical legacy of rhetorical theory, it is equally important to acknowledge the 
multiple and complex ways in which that legacy has been translated into modern form and how, 
thus, the interpretations have influenced modern approaches to rhetoric and persuasion. 
 
Vulnerable Audiences, Caveat Emptor and Accountability 
 Traditional approaches to persuasion continue to be the dominant forms of thought about 
behaviors in the marketplace such that, as one scholar explains, “advocates of all sorts (legal, 
commercial, and editorial) still subscribe to the tenets of persuasion set forth by the likes of 
Aristotle and Cicero. Because this traditional approach is in effect, we must be prepared to deal 
with the potential for unethical use of both the language and the techniques of persuasion.”34 This 
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traditional legacy is one of democratic and rational debate. It assumes advertising provides an 
important public service by providing the proper information for the marketplace to flourish 
through rational and well-informed decision processes, a view upheld under the doctrine of free 
speech by the Supreme Court in the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc.35 But the legacy of Aristotle was based on the belief that 
rhetoric should not be misused to persuade audiences of falsities or of something morally 
corrupt36 and so a doctrine of truth is imperative within this system. In fact, “truth is one 
underlying principle about which there is a cross-cultural agreement… Deception destroys the 
social order.  Living with others is inconceivable if we cannot tacitly assume that people are 
speaking truthfully.”37 The human capacity to lie or to obscure the truth, and the power that 
accompanies successful lies is the root of many fears about advertising’s place in society and its 
effects on consumers, particularly those consumers deemed not intelligent enough, capable 
enough or rational enough to look out for themselves.  Thomas Bivins writes,  
“Not everyone has viewed the ‘people’ as intelligent enough to look out for 
themselves. This is an important point to come to grips with, as much as the 
justification for the type of communication that both advertising and public 
relations engage in is predicated on the notion that listeners are intelligent enough 
to discern true from false... This belief in the rational abilities of the people who 
receive media messages is directly responsible for such precepts as caveat emptor.  
‘Buyer beware’ assumes that an intelligent consumer will be able to discern 
nuances in messages–nuances that the designer of the message may have 
intentionally obscured. And this turns up the other side of the coin:  Why do those 
advertising and public relations practitioners who say they believe in the 
intelligence of the average consumer try so hard to cloud their messages?  Could 
it be that, like Plato, they really believe that the masses are easily deceived by the 
‘shadows on the cave wall’?”38 
 
Thus we witness contrariant tendencies in the marketplace that are alternately paternalistic and 
absolving; but, Bivins continues, “whether you agree with Plato or with Milton, placing the onus 
of recognition of reality solely on the receiver of your message is failing to live up to your own 
moral obligations.  Intent is still the ultimate measure of truth telling.”39 While it is helpful to 
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distinguish the message communicator and message recipient in parsing matters of intent and 
misinterpretation and while these distinctions are frequently used to determine obligation and 
accountability, acknowledging the necessary interaction of the two as constitutive of the 
persuasive message is equally important theoretically. As in dialogic theory, “communication is 
not the transference of knowledge but a dialogic encounter of subjects creating it together.”40 If 
contradictory approaches to the nature of the consumer are allowed to flow through industry and 
ethical discourse without close critique, and if none of these approaches acknowledges the 
dialogic creation of the message, then the industry and its critics will be allowed to proceed 
unabated by ethical concerns, by using an account of the consumer that best suits immediate 
advantage.   
 Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll and McKee address concerns about “special audiences” and 
consider whether certain audiences should be considered more vulnerable to the persuasive (or 
manipulative, depending on your perspective) effects of advertising:   
“Advertising practitioners tend to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the pursuit of 
their craft is generally socially beneficial and that for most people, most of the 
time, advertising performs a useful service. Those carrying the banner of special 
audiences, on the other hand, contend that the system is simply unfair to those 
who may be potentially more vulnerable and, hence, must be treated with greater 
sensitivity.”41  
Many advertisers, in defense of their freedoms, argue, “advertising should not have to ‘protect 
people from themselves.’  Yet advertising commonly does just that–voluntarily.”42 How an 
advertiser views the audience is often reflected in the conventions of the advertisement and the 
expectations of how advertising representations will be interpreted;43 it is represented not only 
through the things an advertisement shows or says, but through those things it may not show or 
say. Advertising, after all, cannot afford to offend and displease the target market. But at what 
point do advertisers look beyond their target market to the good of the industry or even to the 
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good of society? As Bivins recounts, “In the final analysis, the media cannot afford to lie–in any 
way, for any reason. If we cannot be assured that the default position is always the truth, then the 
media will continue to slide in esteem, along with their ability to affect lives in positive ways.”44  
Such concerns certainly do not fall under the refuge of caveat emptor, but the problem remains 
of how obligated a given advertiser may feel about his role in the larger context of the consumer 
environment, if he does indeed consider that role at all. 
 Where the industry is not interested in affording protection, the government might be.  
Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission’s capability to regulate advertising varies, but it 
remains the main body responsible for keeping the advertising industry in check.  In 1914, the 
Federal Trade Commission was charged with preventing unfair competition in commerce, and 
with the Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938, the authority of the FTC was extended from 
prevention to elimination. The 1970s were a time of renewed interest in consumer protection, 
and in 1972 the Supreme Court held that not just merchants and manufacturers, but consumers as 
well should be protected from unfair market practices,45 initiating the unfairness doctrine of 
consumer protection, which took the FTC beyond the realm of fact and into questions of public 
values.46 
 And so there are at least two powerful and rather inapproachable agents of protectionism, 
each with its own allegiances and agendas, determining who should be protected and under what 
circumstances. To restate and revisit the issue of power in media, recall, “Power is the ability to 
define both events and meaning.”47 The advertising industry, government, and the media are 
involved in defining fairness and deceit in the marketplace, as well as in defining the audience.  
But addressing these entities and determining accountability is a formidable task bound by the 
complexities of organizational structure, antagonistic loyalties and the fact that these complex 
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and amorphous systems do not exist in a vacuum but operate within larger contexts of capitalism, 
democracy48 and even globalism. Sometimes they are bound by loyalties within these larger 
contexts that are not necessarily in the public or consumer interest. In his discussion on the 
effects of organizational structure on moral decision making, Bivins points out, “The roles we 
take on as media practitioners also imply a responsibility to perform certain functions associated 
with those roles. ‘Responsibility’ could be defined as a bundle of obligations associated with a 
job or function.  In other words, responsibility refers to more than just the primary function of a 
role; it refers to the multiple facets of that function… Does responsibility naturally equate with 
accountability? ‘Accountability refers to blaming or crediting someone for an action – normally 
an action associated with a recognized responsibility. The assumption, therefore, would be to 
hold a person responsible for an action also accountable for the results of that action. This 
assumes that the responsible party is relatively autonomous.”49 It further assumes that the 
responsible party is identifiable, which can be difficult within large organizations and may be 
even less definitive within large social structures such as an “industry” or “government” or 
“media.” 
 
Culture and Persuasion 
 Manipulation involves deception and falsities, which are not legally allowed in commercial 
communications; but persuasion can involve exaggerations and embellishments, known as 
puffery,50 which are legally allowable on the argument that a reasonable person would 
acknowledge and understand the embellishments. But our engagement with imagery is complex; 
and it may be as much that we use the image to constitute and convey our sense of reality as it is 
that the image shapes our sense of reality. Indeed, humans live in a world of representations and 
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interpretations–they are the very essence of culture.51 It is this interpretive domain, in which the 
audience is considered to have a constitutive role, that I suggest is most helpful in addressing 
issues surrounding vulnerable audiences. 
 According to Christians and Traber (1997),  
“in dialogic theory, humans—in contrast to the rest of the animal kingdom–are 
not only situated in the natural world but live alongside it. Their symbolic 
capacity separates them from other forms through their consciousness… 
Mediating systems, from this perspective, are inescapably human creations, as 
well. In literary works or cinema, the indispensable features of their inner 
dialectics—the point of departure, plot, setting, overall tone, and resolution of 
conflicts—are all value driven and either engage a culture’s value system or they 
cannot be understood.”52 
 Similarly, perception is necessarily value driven such that “the way we see things is affected by 
what we know or what we believe… Our vision is continually active, continually moving, 
continually holding things in a circle around itself, constituting what is present to us as we are.”53 
Viewed in this way, advertising becomes a part of a complex web of communicative conventions 
that are reliant for their meaning on their situatedness in material culture,54 on the viewer’s 
perceptions of the message in its given context at its historical moment, making any analysis of 
its effects an overwhelming endeavor.  
 What the discussion thus far suggests is that a manipulation model of persuasion is not only 
too simplistic and unidirectional, but is unsubstantiated and negligent.  Too often critics read 
messages without addressing the circumstances of their use,55 and theories of persuasion and 
manipulation have been developed without attention to the “viewing strategies available at a 
particular moment in time” and “cultural and historical conditions on which the perceptual act 
depends,”56 leaving the field of advertising with criticisms that have no substantial basis to allow 
for advances in ethical behaviors and theories in the marketplace.  Failure to acknowledge the 
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participation of both the communicator and receiver is a failure to understand the communication 
itself. 
 
Dialogic Ethics 
 As I have tried to express, a central theme in advertising ethics today is one that has been the 
subject of debate since the dawn of persuasive theory. This debate has assumed new meaning 
through the interaction of new and widespread methods of communication and through changing 
theoretical perspectives that, in their ability to define, harbor power over our communication, our 
interpretive ability and thus our very humanness. One version of dialogic ethics is rooted in 
ancient Greek philosophy. As a rhetoritician notes, “The Greek legacy to us includes some ideas 
about the relationship between power and rhetoric, as well as the ways in which popular culture 
is related to both…  [Changes] in theory may be part of changes in power.”57 Generally 
widespread and accessible modern theories of consumer society recognize that consumption does 
more than fulfill our physical needs, that it addresses in large part our cultural needs, our need to 
have meaning, and our need to have power in the process of created and shared meaning, much 
of which is created by and passed through our cultural imagery and discourses. A dialogic ethic 
brings us to a place of respect for the historical processes of meaning, for the contemporary 
moment of a globalized and technological world where mono-cultural perspectives are 
insufficient, and to a place in ethical debate where the social and historical process of defining 
vulnerability are not just useful in exploring the concept but are necessary.  
 Ronald Arnett argues, “Dialogic ethics is the meeting place for learning in an age of 
difference.”58 As the rejoinder to individualistic rationalism, ethics is bound in “our mutual 
human existence across cultural, racial, and historical boundaries.”59 The various derivations of 
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dialogic ethics share an understanding of selfhood called to duty through relation or dialogue 
with community.60 Martin Buber has been called the archetype of the dialogical perspective, and 
his “I-Thouness” thesis of human existence its frame of reference.61 Ethics stems from the 
“other” but is not extrinsic, as in the formalism of the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill and 
John Locke.62 Instead, for Buber, human relationships are primary, with primacy of Thou 
incorporating not only other humans, but also human relation with nature and spirituality.63  
Buber has been criticized for failing to offer a terminus a quo for revolutionary change and for 
appearing naïve and romantic.64 Because the focus is on person-to-person interaction, he does not 
offer a theory that deals adequately with social institutions and therefore does not provide a 
framework for demanding institutional and structural change.65  
 Greatly influenced by but ultimately rejecting Buber, Emmanuel Levinas proposed an ethics 
centered in the other, rather than “the ethical relationship as residing in the ‘between’ of the 
interpersonal relationship” as with Buber.66 For Levinas, humanness is presumed by our moral 
obligation in relation to others; the other is the source of ethical obligation.67 Levinas criticized 
western ontology for its self-centered focus on human subjectivity.68 In fact, Levinas posited 
relational duty to be fundamental to human identity and to supersede individual rights.69 Rather 
than proposing that we might “know” the other, which he conceived to be an act of dominance if 
not violence, he posited a phenomenological approach to the Other through the way that the 
Other conveys itself. As Murray (2002) explains, “Ethics is reconceived, therefore, as a 
summons that comes from the Other… Responsibility is in ‘response’ to the call of the Other.”70 
Levinas brings listening to the forefront of communication and presents a view of self that 
requires learning from the Other. While Levinas brings ethics to the center of humanness and 
conceptualizes communication as “the doing of ethics discovered in the act of listening,”71 this 
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centeredness in the Other and the phenomenological appearance of the Other poses several 
problems in politicizing the ethics of Levinas. As Murray (2002) explains, “[T]he face of the 
Other may be instead an inescapably interpreted phenomenon. In other words, the announcement 
of ethical obligation may depend upon communication rather than initiating it, and therefore be 
subject to interpretive distortion… The call of the Other, as an ethical summons, is only heard 
against a cultural and historical backdrop.”72 Further, Levinas’s Other is essentially an 
interpersonal, face-to-face encounter. Therefore, Levinas does not offer a satisfactory ethical 
framework for a globalized, multicultural, mass communication society that hosts a variety of 
examples in which the face of the Other is masked or distorted through cultural and historical 
processes.73 But the deontological framework that Levinas presented offered a counter to 
Nietzsche’s ethical relativism by placing ethics in the call of the Other,74 and influenced the 
development of dialogic ethics. 
 Clifford Christians (2007) offers three versions of dialogic ethics—discourse ethics, feminist 
ethics and communitarian ethics.75 The discourse ethics of Habermas places ethics in public 
communication practices. Ethics is dialogic rather than monologic and is derived from 
“communicative action—the process of giving reasons for holding or rejecting particular 
claims.”76 Feminist social ethics is rooted in human social relationships and experiences with the 
language of caring and understanding. It “situates the moral domain within the general purposes 
of human life that people share across cultural, racial, and historical boundaries.”77 
Communitarian ethics acknowledges sociocultural influence on existence and meaning. Human 
identity is developed in the social realm and fulfillment is achieved in community. In its basic 
form, communitarianism is political theory that argues a politics of individual rights fails to 
acknowledge identity formed through historical and cultural processes and is therefore incapable 
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of offering human fulfillment.78 But while these versions of the dialogic move us towards the 
“transnational and cross-cultural in a way utilitarianism is unable to match conceptually,”79 they 
are not sufficient to understand vulnerability in these contexts. 
 Habermas has been challenged for failing to be “deeply holistic, gender inclusive, or 
culturally constituted” and discourse ethics more generally as being ethnocentric.80 The political 
agenda of communitarianism is predicated on a dialogic view that can only be maintained in 
context of a larger political structure that works within the same belief system. While it may 
acknowledge the social, it does not demonstrate adequately how more localized dialogue work 
within the larger social system. And while feminist social ethics avoids the political policy 
agenda of communitarianism, an ethic of caring still insinuates a dependence relationship that is 
problematic beyond the interpersonal. Therefore, none of these versions of the dialogic offer an 
adequate ethical framework for understanding vulnerability and responsibility in a multicultural, 
historically-rooted environment of mass communications. Instead, I suggest that the dialogic 
ethic of Paulo Freire is uniquely situated to address the concept of vulnerability, specifically 
through several important concepts—the socio-historical situatedness of meaning that not only 
allows for but anticipates multiculturalism, pluralism, and transformation; the notion of 
liberation through dialogue, not as an act of violence, but naming and therein transforming the 
world; the importance of voice, or the ability to be a part of naming the world; and the concept of 
responsibility not only as centered in the individual, but also in the social.  
 
Paulo Freire 
 Because Paulo Freire’s concept of dialogue emanates from concrete historical experience, is 
contextual in nature and “his books and essays are ongoing reflections of activities in process,”81 
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it is important, likewise, to place Freire in context.82 Freire was born in 1921 in northeast Brazil, 
one of the poorest regions in the world. As a child, he witnessed the impact of the Great 
Depression and knew his own hunger and saw the hunger of others. Despite this, in the 1940s he 
was able to obtain a law degree and complete a doctorate in education. Literacy was important to 
Freire from his early career, and in 1946 he was named director of the Department of Education 
and Culture of the Social Service in Pernambuco. He was faced with the fact that literacy was an 
obstacle to participation in society, and so education became imperative for participation. Ronald 
Arnett places this in western perspective by pointing out, “in the United States, literacy tests 
were used to exclude many citizens from voting until the Voting Rights Act of 1964, which 
attacked numerous forms of disenfranchisement.”83 Freire’s ideas were not simply esoteric; 
rather, he was an educator whose work was pragmatic. In 1962, he taught literacy to three 
hundred sugarcane workers in forty-five days; he became the coordinator of Brazil’s national 
adult education campaign by 1963; and in 1964 after a military coup that toppled the “reform-
minded regime,”84 Freire was imprisoned and then exiled to Chile, where he continued his work 
in adult education. He published Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1974), his most widely known 
book and in which his concept of dialogue is addressed most elaborately,85 while a visiting fellow 
at Harvard’s Center for Studies in Education and Development.  
 Freire’s personal experiences in various third-world countries influenced and politicized his 
thought and, as De Lima and Christians (1979) articulate, “prompted Freire to name 
humanization as today’s central problem and to see domination as the fundamental theme of our 
time, implying its opposite (liberation) as the permanent goal to be pursued.”86 Dehumanization, 
as Freire contends, “is not only an ontological possibility” but also a “historical reality.”87 
Therefore, the “great humanistic and historical task” is liberation, not only for the oppressed, but 
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for their oppressors, as well. Humanity is created and expressed through communication, in the 
dialogic, through interdependent reflection and action. In the act of oppression, the oppressors 
are not only dehumanizing the oppressed by denying their rights, but in the act of denying 
humanity to others are negating their own, as well.88 Dialogue, for Freire, “is the encounter 
between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world.”89 And in naming the world, 
thereby transforming it.  
 Socio-historical relation and creation. Freire’s notion of conscientização90 opens the doors 
for people “to enter the historical process as responsible Subjects”91 and engage critically and 
dialogically in the creation of meaning. They transform the world together and in relation. Freire 
tells us, “It is as transforming and creative beings that humans, in their permanent relations with 
reality, produce not only material goods—tangible objects—but also social institutions, ideas, 
and concepts. Through their continuing praxis, men and women simultaneously create history 
and become historical-social beings.”92 His notion of “speaking a true word” is rooted in the 
relationship between the Subject and the Subject’s grounded socio-historical reality.93 For 
change, or transformation or liberation to occur, it has to emanate from the social-historical 
reality of the Subject, thereby binding it in social action.94 
 Multiculturalism and globalism. Because Freire’s work is so clearly articulated through his 
experience in third-world countries, it introduces an alternative to western individualism. We can 
as Freire does, trace a distinction between his experiences and an alternative to Western 
monologic individualism and empiricism and even to communitarian approaches. Freire’s ethic 
is based on an understanding of humans-in-relation. Freire writes, 
“There is no longer an ‘I think’ but ‘we think.’ It is the ‘we think’ which 
establishes the ‘I think’ and not the contrary. This co-participation of Subjects in 
the act of thinking is communication. Communication implies a reciprocity which 
cannot be broken… It is not transference of knowledge, but the encounter of 
  
242 
subjects in dialogue in search of the significance of the object of knowing and 
thinking.”95 
In dialogic theory, as Christians (1997) explains, “discourse is born of conscience… We resonate 
through our spirit cross-culturally to the moral imagination of others everywhere.”96 Humans are 
bonded together in seeking humanity, which develops out of dialogue and is situated in the 
interpretive. In dialogic encounter, where authentic lingual and symbolic utterance is not just an 
expression but is also constitutive of humanness, simply being open to another’s perspective is 
not sufficient; rather, participation in dialogue requires active listening and contribution “with a 
view to uncovering non-idiosyncratic truth capable of withstanding the test of critical 
dialogue.”97 Cultural difference, then, does not supersede humanness in the dialogic encounter. 
 Liberation and Power. As previously stated, liberation and fulfillment cannot occur if the 
oppressed topple the oppressors merely to become oppressors themselves. Oppression denies 
fulfillment of humanness. Dialogue, which is built on co-participation, is not simply a means of 
communication; it is “the only acceptable tool of liberation.”98 For Freire, liberation as authentic 
social change occurs through empowerment, not merely a transfer of power that shifts the objects 
of disempowerment.99 However, a central problem for Freire is the ambiguity implicit in 
oppressed existence whereby the oppressed, whose concrete reality has been shaped by the 
structures of their oppression, internalize both the deprecation they have endured and the state of 
oppressing as the expression of humanity; while desiring their freedom, they contemplate it 
through the state of their oppressors.100 Freire’s response to this ambiguity and mistrust of the 
oppressed is conscientization, such that people critically recognize the causes of their own 
oppression and name or create a new situation.101 Freire postulated a “culture of silence” of the 
dispossessed and, through his experiences, “came to realize that their ignorance and lethargy 
were the direct product of the whole situation of economic, social, and political domination—and 
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of the paternalism—of which they were victims.”102 Thus, regaining humanity would require 
transformation of these structures. But Freire also situates a power within the oppressed that is 
seldom and not easily accessible by the oppressors, which is the ability to regain humanity not 
only for themselves but for their oppressors. That is, as Freire stated, “it is only the oppressed 
who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors.”103 They do this by seeking their own 
humanity.104 
 Voice and Power. For Freire, authentic transformation cannot occur unless the oppressed are 
subjective participants, that is participating in the naming of the world, in their liberation.105 This 
requires that the oppressed are the agents of their own struggle. For Freire,  
“No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by 
treating them as unfortunates and by presenting their emulation models from 
among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle 
for their redemption… It would be a contradiction in terms if the oppressors not 
only defended but actually implemented a liberating education.”106  
A project of empowerment “gives people the strength to create a space for themselves.”107 People 
must be able to name both the problem and the solution in their own oppression for 
transformation to liberate; therefore, liberation develops from “open spaces” and not from the 
political and economic elite.108 Freire problematizes the conundrum that without political power 
the oppressed cannot initiate their own liberating education. His answer is a pedagogy of the 
oppressed “which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in 
the incessant struggle to regain their humanity.”109 That is, again, that the oppressed must be 
empowered with a voice in dialogue; they are not treated with paternalism or objects to be saved, 
but as participants in a dialogue built on a nurtured and mutual trust.110 They must be treated as 
Subjects constituting meaning. They must be given voice.111 Christians (1991) writes, “In 
Freire’s alternative, power is relational, that is, characterized by mutuality rather than 
sovereignty… Power in this perspective is reciprocity between two subjects, a relationship not of 
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domination, but rather of intimacy and vulnerability.”112 A concept of vulnerability is only 
acceptable insofar as it is not harbored in the domination, or the naming, of one over another, but 
rather a surrender of each to the other. 
 Responsibility. Scholars have demonstrated that social institutions and those doing the work 
of social institutions are moral agents and thereby hold responsibility for their actions.113 Much 
advertising and marketing material is the end result of efforts by and contributions from a variety 
of sources. Therefore, audiences receive, interpret and create meaning from messages that are the 
collaborative effort of perhaps many, sometimes unidentifiable individuals. One potentially 
could track the development of an advertising message from its original inception through the 
media that broadcast it and develop a list of individual participations. But any attempt to parse 
individual efforts to determine responsibility de-contextualizes responsibility for the message 
from its coherent or unified meaning. So simply attributing responsibility to individual actors in 
such situations is insufficient. We must also consider responsibility on the institutional and 
corporate level. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated how both role- or task-related and corporate 
responsibilities are legitimate expectations in complex social systems;114 we can evaluate the 
ethicality of persuasive messages and attribute responsibility on a variety of levels, including 
socially to the institutions developing them and to the audiences interpreting and often re-
creating or co-creating meaning.  
  One defining feature of marketing communications professions, and specifically advertising, 
is that audiences assume their messages to be biased. We enter into the message exchange 
expecting a persuasive intent and with the assumption that we can know on whose behalf the 
message is presented. As scholar Thomas Bivins writes, “Transparency in media communication, 
or in all communication for that matter, is the mainstay of human interaction… It means that 
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both your identity and your motivation are apparent to those whom you are trying to 
persuade.”115 Further, Bivins maintains that the measure of ethicality of persuasive 
communications is whether the message was developed with the intent to deceive an audience in 
order to manipulate them. If the person receiving the message is not afforded the opportunity to 
“reflect critically on his choices in a situation,” as scholar Richard Perloff maintains, then the 
message is unethical.116 But advertising presents a variety of kinds of “information,” rendering it 
difficult in many situations to determine intent or “truth.” What is truthful, for example, about 
“the image of a skier screaming down the side of a skyscraper, or of huge draft horses playing 
football, or of frogs talking with lizards about beer”117 or of a man whose shoes make him fly? If 
we can assess that these messages were developed with the intention to mislead consumers by 
blurring lines between reality and fiction, then we evaluate the message as unethical. But if 
instead we expect the message recipient, or consumer, to discern the variety of types of truths 
available, such as metaphorical meaning or irony or humor, then we evaluate the message as 
transparent and ethical.118 However, an assessment of a message as transparent or truthful and 
thereby ethical does not alleviate an advertiser’s responsibility. That is, institutions and 
individuals alike are bound by similar obligations as “cultural agents” to uphold our “cultural 
vitality,” but to thrive these obligations must also be developed likewise through collective or 
communal responsibility.119 As Christians states, collective responsibility “inheres in our 
humanity as social beings.”120 
 Through Freire, we can posit a third form of responsibility that resides in audiences. For 
Freire, “It is essential for the oppressed to realize that when they accept the struggle for 
humanization they also accept, from that moment, their total responsibility for the struggle.”121 
Freire empowers the oppressed to become Subjects of their own liberation, as well as the 
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liberation of their oppressors; but in doing so they must maintain their own responsibility in this 
reciprocal process. Christians (1988) proposes a collective responsibility through social being 
that is housed in the audience as constitutive of their communication with broader social 
institutions. Thus, when audiences are empowered, they are also responsible. While this 
collective responsibility is difficult to grasp, it is nonetheless imperative because it is part of the 
fabric of our social being.122 As “we enact our culture in everyday life” we are thereby agents of 
it and responsible for it.123 Our symbolic life is “a critical element in total humanization”124 and 
media systems are mass purveyors of these symbols. Therefore, as agents in our own cultural 
systems, we hold a moral responsibility for these social processes of communication and, as 
Christians (1988) demonstrates, “we can legitimately be called to account to the extent of our 
power for effecting change.”125 
 While some difficulty in determining a dialogic relation with social institutions does arise 
from Freire’s articulation of his position from his lived experience in particular socio-cultural 
circumstances, I believe that we can reinforce through Freire the kind of social justice projects 
enacted by activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. While transformation requires 
fundamental changes in structures of oppression, those changes can be expressed and instituted 
in the “open spaces” of community and develop not out of top-down dictates of elite, but out of 
the “voice” of the oppressed as they enter into authentic dialogic relation. 
 
Conclusion 
 Often our cultural, legal and ethical approaches are in discord, particularly in varying 
definitions of the role of advertisers and the nature of consumers, and the production of each 
within economic and political systems.  Some social movements have addressed cultural images 
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and representations in the media and advertising as important sites for social change.126 But when 
these social practices are criticized or regulated in the name of social change, it is just as 
important to recognize and address the value-laden nature of these criticisms and regulations as it 
is of the messages they attempt to alter.   
 Historical perspective of the theoretical underpinnings of theory is critical for our 
understanding of the power relations involved in consumer contexts; but at some point, as well, 
we must be able to move beyond the problems inherent in the traditional conflicts involved in 
this discussion. Mutual respect for the elements of communication–for the position of the 
communicator; for the elements and conditions of the message, whether formal or informal, 
whether fact or image; and for the autonomy, abilities and vulnerabilities of the recipient–are a 
positive starting point. As in dialogic theory, communication rests in “the interpretive capacity, 
the spirit. Discourse is born of conscience. A fulsome anthropology of organic wholeness moves 
language from its Enlightenment site in cognition to an interpretive axis in values and 
worldviews–or, as the center of our being is sometimes called–to the human spirit. If the 
interpretive domain is lingual, and if language is the matrix of community, then human bonds are 
not constituted by reason or action but through finding common meaning in hermeneia.”127 And 
if we are willing to relinquish our worship of Enlightenment interpretations of “rational” 
reasoning, we may legitimately expand the tools of the interpretive domain. That is, “being an 
audience member entails a certain kind of creativity—specifically, the creativity exercised when 
one adjusts one’s interpretation of a message to one’s evolving perception of reality.  
 A related assumption of this kind of study is that the construction of meaning is part of a 
social process…  Although these assumptions are shared widely enough to make them appear 
relatively uncontroversial, they nonetheless bear repetition—if only because of the prevalence, 
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both in research and in public perception, of an opposite view of the audience member, as 
passive and isolated.”128 Again, the ability to control definitions within a culture is a powerful 
tool, and it can be used to the disadvantage of certain groups. Using that power to define the 
communication environment without proper understanding of its tools and without proper 
respect for its participants can result in unethical activity that can, if not checked, become 
widespread through the dominant institutions and, in doing so, diffuse the subjects of 
accountability. Proper ethical decisions, then, cannot be made without greater knowledge of the 
power to define our reality. 
 Dialogic ethics offers a framework that both insists on people’s agency in creating their own 
worlds while at the same time acknowledging the structures of power through which they must 
navigate. It brings us to a place where multiple and multicultural meanings are nurtured and, 
indeed, required. And it requires us to engage in dialogue that encourages critical consciousness 
and empowers us by giving us the tools of our own liberation and humanness. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION—SOCIO-HISTORICAL CASE FOR A DIALOGIC 
ETHICS OF VULNERABILITY 
 
  
 I began this work by arguing that past thinking about consumer vulnerability has not 
accounted for the complexity of the historical, social and cultural circumstances that people 
navigate, nor for that of the market and the processes of meaning making. Instead, vulnerability 
has been defined by those in a position to define meaning, which is a position of power, and has 
been situated across a delineated set of demographic variables that are historically associated 
with groups that have been misrepresented, underrepresented, suppressed or oppressed in some 
way. Even when prescribed by well-intentioned advocates, these definitions have amounted to 
paternalism that silences the voices of those being defined and instead can disempower the very 
audiences that these definitions are intended to protect.  
 To more fully understand the issue of consumer vulnerability and to provide a more nuanced 
explanation of the complex systems through which people navigate the consumer world and 
communication environments, I explore the circumstances behind the “sneaker killings” of the 
1980s and 1990s, placing them within the broader history of race and consumption in the United 
States. Not only does this history illuminate issues of vulnerability but also offers an important 
reflection of race relations that is integral to theorizing vulnerability as historically and culturally 
situated. I suggest that dialogic ethics acknowledges the interpretive domain of human nature and 
offers a more positive framework from which to understand the concepts of consumer 
vulnerability and through which to empower the lives of the otherwise disempowered. Therefore 
to conclude, I draw a more deliberate connection between the theory of a multicultural, dialogic 
ethic presented through Paulo Freire, and the histories of African Americans, Nike and markets 
developed in these chapters.  
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 African Americans have long fought for inclusion and positive representation in consumer 
markets and advertising not only as an indication of economic power but also as a symbolic 
expression of social value and respect. They were struggling against the embeddedness and depth 
of racial misrepresentations that had been necessary for the maintenance of advertising but 
remained long after the abolition of slavery and endured in the development and representation 
of the imagery of minstrelsy and iconic advertising figures such as Aunt Jemima. Such 
misrepresentations continued to prioritize the voice of the oppressor and to dehumanize African 
Americans with sweeping generalizations and inappropriate caricatures. But for centuries, even 
as they had to navigate their lives alongside these misrepresentations, they at the same time 
developed voice through early publications such as Freedom’s Journal and market resources 
such as The Negro Yearbook and the Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro and later through the 
growth of magazines like Ebony that appealed to a growing African American middle class and 
drew national accounts. Through these various publications, they began to press American 
corporations to recognize black consumer markets and offer alternative, positive representations 
of African American life. 
 By the late 1800s, black-owned businesses began to accumulate wealth by establishing trust 
on the very basis of speaking to consumers through advertising with more realistic and positive 
depictions and engaged their communities in the process of growing and strengthening. 
Realizing that working to become a strong economic force would give them weight in cultural 
and political realms and help them to gain acceptance and participation in American society, 
black leaders developed organizations such as the National Negro Business League, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League in the early 
1900s. Just as Jim Crow laws formally enacted social and political segregation well into the 20th 
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century, the negative depictions or otherwise absence of African Americans in advertising 
represented economic and symbolic censure from American life. Together, these publications 
and organizations pressured advertisers and the advertising industry for more representation not 
just in their media depictions but also in their ranks. African Americans mobilized throughout 
the 20th century to demonstrate their economic clout and that mistreatment, misrepresentation 
and lack of representation were important issues. The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaigns of the 1930s, for example, and later the Montgomery Bus Boycotts and the “Be 
Black. Buy Black” theme of the Civil Rights era demonstrated the power of African American 
retribution and paved the way for the success of future boycotts and further advancements 
through economic and market means.  
 Companies responded to this kind of pressure, particularly as they increasingly recognized 
the potential of the African American market, but they did so slowly and with trepidation. While 
some companies had begun targeting African Americans by the mid-1930s, they were doing so 
with ads and imagery developed for the mainstream market that was not reflective of African 
American life and culture; still other companies continued to avoid association with black 
consumers, either through blatant discrimination or a general and unfounded fear of white 
backlash. As they entered the Civil Rights Era, black communities increasingly turned their 
attention to the advertising industry, recognizing as most had its considerable impact on 
symbolic life, and tried to break the industry of its fear of white backlash and the assumption that 
African Americans did not have their own unique market needs and could be reached through 
white-oriented messages. It was not until the 1980s that Americans began to see positive, 
authentic reflections of African American life in force through mainstream media. 
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 At the same time, blacks seized opportunities to leverage American rhetoric of democracy 
and freedom to highlight their own unjust treatment. During World War II, African Americans 
pointed to the inconsistency of American policies towards equality at home and abroad through 
the “Double V” concept, and later the lessons of the Civil Rights era reflected the discrepancies 
between American ideals and American realities. African American soldiers had returned from 
war with an increased sense of consumer activism, and they witnessed the end of formal 
discrimination in government-related defense industries, opening the doors to skilled industrial 
labor positions in urban environments. Several waves of black urbanization were met with both 
increased racial tension and with new opportunities through culture and the arts that eventually 
would find voices in mass media. Both music and sports played prominent roles in the 
development of the sounds and aesthetics of black culture that crossed into mainstream 
American life.  
 The sounds of black music took the world stage during World War I as U.S. army bands took 
their Jazz sounds to other countries, spreading the sounds that ushered in the “Jazz Age.” While 
black representation in the sounds of radio, disseminated throughout American homes in the 
1930s, were filled with many of the same racial caricatures that had dominated stage 
entertainment and print media, radio did begin to speak directly to black audiences and black 
companies used these cultural spaces to reach out to black consumers. With increasing African 
American urbanization after World War II, large radio markets for African Americans were 
formed. The rhythm and blues sounds of these black-oriented stations began to cross over to the 
white teenage market. While black music and sounds had a strong influence on mainstream 
American culture and pressures during the Civil Rights movement ensured more African-
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American programs, the majority of radio stations had white ownership and many were skeptical 
that these programs were merely accomodationist and did not reflect substantial change. 
 As television technology developed and disseminated throughout America, it absorbed many 
of the same racial conventions of radio.  Radio shows like Amos ‘n Andy transitioned onto 
television and presented long-standing and derogatory caricatures of blacks reminiscent of those 
found in slave ads and minstrel acts and only served to perpetuate dehumanizing stereotypes. 
Thus, organizations such as CORE turned their sights on the powerful representations that 
entered American living rooms through their televisions sets. They pressed both for integration 
and representation in television commercials and in media industries, targeting some of the 
largest and most prominent corporations to promote change. These campaigns were founded on 
the belief that advertising played a significant role in the oppression of blacks and that, given this 
power, could also serve to improve their conditions. The 1968 Kerner Commission report further 
implicated mass media in the persistent subordination of African Americans and argued that 
most white Americans were ignorant of the destructive conditions of the racial ghetto despite 
being deeply implicated in a system of oppression that created a pattern of social and economic 
disadvantage in these communities. 
 Scholars increasingly turned attention to media representations of African Americans. The 
use of “Negro market” specialists earlier in the century and the growth of black-owned agencies 
and media outlets into the 1970s had helped companies become more sophisticated in their 
communication with black consumers, and helped redefine images of African Americans and 
promote new concepts of the consumer market that aligned with overall social goals.1 But while 
research posted notable changes in the number and types of representations by the 1970s, some 
scholars and activists felt these changes merely represented shifts in racial stereotypes rather than 
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movement towards authentic representation of black life. Additionally, the long-standing debate 
continued over whether integration into mainstream advertising or targeting with images unique 
to African Americans was a more appropriate means to improved representation and justice. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 obliged government organizations to target blacks with their services, 
and many sought similar attention from the private sector. For some, targeting symbolized just 
the kind of deference that black activists had been seeking for decades, but others considered it 
reverse racism. 
 While targeting practices had the potential to provide more authentic and tailored 
representations, black communities were disproportionately targeted with “sin” products such as 
alcohol and tobacco that undermined positive values. While the consumer movement of the 
1970s took up issues pertaining to unethical targeting and advertising practices, it developed out 
of the white, middle-class and did not incorporate the voices of the heavily disadvantaged in 
poor, black and urban communities. As Andreasen pointed out, the oppression and exclusion to 
which African Americans were subjected throughout American history distinguished them in 
terms of the values they brought to the marketplace, and yet analysis of these communities 
tended to be derived from middle-class standards of rationality and stereotypes of the poor 
without proper understanding of the conditions of life in poor, black communities.2 
 Further, while the Civil Rights movement clearly had made tremendous gains towards 
equitable treatment and civil liberties, the social turbulence of the 1970s and the Vietnam War 
took a heavy toll on the poor. Black communities, in particular, shouldered much of the burden 
and became increasingly disenfranchised as economic and political practices leading into the 
1980s resulted in larger discrepancies between the “haves” and the “have nots.” In the wake of 
the Civil Rights movement and even in light of the development of positive forms of 
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representation, increasing educational opportunities and higher standards of living, more 
representation in elected bodies and in businesses for African Americans, many media images 
such as those found in blaxsploitation films of the 1970s remained problematic. Further, the 
imagery of conservative politics that began to take hold depicted African Americans as criminals 
and statistics on the number of incarcerated youth and stories and experiences of police brutality 
painted a dire picture of urban life. 
 Thus, many in the black community felt little protection from their government and for their 
civil liberties. The 1970s youth generation of African Americans was the first to grow up free of 
legalized segregation; yet many living in inner-cities failed to see in their own lives how the 
gains of the Civil Rights were realized for them. It was in these conditions that the cultural 
movement of hip-hop developed out of the streets of New York City in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Early hip-hop entrepreneurs believed hip-hop had the potential to change the lives of the 
otherwise disenfranchised. It offered an alternative to the gang warfare that had mired the streets 
as DJ’s “battled” out their problems lyrically and rhythmically. These early hip-hop artists were 
the bridge between Civil Rights and the hip-hop generation that they inspired. African American 
musical styles had long had influence over the sounds of American life. From jazz to rhythm and 
blues, the unique stylization of black music was integrated into the American experience, though 
often co-opted by white-owned businesses for financial gain. But in the beginning these young 
hip-hop artists exerted control over their own stylistic expressions and ultimate created an entire 
industry around these sounds. Hip hop was the manifestation of the unique, African American 
experience and in its early days offered a politicized voice that grew out of the hardship and 
disadvantage in their own communities and expressed rebellion against the social institutions that 
had long limited them. 
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 Thus, despite the development of some of hip hop’s more violent and sexist tendencies that 
drew a great deal of criticism throughout the 1980s and 1990s and tended to overshadow the 
social commentary that inspired the movement, hip hop culture and the organizations that arose 
out of it provided space to mobilize and empower disadvantaged and marginalized youth. It was 
not just a sound, but a culture and an aesthetic that dictated fashion and incorporated the style of 
sport most popular in the inner-cities—basketball.  
 As the hip hop movement grew, so did another, at-the-time completely disconnected but 
equally important part of this story—Nike. There are clear distinctions between Nike’s early 
days as a running shoe company and the image that developed after Nike entered the basketball 
arena on Michael Jordan. Phil Knight’s original business plan was based on the concept of 
manufacturing shoes overseas at lower costs and selling them in the United States at competitive 
costs; but it was also based on the ideas of shoe technology and performance, as epitomized in 
the influence of Bill Bowerman. The original market for shoes was high school and track team 
members, and even once Nike was outfitting the trend-setting fashion elite they maintained in 
their discourse a commitment to the serious athlete. Indeed, the company was established by 
athletes, sports enthusiasts and with the influence of the competitive spirit of sport. By the early 
1980s, the company had championed numerous victories in the sports and business worlds. They 
had made a successful public offering and had witnessed Olympic athletes cross the finish line 
with the swoosh on their feet.  
 The company sales growth was rapid in the early years, in large part due to the 1970s jogging 
and fitness revolution that was in no small measure inspired by Bowerman’s passion for track 
and field and his communication of the jogging phenomenon to the American public. But growth 
was so rapid that the company’s internal structure and their ability to meet market demand could 
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not keep up with the rapid changes that accompany such development. The company was faced 
with numerous financial and supply problems in the early days and by the early 1980s was facing 
structural problems and internal struggles, not to mention a very public oversight of the aerobics 
market. Thus, despite a move towards a national branding campaign for the 1984 Olympics, 
Nike was facing dire circumstances. They made several risky but strategic decisions to try to 
improve their position, including withdrawing from many of their endorsement deals and 
concentrating instead on a lining up a team of superstar endorsers. It was at this time and in the 
midst of great turmoil and their first-ever documented losses that Nike made an unprecedented 
endorsement deal with a rising basketball star, Michael Jordan. 
 While Nike did not anticipate the kind of success they would achieve with Jordan, and while 
their decision was a strategic business move as they worked to expand into the sport of 
basketball and as they faced potential takeover or demise, this relationship cannot be separated 
from the broader historical and social circumstances in which it existed. First, basketball was a 
sport that had become popular in urban areas, only requiring a ball and a goal and serving as a 
place for recreation and of social exchange. Further, while sport was one of those arenas in 
American life where African Americans were able to make significant inroads, these were hard-
won.  Jackie Robinson had signed with the Brooklyn Dodgers in the 1940s and helped pave the 
way for future African American athletes in mainstream sport like Michael Jordan and Bo 
Jackson. But as history demonstrates this was at the expense of black leagues, and even through 
the 1980s discriminatory practices in sport were evident. In the endorsement game, popular black 
figures such as Bill Cosby, Michael Jackson, Ray Charles, Whitney Houston and others had 
prominent commercial deals in the 1970s and 1980s, but none would rival the kind of 
achievement realized by Michael Jordan and Nike in terms of cultural impact.  
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 Nike gave Jordan his own line and a strong stake in its success. In an unprecedented move 
for a team sport player, Nike built an entire program around Jordan. According to popular 
accounts, “They are the hottest selling shoes in the world, because of one man.”3 As is elaborated 
in previous chapters, a complex set of forces impacted the meaning instilled in the shoe: the 
winged goddess of victory that epitomized the spirit of sport and business competition, the air 
technology, the fat checkmark that became known as the swoosh, the swoosh of a Jordan net 
shot, the original image of a winged shoe, the wholesome image of Jordan in contrast to his 
aggressive and graceful style of play, and the outrageous colors of the shoe and the NBA’s 
response—the collision of both strategic and fortuitous circumstances and, I argue, a cultural 
moment at which the urban African American community was searching for and developing 
ways of conceptualizing their identity in a post-Civil Rights world—led to the creation of a hero, 
an idol and an icon of American possibility and of the complex processes of meaning in a 
multicultural and diverse landscape. 
 As the previous chapters demonstrate, by the early 1990s the shoes had become implicated 
not only in the symbolism of American possibility, opportunity and growth, but also of a 
continuing and historically-situated racialized system of violence. Media critics who drew 
attention to the “sneaker killings” did so out of an implicit concern that Nike, Michael Jordan, 
and Spike Lee had an influence uniquely on inner-city black consumers such that they were 
vulnerable to the advertising messages and through these messages compelled to buy over-priced 
shoes that they did not need. These media critics never addressed young, white consumers who 
may not have been any more privileged financially and who certainly were Nike consumers; 
further, they did not account for the multiple ways in which inner-city black consumers, 
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themselves, had fashioned much of the meaning for Nike and many other brands. As Erin Patton 
argued of the hip-hop generation and Nike’s targeting practices: 
“These innovators looked at these brands as, I’m gonna create in and around it 
and I’m gonna adopt it and utilize that product in a way the utility of that product 
is going to be a little different from me than the others. At the end of the day that 
reverberating impact ultimately sent a signal out into the masses and that’s sort of 
the notion of, you know, under the influence and the influence that this audience 
had… In my entire time at Nike I can’t think of one meeting I was in and 
someone said, you know, we gotta get these inner-city urban consumers to adopt 
the brand. I mean, Nike’s a performance-oriented company and the design 
aesthetic makes it appealing and the aura, the halo of the brand and the athletes 
and the celebrities that all got tossed in a pot and shuffed up together made it what 
it was but there was never really an overt attempt to actively kind of create a false 
sense of identity or challenge the value system too much.”4 
Nor did the argument made by Phil Mushnick and other critics of Nike, Mike and Spike account 
for the history of economic and market battles that the African American community had waged 
for well over a century to find recognition, inclusion and positive representation in consumer 
environments as part of a civil rights agenda. Nor did they account for the multiple ways, 
whether well-intentioned or not, that concern over the consumption practices of poor, black 
consumers had interpreted into judgments of their buying practices that were based on value 
systems of middle-class white consumers. 
 Thus, it is not surprising that Mushnick and fellow critics had their own share of critics. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the voices of those who spoke out against Mushnick were from both 
within and outside of the marketing and advertising community and popular press. These critics 
of the critics argued that the notion that Nike, Jordan and Lee were manipulating inner-city 
consumers was either insinuated or outright racism. Spokespeople for Nike pointed out that it 
would be racist, instead, for the company to neglect black consumers and not target them 
because of presumed vulnerability espoused by the critics. History supports this assertion and for 
many years black communities sought the very kind of targeting for which Nike was being 
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criticized because, among other things, it represented regard for their market power. Further, 
some observers suggested a caveat emptor approach under the expectation that inner-city, black 
consumers would be capable, as most consumers are, of critically examining the situation. 
Indeed, research demonstrates the savvy of inner-city consumers in discerning market claims,5 
and the story of Nike demonstrates that members of this community were not simply recipients 
of marketing messages but rather they were active participants in its brand equity. 
 Unfortunately, though, the latter arguments do not account for the structures of power, formal 
and informal, through which inner-city consumers had to navigate in their daily and consumer 
lives. Ultimately, the media commentary failed to provide a nuanced understanding of markets 
and of consumers, offering instead either paternalistic assertions about proper behavior in the 
marketplace or withdrawing responsibility completely from the equation. Even those reports that 
presented multiple viewpoints and recognized the complexity of the situation, such as Telander’s 
Sports Illustrated article, still failed to provide a foundation on which to move forward and 
improve our understanding of vulnerability and responsibility. Further, scholarship in consumer 
vulnerability and responsibility does not provide an adequate framework for examining the 
complex circumstances and diverse audiences involved in the history of Nike and the “sneaker 
killings.” I argue that a dialogic ethics, as the one presented in Chapter 6, can provide such a 
framework. 
 Dialogic ethics places the interpretive domain of human nature in a position of primacy. In 
this interpretive domain, audiences have a constitutive role in the development of meaning. A 
Freireian stance on dialogic ethics requires that we acknowledge and respect the historical 
processes of meaning. Likewise, the history presented in the preceding chapters points to the 
importance of the historical process and the values through which it is defined. For example, the 
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concept of vulnerability has been historically situated such that vulnerability has been associated 
with particular populations that have been oppressed, suppressed and stereotyped. At the same 
time, we recognize that through the very same systems of power that have oppressed, suppressed 
and stereotyped, those populations have also been disadvantaged. That is, as we understand from 
Freire, in naming the world we make it so. Further, by examining the history of African 
Americans and consumption and advertising, we better understand the complexities of the swell 
of meaning in the Nike brand and that the circumstances of the “sneaker killings” are different 
from and more than the critics would have us believe in suggesting that this is the result of a big 
corporation manipulating vulnerable consumers to overspend for products that they cannot afford 
and do not need. 
 Further, Freire’s dialogic ethics is bound in the cross-cultural existence of our shared 
humanness; it is not monologic. It is grounded in an understanding of how communities operate; 
we exist in “relation or dialogue with community.”6 We are liberated in our humanness through 
dialogue. Suppression of dialogue, then, is an attempt to dehumanize. From such a stance, we ask 
different questions than from other approaches such as the utilitarian one often found in the 
context of American market systems. Specifically, we must ask whether a communication is a 
true dialogue such that it enables critical consciousness to develop and empowers the listener to 
name the world. Alternatively, we must ask whether the voice of the communicator represents 
the language of oppression. 
 There were many voices in the history presented in previous chapters. I will elaborate on two 
to articulate the point of dialogic ethics and propose an understanding of vulnerability and 
responsibility. The first is the voice of the audience and, in these circumstances specifically, the 
voice of the African American, urban audience. Despite centuries of degradation and hardship, 
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the African American community found multiple outlets through which to name and thereby 
transform the world. Through the early newspapers and publications, early African American 
businesses and advertising agencies, the formation of organizations and activist groups, support 
of prominent black leaders, to music, dialect, aesthetics, sport and style, and in the culture of hip 
hop, African Americans have named the world.  
 This does not devalue the important impact of years of oppression, segregation, and 
derogatory language and imagery that black Americans suffered as attempts to dehumanize 
them. Rather, it demonstrates the strength of their efforts towards empowerment. The early hip 
hop movement developed out of the language in urban streets and reflected on this world. Its 
messages were critically engaged in a dialogic encounter in a very literal sense through the 
conversation of lyrical “wars.” Socially conscious hip hop provided an alternative to gang 
warfare and a positive outlet for the expression of frustrations. It would not alleviate the many 
pressures of the street and so we cannot neglect to recognize the power structures within which 
hip hop formed, but it was an expression of meaning that was heard, as it grew, by the world. But 
because liberation requires freedom from oppression and not just a reversal of power, we cannot 
consider other forms of hip hop that developed violent and sexist tendencies, to be expressions of 
true dialogic encounter. Further, if we concede that the hip hop culture and generation engaged 
in instilling meaning in the Nike brand as part of their cultural expression and demonstration of 
participation in the consumer world, then we also understand them as sharing responsibility for 
that meaning. Therefore, when we examine circumstances that are unacceptable to us as moral 
beings, such as murder in the name of a pair of shoes, and we recognize a problem with the 
privileging of consumption over other values such as the value of human life, we look to those 
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constitutive of that meaning to assess responsibility. This brings me to a second voice—that of 
communication of Nike, Michael Jordan and Spike Lee. 
 Nike, as a large corporation with billions of dollars and the ability to mass communicate, is in 
a position of power. The decision makers at Nike have responsibilities to their employees, to 
their shareholders, to the brand and to a variety of other stakeholders including their audiences. If 
we take the position, as dialogic ethics allows us to do, that transparency is an important 
determinant of the ethicality of an advertising message, and we understand that audiences are 
savvy and understand the conventions of advertising such as irony and humor, then we are left 
with little room to argue that Nike’s advertising in and of itself was unethical. But we also must 
ask whether their messages enabled critical consciousness and empowered the listeners. In the 
context of the history of African Americans and advertising, Nike’s collaboration with Michael 
Jordan and Spike Lee was groundbreaking in so far as they provided a venue for positive, 
empowered representations of African Americans on a scale not previously known. Spike Lee, as 
he had done through his movies representing urban life, brought the language and style of the 
inner-city to mainstream advertising. As an icon in American and black culture and, as many felt, 
a positive role model, Michael was in a position of power. But he acknowledged the 
responsibility that came with it: “It’s a scary responsibility. It’s a responsibility that I really 
didn’t’ ask for but it was bestowed upon me and I have graciously accepted it.”7  There were 
those who wanted Jordan to insist that Nike lower the price of their shoes or refuse to endorse 
them. But such a request does not account for the systems of meaning and limitations in the 
market. We legitimately can criticize the company for failing to hire African American 
employees at that time, but we must also recognize that Nike heard the voices of criticism and 
responded.8 Further, Nike vehemently denied being the cause of “sneaker killings.” As part of 
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the system of meaning, they are not without responsibility; they accepted it implicitly, though, by 
listening and responding to the voices of criticism by implementing a number of advertising and 
community-based measures—such as the stay in school advertising and the P.L.A.Y. program—
to help empower the black community. Granted, they spoke to them through the language of 
commercialization and sport, but they did so in dialogue with and through the black community. 
They also did so within the larger systems of power and limitations in the market.  
 These are two of the multiple parties and circumstances that constitute the discourse of Nike 
and of the “sneaker killings.” For example, we might question the reports of Nike’s market 
relationship with drug dealers and gangs. However, anecdotal reports that Nike courted the 
business of drug dealers are not the basis on which to make a strong argument. Further, we might 
consider to what extent we can consider gun-wielding criminals “vulnerable” to the messages of 
advertising. We might also look to those in the media who sensationalized the events of violent 
crime over sneakers. 
 But ultimately, the argument that I propose remains consistent on these points. We cannot 
accept circumstances in which lives are taken in the name of possessing material goods. But to 
suggest that this happens because Nike manipulates vulnerable, inner-city consumers is 
simplistic and neglects the struggles and history of African Americans and the dialogic encounter 
that occurs through one of the most pervasive symbol systems of contemporary society—the 
market system, including advertising. I propose a dialogic ethics as a framework for 
understanding vulnerability and responsibility in consumer environments. As Freire helps us to 
understand, our humanity is bound in dialogue. Dialogue requires co-participation. The naming 
of groups as vulnerable through sweeping generalizations neglects to empower the oppressed by 
giving them voice in the encounter. When definitions of vulnerability are instituted in cultural 
  
270 
and social structures of meaning without appropriate respect for and discourse with those so-
named, then we risk instituting a culture of silence from the oppressed or “vulnerable.” This 
dehumanizes the oppressed and diffuses the structures of accountability that come with 
liberation. Instead, we must engage in true dialogue that accepts multiple voices, presents 
message that enable critical consciousness and empowers the participants, acknowledges the 
historical circumstances of our language in discourse, and promotes our humanness, which we 
find in relation to others. 
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